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ABSTRACT 
 
This MPhil thesis is a case study of the British 21st Infantry Division on the Western Front 
during the First World War. It examines the progress of the division, analysing the learning 
curve of tactical evolution that some historians maintain was experienced by the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF). 
 
  21st Division was a New Army division, typical of those raised after the declaration of 
war, and its performance throughout the war may be regarded as indicative of the progress or 
otherwise of these units within the BEF. 
 
The conclusions are drawn through an assessment of 21st Division in four battles 
during the war. The achievements of the division are analysed using a series of performance 
indicators, taking into account variables such as the weather, the terrain, and the enemy. The 
relative successes and failures of 21st Division at each of these battles demonstrates the extent 
of tactical evolution and the smoothness or otherwise of the learning curve both during and by 
the end of the war.  
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Abbreviations and Definitions 
 
ANZAC Australia and New Zealand Army Corps. 
  
Battery A group of six guns or howitzers. 
  
Bde. Brigade. 
  
BEF British Expeditionary Force. 
  
BGGS Brigadier-General, General Staff. The most senior staff 
officer in a corps.  
  
BGRA Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery. The most senior gunner 
in a division. 
  
Bn. / Bttn. Battalion. 
  
CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 
  
C-in-C Commander in Chief. 
  
CRA Commander, Royal Artillery. The most senior gunner officer 
attached to a formation.  
  
CRE Commander, Royal Engineers. The most senior engineer 
officer attached to a formation. 
  
CSM Company Sergeant Major. 
  
DA & QMG Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General; effectively the  
senior staff position in a battalion, usually a captain. 
  
Enfilade To fire down a trench or at a row of men lengthways, rather 
than crosswise. A particularly lethal way of firing, as it is far 
less likely that bullets or shells will fall short or over their 
target. In addition, the target itself is denser – a row of 50 
men, one deep, is equivalent to a column of 50 when 
enfiladed. 
  
FOO Forward Observation Officer for artillery batteries. 
  
GHQ General Headquarters; the headquarters of the Commander-
in-Chief. 
  
GOC General Officer Commanding. 
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GSO1 General Staff Officer – the number indicates seniority,  
1 being the most senior. 
  
Gun High velocity artillery piece with a flat trajectory; seldom 
fired at an angle greater than 20°. 
  
HE High Explosive. 
  
Howitzer An artillery piece firing a heavier projectile at a lower 
velocity than a gun of a similar calibre, and at a higher angle. 
Can be fired with a variable charge. 
  
IWM Imperial War Museum 
  
KiA Killed in action. 
  
Lewis Gun The standard light machine-gun of the British army. It 
weighed 26lb (unloaded) and could be fired by one man, but 
several more were required to carry drums of ammunition. It 
had an unfortunate tendency to jam in wet and dirty 
conditions, of which there were no shortage on the Western 
Front. 
  
MGGS Major-General, General Staff; the senior staff officer in an 
Army. 
  
MGRA Major-General, Royal Artillery; the senior gunner in an 
Army. 
  
MiA Missing in action. 
  
MiD Mentioned in Despatches. 
  
NCO Non-commissioned Officer, such as a corporal or sergeant. 
  
OH The Official History of the Great War, Military Operations – 
France and Flanders, compiled by Edmonds. 
  
OP Observation Post. 
  
ORs Other Ranks; soldiers who are not officers, including NCOs.  
  
Picquet / piquet Soldier on outpost sentry duty; also, stake or similar 
contrivance to support barbed wire. 
  
PRO Public Record Office, Kew. 
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RA Royal Artillery. 
  
RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps. Also known as Rob All My 
Comrades, due to the propensity of orderlies to steal from 
sleeping or unconscious patients. 
  
RE Royal Engineers. 
  
RFA Royal Field Artillery; responsible for batteries and guns 
within an infantry division. 
  
RFC Royal Flying Corps; converted into the RAF with effect from 
1 April 1918. 
  
RH & RFA Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery; the ‘umbrella’ 
formation to which gunners were recruited. 
  
RSM Regimental Sergeant Major. 
  
SAA small arms ammunition. 
  
Shrapnel Type of artillery shell filled with small lead balls, which 
would spray forwards and downwards with lethal effect upon 
the shell bursting. 
  
Stokes Mortar Light mortar, consisting of a smooth-bore tube, resting on a 
baseplate and supported by a bipod. 
  
Verey Light A type of flare, fired from a bras pistol and used to illuminate 
No-Man’s Land at night, or for signalling purposes. 
  
Vickers gun The standard heavy machine-gun of the British army. Unlike 
the Lewis Gun, the Vickers was water cooled, and given that 
it also weighed over 88lb, it was far less mobile. Its use of 
ammunition in belts meant that it could be fired for far longer 
than the Lewis, and it had a greater range. However, it 
required a team of ten men to carry the gun, its mounting, 
water and ammunition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last twenty years the historiography of the British Army on the Western Front has 
been rewritten. Around the sixtieth anniversary of the Armistice there emerged a new strand 
of historical analysis, focusing on the development of tactics and technologies – in other 
words, how and by what methods did the British Army win the Great War?1 The first work to 
tackle this subject was Firepower, the 1982 collaboration between Shelford Bidwell and 
Dominick Graham. They began with the assertion that the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 
had to move from its traditional impression of itself and of its actions, and demonstrated, 
through the artillery arm, the BEF’s rapid and near-continuous adoption of new tactics and 
weaponry, both on an unprecedented scale. They suggest that it was the absorption of this new 
type of warfare, along with the experience gleaned by the BEF towards the integration of all 
arms, that finally achieved victory in 1918. With Firepower originates the detailed study of 
the technological developments of the war and the practical application of this new 
technology to achieve victory – tactics. 
 
 The Canadian Tim Travers was among the first progenitors of this new, operational 
genre. In The Killing Ground (1987) he described the developing dichotomy between 
differing historians of the war. He cited the ‘mud and blood’ school of thought on the one side 
– those who blamed the problems of the Western Front on the internal failings of the British 
Army itself and its High Command in particular – and on the other he placed historians who 
laid more import on external factors – primarily the continual emergence of new weaponry 
                                                 
1 See Ian Beckett, ‘Revisiting the Old Front Line – The Historiography of the Great War since 1984’, in Stand 
To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, 49 (April 1995), pp. 12-15; J.M. Bourne, ‘Goodbye to All 
That? Recent Writing on the Great War’, in Twentieth Century British History, 1 (1) (1990), pp. 87-100; Keith 
Simpson, ‘An Annotated Bibliography of the British Army 1914-1918’, in Ian Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), 
A Nation in Arms - A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1985), pp. 238-65. 
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and tactics, plus the actions and abilities of the German Army. Travers sought to establish a 
middle ground between these opposing camps, arguing that British generalship was marked 
by a reluctance to abandon traditional pre-war ideas and values, lacking the doctrinal 
approach of the Germans. The period 1900 to 1918 marked a transitional phase for the British 
Army as technology replaced ‘the offensive spirit’ as the arbiter of victory. Travers’ second 
book on the subject, How the War was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army 
on the Western Front 1917-1918 (1992), examines the degree to which the British Army as a 
whole had withstood the strain of two years of modern, industrial war, and the importance or 
otherwise of new technologies and their absorption into the existing army structure in 
achieving victory in 1918.2
 
 There followed a proliferation of works following Travers’ lead. Two American 
authors, Bruce Gudmundsson, in Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army 1914-
18 (1989) and On Artillery (1993), and Martin Samuels, in Doctrine and Dogma: British and 
German Infantry Tactics in the First World War (1992), attempted to demonstrate how the 
British Army rose to the challenges imposed by the war by comparing its progress to that of 
the Germans. Both authors reached the similar conclusion that the British Army was 
characterised by its “unsubtle and inflexible approach to battle. Having once adopted this 
approach, it proved virtually impossible to alter it. The whole system of training produced 
soldiers and officers unused to independent thought, men unable to develop a more dynamic 
doctrine or put it into practice.”3 In contrast, the Canadian Bill Rawling’s study, Surviving 
                                                 
2 Travers’ work has, however, been shown in recent studies to be deeply flawed on a number of issues. See, for 
example, Peter Simkins, ‘Somme Reprise: Reflections on the Fighting for Albert and Bapaume, August 1918’ in 
Brian Bond, ed., Look to Your Front – Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military 
History (Staplehurst: Spellmount Ltd., 1999), pp. 147-162. 
 
3 Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War (Westport: 
Prager, 1992), p. 223. 
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Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps 1914-1918 (1992), which can equally 
be applied to the ‘citizen army’ that became the BEF, composed largely of men previously 
devoid in military experience, demonstrates how troops were forced to learn from their 
difficult and often-horrendous situation how to adapt both their equipment and their tactics to 
the unexpected and complex face of industrial warfare.  
 
 Another notable contributor to the historiography of the Great War is Paddy Griffith. 
His incisive analysis, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack 
1916-1918 (1994), emphasises the significance of Britain’s victory over the Germans, and 
argues that this was achieved through attack and not defence. Griffith stresses that the British 
Army learnt from the failure of its improvised tactics and technologies during the first half of 
the war and was able to apply this accrued knowledge and experience in the final two years of 
the war until, during the Hundred Days campaign of 1918, it was achieving a level of skill 
and mobility seldom equalled, even in the Second World War. Griffith also points out the 
misconceptions about the British Army’s learning process during the war, emphasising not its 
perceived amateurism, but the mechanisms established by GHQ for the rapid dissemination 
and distribution of tactical lessons learnt during the conflict. This line of argument was 
continued in British Fighting Methods in the Great War (1996), a collection of essays edited 
by Griffith, which sought to emphasise the encouragement by GHQ of tactical and 
technological development and the lengths it went to disseminate tactical lessons learnt from 
each operation. One of the contributors to this collection was Peter Simkins, whose ‘British 
Divisions in the Hundred Days’ set out to destroy the myth that the British formations were 
perceived as inferior to their Dominion counterparts, and were seldom trusted with difficult or 
strategically important attacks. Simkins’ findings are particularly significant to the divisional 
debate: by analysing the results of nearly one thousand assaults made during the Hundred 
 3 
 
Days, he demonstrates not only that success rates by British divisions were on a par with 
Dominion formations but also that the British troops bore by far the heaviest burden: 
Far from being the ‘bluntest of swords’ or a mere supporting cast the British 
divisions in the ‘Hundred Days’, in spite of the crises they had experienced earlier 
in the year, actually made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.4
 
One of the most important recent additions to the tactical debate is Robin Prior and 
Trevor Wilson’s study of Sir Henry Rawlinson, Command on the Western Front (1992). This 
was one of the first attempts to bridge the gap between the analysis of high command and the 
experience of the man on the ground. Prior and Wilson’s original intention was to show how 
Rawlinson, who began his career on the Western Front as a divisional commander and rose to 
command an Army, and who had a prominent involvement in many important offensives, 
particularly the Somme campaign, absorbed the lessons of the war and used them to guide his 
Fourth Army to striking victory in 1918. However, their research shows Rawlinson as an 
inconsistent learner, failing to develop a methodical operational procedure, and that his role in 
1918 was of considerably less importance than in 1916. Rawlinson adopted more the role of a 
team co-ordinator, with his subordinates, all experts in their fields, undertaking the task of 
planning offensives.5 This decentralisation of command is indicative of the British Army as a 
whole, showing how with flexibility and initiative the BEF was able to attack with success in 
                                                 
4 Peter Simkins, ‘Co-Stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions in the ‘Hundred Days’, 1918’, in Paddy Griffith 
(ed.), British Fighting Methods in the Great War (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 57. His reference of ‘the bluntest 
of swords’ is a scathing remark made by the controversial Denis Winter, Haig’s Command: A Reassessment 
(London: Viking, 1991), p. 150. 
 
5 However, it is debatable as to whether Rawlinson was an “inconsistent learner”, particularly given that Fourth 
Army had relatively little to do in 1917, and that he hardly put a foot wrong in 1918. His defence of Amiens at 
Villers Bretonneux in April was very skilful in view of his slender resources, whilst Fourth Army’s attacks at 
Hamel, Amiens and on the Hindenburg Line were among the outstanding achievements of the war, representing 
the apogee of the BEF’s tactical and technological improvements. In addition, these last named battles were set-
pieces, meaning that Rawlinson inevitably had a role in their planning or co-ordination, displaying arguably a 
much greater sureness of touch than he had in 1916. 
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1918, reinforcing success rather than prolonging wasteful attacks on strongly-held positions – 
the “entirely appropriate use of available resources”.6
 
 Running alongside these debates has been a detailed analysis of the extraordinary 
‘citizen army’ which became the BEF and the society from which it sprung. The ‘war and 
society’ approach attempted to place the war and the British Army that fought it in a wider, 
socio-economic context, hoping to find explanations for the Army’s record within this 
context. This approach received much attention during the 1980s, the best of which included 
A Nation in Arms (1985) edited by Ian Beckett and Keith Simpson, The Politics of Manpower, 
1914-1918 by Keith Grieves, and Kitchener’s Army by Peter Simkins (both 1988).  
 
 These books are but a handful of the huge volume of important works on the Great 
War. Many others are listed in the bibliography that concludes this thesis. And, as another 
historian has pointed out,  
one perhaps may be forgiven for thinking that there is nothing left to be said. This 
is not the case. Volume is not a measure of quality. There have been many recent 
books about the war which display ability and insight. But there have been many 
more which seek only to exploit the public’s seemingly endless fascination with 
military trivia and are content to repeat uncritically… assumptions and 
prejudices.7
 
The Great War was a monumental event in world history. The achievement of the 
British Army and its endurance in accomplishing victory was remarkable. The fact that the 
war and the army that fought it are so little understood almost trivialises the struggle and 
sacrifice of those who took part. This thesis intends to add to and enhance the current 
historical research arguing that the British Army on the Western Front did not undertake a 
                                                 
6 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front – The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 390. 
 
7 J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. vii.  
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series of misjudged and futile offensives, fought by heroic boys and commanded by ignorant, 
incompetent generals, but was a force that achieved much after its humble beginnings as a 
citizen army – the defeat of the major military power in the world at that time. 
 
The Place of the Division within the Tactical Debate 
 
The British Expeditionary Force in France during the Great War was co-ordinated from 
General Headquarters (GHQ) and led by the Commander-in-Chief. Under his control were 
eventually five Armies, 22 Corps and upwards of 61 Infantry Divisions, including the 
Dominion forces. The Army and Corps level of command, reporting to and under the 
guidance of GHQ, were primarily concerned with operational planning and strategy, leaving 
the question of tactics to the subordinate level of command – the division. In the light of the 
continuing debate over tactical development and evolution, it is the divisional unit that 
promises the most from extensive and detailed study. Co-ordinated in turn at Army and Corps 
level, the division was the largest fighting unit to enter into battle as a homogenous force.8 
Furthermore, the division was a self-contained unit, comprising by 1918 three infantry 
brigades of four battalions, although the restructuring during the winter of 1917-1918 due to 
the losses of the Third Ypres campaign and an increasingly alarming shortage in manpower 
                                                 
8 Divisions, unlike Corps and Armies, tried to maintain a continuity of serving units, keeping the same brigades 
and battalions fighting alongside each other. Although preferable to the constant switch of units, this practise 
was by no means regulation, as subordinate units were often switched between divisions, as in the case of 110th 
Brigade (see below, p. 14), and many other divisions also had brigades or battalions switched. Most Territorial 
units remained largely exclusive in composition, particularly in 1916, but many Regular divisions found their 
numbers diluted by Kitchener forces and vice versa. In addition, several divisions were partly or even wholly 
reconstituted after the 1918 Spring Offensive had decimated many units. In fact, the only truly homogenous units 
in the BEF were the Canadian Corps which, from its establishment in May 1915, maintained the same four 
Canadian divisions as its serving units; and the Australian Corps, which was only established in the summer of 
1918 after the promotion of John Monash to its command.  
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reduced many brigades to only three battalions.9 Other units serving alongside these brigades 
included a battalion of the Machine Gun Corps, three field companies of Royal Engineers, a 
signals company, a pioneer battalion, logistical troops, three field ambulance units, veterinary 
services, and a divisional artillery of four field artillery brigades, each comprising four 
batteries, and a trench mortar battery. This self-contained unit of the division clearly offers 
much scope for operational analysis: large enough to study as a miniature version of the BEF, 
but not so large as to be overwhelming, and generally composed of the same smaller units 
within the war (unlike the Armies and Corps which rotated their units) thus enabling a 
comparative analysis of the division against itself in different operations. 
 
Despite the obvious merits of divisional study, however, there are very few in the 
Great War literature. The SHLM Project, established by leading historians at the Imperial War 
Museum, was intended to create a comprehensive database of the BEF divisions, rating them 
individually and against each other according to a series of performance indicators including 
variables such as weather, terrain, the enemy, and so on, using much the same criteria as this 
study.10 This monumental and ambitious undertaking has, however, sadly fallen by the 
wayside, with its contributors being distracted by other projects.11 There are similar studies to 
this one currently in progress; postgraduate colleagues here at Birmingham University are 
                                                 
9 For general understanding of the various infantry formations of the BEF, there were 14 men to a Section, 
commanded by a corporal; four Sections, plus an officer, sergeant, runner and batman, to a Platoon; four 
Platoons to a Company, usually commanded by a captain; four Companies to a Battalion, commanded by a 
Lieutenant-Colonel; four Battalions to an infantry Brigade, commanded by a Brigadier-General; and three 
infantry Brigades to a Division, commanded by a Major-General. There were upwards of two Divisions within a 
Corps, although the usual number was three, but there was no established standard of Corps within an Army. 
 
10 The founders, Peter Simkins, Bryn Hammond, John Lee and Chris McCarthy, gave their initials to the 
project’s title, although the indication that this is solely an IWM project is misleading – John Lee is not 
connected to the museum. For a fuller picture see John Lee, ‘The SHLM Project – Assessing the Battle 
Performance of British Divisions’ in Griffith ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War, pp. 175-181.  
 
11 I am informed, however, that the SHLM Project is “only comatose, not dead”, and that plans to revive it are 
currently in progress. Simkins, e-mail to the author, 9 October 2000. 
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researching 8th, 25th, 38th (Welsh) and 46th (North Midland) Divisions, in line with the Abbots 
Way project led by John Bourne, and 16th (Irish) and 55th Divisions are being studied 
elsewhere. Similar work has been undertaken by Gary Sheffield of the Joint Services 
Command and Staff College, and by Terence Denman and Nicholas Perry in Ireland. It seems 
clear that divisional studies represent a different tangent from those currently in progress, 
which are primarily tactical evolution, the study of various arms of the BEF, and the 
vilification or exoneration of the British High Command. In order to obtain a well-rounded 
impression of the British Army in the Great War it is axiomatic that all the various branches 
of historical research should be assessed alongside each other. The importance of divisional 
study is that, as a miniature version of the BEF, it should demonstrate the varying degrees of 
tactical evolution and the competence or otherwise of command within the British Army 
during the Great War. 
 
The choice of division for study was based on certain criteria. Firstly, it seemed 
appropriate to examine a New Army division, in that the study of a previously non-existent 
division and charting its progress through the war has more potential than a unit with a 
historical record, an existing ethos and, above all, experience. Whilst the fate of a New Army 
division alongside a Regular or a Territorial unit would be an interesting and necessary 
comparison for future research, this is probably more suited to a Doctoral thesis. This first 
criterion therefore eliminated the first eight divisions, all Regular troops; the Guards Division, 
which was formed in France from the Guards of the other Regular divisions; 27th to 29th 
Divisions, also Regulars; and 42nd to 66th Divisions, excluding 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, 
which were Territorial units.12  
                                                 
12 For a clearer picture of the organisation of the BEF, see Brigadier E.A. James, British Regiments 1914-1918 
(East Sussex: The Naval and Military Press, Ltd., 1998), Appendix to Part II.  
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 Secondly, the division needed to have spent its entire active service on the Western 
Front, as it is this theatre of the war that is the prime field of contemporary research. This 
second factor excluded 11th Division, which served in Gallipoli; 22nd and 26th Divisions, 
which only served on the Western Front for one month; 23rd Division, which served in Italy 
for the last year of the war; and 74th  (Yeomanry) and 75th Divisions, the former of which only 
arrived in France in May 1918, having previously served in Palestine. 
 
 Thirdly, and on a personal note, it seemed unsuitable to study a division which already 
had a written history, as this thesis was to be analytical rather than narrative, and an existing 
account of the division’s actions may have hindered the analytical process. This eliminated  
19 of the remaining 27 divisions,13 leaving 14th (Light), 21st, 24th, 31st (despite earlier service 
in Egypt, the division fought in France from March 1916), 32nd, 39th, 41st and 63rd (Royal 
Naval) Divisions.  
 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an interesting series of actions and operations 
would seem to be a prerequisite for detailed analysis. Of the remaining seven divisions, 14th 
(Light) Division did not attack on the Somme, but merely held the line, as at Ypres in 1917, 
although it was extremely successful at Arras earlier in that year, and was so decimated by the 
Spring Offensive that it was reduced to a cadre in order to supervise construction work; 24th 
Division suffered a ‘baptism of fire’ at Loos in 1915, generally failed at Delville Wood on the 
Somme, on the Canadians’ flank at Vimy, and at the Gheluvelt Plateau at (Third) Ypres, and 
was only involved in the Hundred Days from October 1918; 31st Division failed entirely on 
the Somme, was barely in action during 1917, and spent 1918 following-up the German 
                                                 
13 These were 9th (Scottish), 12th (Eastern), 15th (Scottish), 16th (Irish), 17th (Northern), 18th (Eastern), 19th 
(Western), 20th(Light), 23rd, 25th, 29th, 30th 33rd, 34th, 35th (Bantam), 36th (Ulster), 37th, 38th (Welsh) and 40th 
Divisions.  
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withdrawals in the autumn; 32nd Division was decimated on 1 July 1916, had a minor but 
costly action on the Ancre in November 1916, and seldom saw action thereafter until the 
Spring Offensive, although it spearheaded Fourth Army’s assault in the Hundred Days; 39th 
Division was heavily involved on the Thiepval Ridge during the autumn of 1916 and attacked 
three times east of Ypres the following autumn, but saw little action after being decimated by 
the Spring Offensive; 41st Division was not engaged on the Somme until September 1916, 
attacked successfully at Messines in June 1917 and led Second Army’s advance during the 
Hundred Days; 63rd (Royal Naval) Division were engaged in the Antwerp and Gallipoli 
operations in the early part of the war, had only a brief involvement on the Somme, were 
unsuccessful at Arras and only held the line at Passchendaele in 1917, and only played a 
minor role in the final advance in 1918.14  
 
21st Division 
 
21st Division’s service on the Western Front is possibly unique, in that it fought in every 
major British offensive from its ‘baptism of fire’ at Loos in the autumn of 1915. This also 
made it one of the first New Army Divisions to go into battle. The division entrained in 
France in early September 1915; within three weeks it had been deployed as one of two 
reserve divisions at the battle of Loos. Marching every day for a fortnight, the division 
arrived, exhausted and soaking, at La Buissiere at 6 a.m., to be met at 6.40 a.m. with orders to 
advance into the battle area at 6.30 a.m.15 The division suffered enormous casualties at Loos – 
                                                 
14 I am grateful to Peter Simkins and his ‘Assessment of the Divisions on the Western Front 1914-1918’ 
(unpublished) for much of this information. Both he and Paddy Griffith have conducted extensive research into 
the relative merits of British divisions on the Western Front. See Simkins, ‘Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British 
Divisions in “The Hundred Days”, 1918’ in Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War, pp. 50-69; 
and Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front – The British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (London: Yale 
University Press, 1994), pp. 80-82. 
 
15 21st Division War Diary, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) WO 95 / 2128. 
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4,051, including 33 officers and 219 other ranks killed, and a total of 2,400 wounded.16 
Lieutenant J.H. Alcock, a subaltern in 8th Lincolnshire, 63rd Brigade, writing in a POW camp 
after his capture at Loos, noted the fates of other officers in his battalion: of the twenty-nine 
serving at that time, he recorded twenty-two as being “taken out” of the war. “The remaining 
officers… were left behind as a reserve and, so far as I am aware, did not take part in the 
action.”17 Given the astonishingly short passage of time from the division’s entrainment in 
France to its deployment at Loos, plus the appalling conditions by which the division 
exhausted itself slogging to the battle arena, its devastation appears understandable, if utterly 
objectionable. This apparently futile bloodshed and waste of young life epitomises the 
popular history of the First World War. Yet the division’s next action, on the infamous first 
day of the Somme, saw peculiar and unexpected success on a day synonymous and forever 
associated with bloody slaughter and needless sacrifice. Facing Fricourt on the far left of the 
British sector, 21st Division was part of a five-division front that witnessed success in this 
most calamitous of offensives. Less than a fortnight later, the division took part in the opening 
act of the High Wood campaign, a series of piece-meal attacks, which, proportionately, cost 
the British forty per cent more casualties than on 1 July.18 However, the initial assault, on 
Bazentin-le-Petit, involved a highly successful night assembly and dawn attack on 14 July 
1916, and will be discussed in Chapter 1. Serving with Rawlinson’s Fourth Army, the 
division fought well for the rest of the Somme campaign throughout the summer of 1916, 
including the attack at Flers-Courcelette when tanks were first deployed in battle.  
 
                                                 
16 Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1915, Volume II (London: Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd., 1928), p. 392. 
 
17 Diary of Lieutenant J.H. Alcock, Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), 96 / 29 / 1. 
 
18 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 203-205. See also Terry Norman, The Hell They Called 
High Wood - The Somme 1916 (London: William Kimber, 1984). 
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21st Division also acquitted itself well in 1917 – the year of Arras, Third Ypres, and 
Cambrai. In April the division fought under Allenby at Arras, standing-to on the extreme right 
of the line, accomplishing the extremely difficult but equally vital role of maintaining contact 
with the French, although two later attacks were unsuccessful. During Third Ypres the 
Division was twice engaged with Plumer’s Second Army - its major success is dissected in 
Chapter 2. The division was thought recovered enough to take part in the highly successful 
opening day of the Cambrai offensive, a major tank operation, during which Byng’s Third 
Army advanced over four miles, and to reinforce the front-line following the German counter 
attacks in December. 
  
Similarly, the division’s actions in 1918 offer much for operational analysis. The 
division was for a time placed on standby for transfer to Italy during the winter of 1917-18, 
but the order was cancelled, and it remained on the Western Front to face the full brunt of the 
German Spring Offensive. Unfortunate enough to be on Gough’s weak and over-stretched 
Fifth Army front on 21 March 1918, the division was overwhelmed during the first of the 
German assaults, and was bludgeoned so badly as to be formed into composite forces. A 
Lewis-gunner from the Wiltshire Regiment noted how “the Divisions of whom there were 
five British, the 8th, 21st, 25th, 38th and the 50th, had got so mixed up in the retreat as to be 
hopelessly separated”, and noted his irritation and disappointment to find he was to be sent to 
one of these composite forces.19 The commander of 21st Division, Major-General D.G.M. 
Campbell, described the accomplishments of the division during the first difficult months of 
1918 in no uncertain terms: 
The 21st Division was probably more heavily engaged than any other Division in 
the British Army… during March, the Division was in the thick of the Somme 
fighting… being transferred to the Ypres sector in April it then, once more, 
                                                 
19 T.G. Mohan, My War Diary, Privately Printed, IWM 80 / 28 / 1. 
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sustained the shock of the German attacks in that section, and was one of the 
Divisions in the line when the great German attack on April 29 was definitely held 
up… being transferred to Champagne in May (it) experienced the full brunt of the 
German attack which was launched on May 27…20
 
After only a short respite from the fighting, the division was back in the front line by 
mid-July, preparing for the advance to victory. As the spearhead of Third Army’s advance in 
the Hundred Days, 21st Division fought over the much-contested battlefield of the Somme, in 
Picardy, and on the Hindenburg Line, fighting at the St Quentin Canal when this 
‘impregnable’ line of German defence was broken, capturing 114 officers and 3,758 other 
ranks.21 The division’s actions are surely worthy of further scrutiny, particularly in this year 
of victory. 
 
Despite fulfilling all the foremost prerequisites, the division initially shows little to 
recommend itself for further scrutiny. Raised in the north and billeted in the Home Counties 
in September 1914 in response to Lord Kitchener’s nation-wide call-to-arms, the division was 
unremarkable in most senses. Its 62nd Brigade included 12th and 13th Northumberland 
Fusiliers, 8th East Yorkshires, and 10th Yorkshires (Green Howards); its 63rd Brigade 
comprised 14th Northumberland Fusiliers, 8th Somerset Light Infantry, 10th West Yorkshires, 
and 10th York and Lancasters; and 64th Brigade contained 9th and 10th Kings Own Yorkshire 
Light Infantry, plus 14th and 15th Durham Light Infantry. Yet although most of these 
battalions were raised in the north, the division as a whole enjoyed little social or regional 
cohesion. Any that did exist, along with a New Army ethos, camaraderie, and esprit de corps 
was undermined by the constant regeneration of units with new drafts to replace casualties, 
particularly once they came in via the conscript laws. However, this unpromising and 
                                                 
20 Major-General David M. Campbell, ‘Introduction’ to H.R. Cumming, A Brigadier in France 1917-1918 
(London: Cape, 1922),  pp. 9-10. 
 
21 Campbell, ‘Introduction’ to Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 11. 
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unremarkable selection of units can be regarded differently, as another historian wrote of a 
similar division:  
It can certainly be viewed as a symbol of the evolution of the BEF from 1915 to 
1918 in that it offers a splendid example of what could be achieved, after a chaotic 
and unpromising start, by an ‘ordinary’ New Army division, raised in the Home 
Counties, without the élitist selection of processes of some Territorial units, 
without the distinct social cohesion of the northern Pals formations, and without 
the sectarian and political binding of the 36th (Ulster) Division.22   
 
In terms of its raising and its social composition, the 21st was a similarly typical New 
Army division. However, in addition to lacking any religious or social cohesion, 21st Division 
also lacks the regional coherence and romantic subtitling of many other units - 14th (Light), 
38th (Welsh), 52nd (Lowland) 74th (Yeomanry) Divisions – to recommend itself through 
literature borne from local enthusiasm. As has been noted, it is one of the minority of BEF 
divisions without a divisional history, most of which were written by serving officers who felt 
the need to document their unit’s service.23  
 
Similarly, the units within 21st Division gave rise to very little literature in the post-war 
period. In an unusual transfer, both Regular battalions of the Lincolnshire Regiment joined 
the division in November 1915 after the disastrous ‘baptism of fire’ at Loos demanded the 
inclusion and absorption of professional troops, but their involvement within the division is 
only documented through the Regimental history.24 In a similar vein, the 110th Brigade joined 
the division in place of the shattered 63rd Brigade after the first day on the Somme. 
Comprising the four Service Battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment, this fairly unusual 
                                                 
22 Peter Simkins, ‘The War Experience of a Typical Kitchener Division: The 18th Division, 1914 – 1918’, in 
Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle (eds.), Facing Armageddon – The First World War Experienced (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1996), p. 298. 
 
23 38 of the 65 British divisions that served with the BEF have Divisional Histories. 
 
24 See Major-General C.R. Simpson (ed.), The History of the Lincolnshire Regiment, 1914-1918 (London: 
Medici Society, 1931). 
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brigade, which distinguished itself throughout the rest of the war, gave rise to only three 
works, the last of which was only published last year.25
 
Neither does the division possess any real historical ‘clout’. It was not renowned within 
the BEF, nor was it a unit that was feared by its enemies at the time, as were the Dominion 
troops, particularly the Canadians and, by their own, modest, admission, the Australians. Nor 
was it a division that has gained historical recognition as an élite unit, such as Lukin’s 
tactically innovative 9th (Scottish) Division, with its exceptional South African Brigade. It did 
not achieve a remarkable or famous success for which it is known, such as the breaking of the 
Hindenburg Line by 46th (North Midland) Division. It was not famously decimated on the 
first day on the Somme as was de Lisle’s 29th Division, unfortunately facing Beaumont Hamel 
in its first battle on the Western Front since returning from Gallipoli, only to find its troops 
trapped on the uncut wire. Nor was the division so decimated by the German Spring 
Offensive that its survivors were fit only to train Americans and cadres for the rest of the war, 
as was the fate that befell 39th Division. It is not renowned as a bad or incompetent unit, such 
as the hapless-sounding Wanless O’Gowan’s 31st Division – known even during the war as 
the ‘thirty-worst’ – which could demand further inspection as to why it was so bad.26 In fact, 
21st Division’s only real claim to fame is its misdeployment at Loos alongside 24th Division, a 
fact that caused the scape-goating of the Commander-in-Chief at the time, Sir John French. 
                                                 
25 H.R. Cumming, A Brigadier in France, 1917-1918 (London: Cape, 1922); D.V. Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The 
Tigers’ - the 110th Infantry Brigade (London: Benn, 1930); Matthew Richardson, The Tigers: 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th 
(Service) Battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment  (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000). 
 
26 Many of these units have written histories. For the 9th (Scottish) Division, see J. Ewing, The History of the 9th 
(Scottish) Division, 1914-1919 (London: John Murray, 1921), Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years with 
the 9th (Scottish) Division (London: John Murray, 1919); for the South African Brigade, see John Buchan, The 
South African Forces in France (Cape Town: Thomas Nelson, 1920), Peter Digby, Pyramids and Poppies: The 
South African Brigade 1915-1919 (South Africa: Ashanti Publishing, 1993); for the 29th see Captain Stair Gillon, 
The Story of the 29th Division (London: T. Nelson, 1925), Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, 29th Divisional 
Artillery, War Record and Honours Book 1915-1918 (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1921); for the 46th 
see R.E. Priestley, Breaking the Hindenburg Line: The Story of the 46th Division (London: Fisher and Unwin, 
1919). 
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Command 
 
In terms of command, 21st Division actually has much to recommend it for further study. In 
total, it had four commanders,27 the last of whom took control in May 1916, thus maintaining 
continuity of command throughout the major part of the war, from the opening of the Somme 
to the Armistice. Its commander for this part of the war, Major-General David ‘Soarer’ 
Campbell, was a successful and popular general; 
very quick and alert, with an inexhaustible supply of energy, a great sense of 
humour, and a fund of common sense, he was the perfection of a Divisional 
Commander. He was very popular with all ranks, and rightly so, as he never 
spared himself in looking after their comfort and efficiency in every way. Added 
to which he was a fine soldier, with sound and original ideas on training, and 
possessed a strong will of his own without being in any way obstinate.28  
 
Campbell’s military record is distinguished by neither notoriety nor fame; he was notable in 
non-martial circles as a fine horseman - achieving the unique record of winning the Grand 
National, the Irish National Hunt Cup, and the Grand Military Steeplechase in 1896.29 His 
obituary in The Times noted that his “personal gallantry was often in evidence (and that he) 
had reason to be proud of his command… He had, too, an unusual receptiveness to new 
ideas” and remarked to “have rarely met a soldier who, confronted with a problem, would 
take so much pains to get to the bottom of it, with the aid of all the information he could 
procure and with grim determination”.30
 
                                                 
27 These were Lieutenant-General Sir E.T.H. Hutton, under whose command the division was raised; Major-
General G.T. Forestier-Walker, from 11 April 1915, who commanded the division at Loos; Major-General C.W. 
Jacob, from 18 November 1915, who was detailed the unenviable task of rebuilding the division after its 
‘baptism of fire’; and Major-General D.G.M. Campbell, who took command on 22 May 1916. It should be noted 
that only two of these commanded the division in action, and it was Campbell who steered it through Britain’s 
major part of the war, from the opening of the Somme offensive to the Armistice. 
 
28 Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 95. 
 
29 Campbell’s nickname, ‘Soarer’, derived from the name of the horse that he rode to victory in the 1896 Grand 
National. 
 
30 Extracts from The Times, 13 March 1936.  
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Campbell took on a division that had rebuilt itself after devastating losses on its first 
outing. His predecessor, Claud Jacob, earned promotion to Lieutenant-General and command 
of a Corps by way of the remarkable turnaround he instigated in 21st Division. After Loos the 
division had held quiet sectors in Lieutenant-General Charles Fergusson’s II Corps, 
warranting the following praise when it left to join XV Corps in preparation for the Somme 
campaign of 1916:  
The commendation of the Army Commander will be very gratifying to you, and 
no one knows better than myself how well it is deserved. It has been the greatest 
pleasure to see how a Division which came to the Corps… shattered by heavy 
losses has by its spirit and energy raised itself again to a fine fighting unit, and has 
established its reputation as such.31
 
In a similar vein, the subordinate units of the division all maintained a large degree of 
command continuity throughout the major part of the war, that is, from the onset of full-scale 
British involvement beginning on the Somme in July 1916. 62nd Brigade was commanded by 
Cecil Rawling from mid-June 1916 until his death in action during the Second Battle of 
Passchendaele in 1917. He was succeeded by George Gater, a 30-year old Oxford graduate 
with a Dip. Ed., who thus completed an extraordinary rise from civilian to Brigadier, with 
DSO and bar, in just over three years. He led the brigade for just over a year until the 
Armistice: 
Campbell was an outstanding soldier, but he was very much a pukka Regular who 
never went out of his way to court popularity, especially among New Army 
officers. Gater nevertheless not only survived under Campbell’s command for the 
rest of the war but also flourished. On two occasions, during the worst of the 
fighting in the spring of 1918, Gater was chosen to command ad hoc units to help 
stem the German tide. The first, known as Gater’s Force, consisted of composite 
battalions from 62nd, 64th and 110th Brigades, together with 66 Lewis guns of 4th 
Tank Brigade. This was sent to reinforce 3rd Australian Division on 29-30 March 
1918. The second, known as Gater’s Independent Brigade, and again composed of 
composite battalions from 62nd, 64th and 110th Brigades, plus support units, was 
                                                 
31 21st Division Routine Orders – Complimentary Order signed by Lieutenant-General Charles Fergusson, 
Commanding II Corps, 28 March 1916, PRO, WO 95 / 2129.  The Army Commander was General Sir Herbert 
Plumer. 
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sent to block any German advance beyond the Marne on 2 June 1918, where it 
came under the command of the French Fifth Army.32
 
64th Brigade was commanded by Hugh Headlam, from the same date as Rawling, until 
the summer of 1918, when he was transferred to staff duties. His successor, Andrew 
McCulloch, also an Oxford graduate with DSO and bar, lasted less than a month before being 
wounded leading the brigade towards Miraumont, the battle examined in Chapter 3. 
Christopher Edwards, a pre-war regular twice wounded during the war, led the brigade 
through the difficult advance to victory until the Armistice.  
 
110th Brigade, which was transferred to the division from 37th Division after 63rd 
Brigade was decimated on 1 July 1916, was under the command of William Hessey, a retired 
staff officer from the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. Lord Loch, another staff officer from the 
Grenadier Guards, took over the brigade in July 1917, steering it through the difficult Third 
Ypres campaign, before being relieved of command because of sickness at the beginning of 
1918. The brigade then came under the command of Hanway Cumming, described by 
Campbell as “not only a magnificent leader of men, but also a soldier of the very highest 
class”33 who was thus returned to active service after six months in charge of the Machine-
Gun Corps Training Centre just a week before the German Spring Offensive. His book, A 
Brigadier in France, which documents his service with the brigade, proved invaluable in the 
difficult study of the battles of 1918.  
 
This unusual degree of continuity throughout the division is indicative of two things. 
Firstly, it demonstrates the extent to which Campbell was happy with his choice of Brigadiers 
                                                 
32 J.M. Bourne, The British General Officer Corps During the Great War, forthcoming. 
 
33 Campbell, ‘Introduction’ to Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 13. 
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– he appointed both Rawling and Headlam – and also how well the three Brigadiers worked 
alongside each other and subordinate to Campbell. The second point is perhaps more 
important for the purposes of this study, and concerns the fact that the divisional commander 
and the Brigadiers within the division maintained their posts, excluding casualties, whilst 
many others throughout the BEF were sent home and replaced for their failures. This indicates 
primarily a large degree of competence and good leadership on their part, and that any 
problems or failures encountered by 21st Division and its composite units were probably due 
to extraneous factors, such as the enemy, the strength of its defences, the weather and others 
described below.  
 
The continuity of command throughout 21st Division was a major factor to recommend 
it for further examination. It ensures that a comparative study of the division against itself will 
not be marred by the consideration of different commands, which could well complicate the 
analytical process.  
 
Another factor to recommend 21st Division is its active service within the whole of the 
BEF. It served in all five Armies, under six different Generals, including Haig, the future 
Commander-in-Chief, and in seven Corps under nine Lieutenant-Generals. It also served with 
the French army, during the battle of the Aisne in May 1918. This remarkable record of 
service implies a division both versatile and quick to adapt, obviously being much in demand 
within the BEF. 
 
 The factors and army service outlined above describe a fairly typical New Army 
division that achieved what was asked of it. And it is this reason that most recommends 21st 
Division as the subject of this MPhil thesis: it went about the business of waging war quietly 
and efficiently, usually succeeding, learning from its mistakes, and using all manner of 
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methods to avoid the problems previously encountered. In short, it is demonstrative of the 
vast majority of units and personnel in the war – those that remain in the public consciousness 
are the very brave and very bloody, the heroic and the disastrous, all the things that perpetuate 
the old myths: that the war was a bloody, futile, unmitigated disaster of a war, at best a 
Phyrric victory but made intolerable by the tremendous and devastating casualties inflicted by 
a High Command perceived as military inept, incompetent and butcherous, languishing well 
behind the lines in luxurious chateaux, apparently oblivious and unconcerned as to the plight 
and the suffering of their troops. This study intends to join the existing Great War literature 
dispelling these ignorant preconceptions: the analytical comparison of a unit against itself at 
different stages in the war, hopefully proving the ‘learning curve’ of tactical evolution that is 
the common theme amongst current research. 
 
Battles 
 
The decision of which battles to study was as important as the choice of division, given that 
different combinations of assaults could lead to wholly divergent conclusions. At this point it 
should be noted that whilst the choice of battles was made very carefully, it should be 
similarly stressed that the decision was not based on which assaults would yield results closest 
to the hypothesis. Instead, the choice was made on the following criteria.  
 
 Firstly, the decision to study four battles was solely due to word length, limiting each 
‘battle study’ to that of the average journal article – about 7,000 words. With a thesis total of 
40,000 words, to include a long introductory chapter and the necessary conclusions, the study 
of four battles was in effect a predetermined factor.  
 
 Secondly, it was imperative to compare like with like, to ensure that a comparative 
study of the division against itself would not be hampered by the consideration of different 
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methods of action. Put bluntly, this meant that all four battles had to be either offensive or 
defensive. As this thesis was meant to demonstrate the tactical evolution of the division, it 
was again almost predetermined that the assaults should be offensive, as it was this type of 
action that could prove or disprove this theory.  
 
Thirdly, it seemed prudent to study battles over a long period of time, preferably 
several months, as it would be unreasonable to expect the division to have learnt the lessons 
of one battle by the time it next saw action. Given that 21st Division saw action in 1915, at 
Loos, the choice of battles could have been determined by one battle within a major campaign 
from each year. Yet it is here that other factors play a role. 21st Division was led in action by 
two different commanders, and in the interests of continuity it seemed appropriate to limit the 
choice of battles to those under Campbell, who commanded 21st Division for the greatest part 
of the war, from the opening of the Somme offensive to the Armistice. This, unfortunately, 
eliminated Loos from the choice of battles, although given the battle itself and the obvious 
mis-deployment of the reserves (21st and 24th Divisions) its inclusion in the study might not 
have led to the most authentic conclusion. 
 
It is at this point that an inspection of the actual battles is required.34 In 1916, the 
major campaign was that on the Somme. 21st Division fought on the opening day, in the initial 
assault on High Wood a fortnight later, at Flers-Courcelette in mid-September, when tanks 
were first used in battle, and in three other minor assaults towards the end of the campaign. 
The battle study from the Somme campaign was therefore to be one of the three listed above, 
but the decision was not as difficult as it first appeared: initial instincts suggested that the first 
day on the Somme was already rather over-documented compared to the others, although a 
                                                 
34 The complete actions of 21st Division are listed in A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions (British Official 
History, 6 vols; London: HMSO, 1937-45) vol. 3, pp. 108-9.  
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better reason for its exclusion soon presented itself. 63rd Brigade, which was the division’s 
assaulting unit on 1 July, was so decimated during the assault that it was exchanged with 110th 
Brigade of 37th Division, which had not taken part in the initial assault. To examine an attack 
by a unit that would no longer play any role within the division seemed inadvisable, as there 
could be no future comparison, and the battle was excluded. The choice between Flers and 
Bazentin (the initial assault on High Wood) was similarly easy: whilst the discussion of the 
first attack with tanks would undoubtedly lead to comparisons with assaults later in the war, 
21st Division actually played an extremely subsidiary role in the attack, and is barely 
mentioned in the Official History. In contrast, the attack of 21st Division on Bazentin-le-Petit, 
made by the newly transferred 110th Brigade and marking its ‘baptism of fire’, was an 
extremely important assault strategically - the British attack on the German Second Position. 
In addition, the assault is mildly famous as the first successful night assembly and dawn 
attack, which would lead to comparisons with attacks at different times of the day. 
 
1917 was the year of two British campaigns: Arras and (Third) Ypres, more 
commonly known as Passchendaele. 21st Division took part in the initial assault at Arras, but 
its role was less offensive than simply to ‘stand to’ at the extreme right of the line, as a pivot 
for the rest of the British assault. Whilst the division did undertake two assaults in the Arras 
campaign, at the beginning and the end of May, these were fairly unsuccessful, which was a 
complete contrast with those during Passchendaele. Initial instincts suggested that (Third) 
Ypres was the campaign of 1917 to study, if for no other reason than because of its sinister 
reputation as the evilest and most futile of all Great War campaigns. My intention was to 
challenge preconception; here was my chance. 21st Division attacked three times during the 
campaign: at Polygon Wood at the end of September; at Broodseinde a week later; and in the 
Second Battle of Passchendaele at the end of October. The attack at Polygon Wood, although 
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successful, was undertaken primarily by Fifth Army and I Anzac Corps of Second Army. 
Second Passchendaele was in fact a protracted period of battle, as the British troops slogged 
laboriously through the infamous mud. Broodseinde, on the other hand, had much to 
recommend it: deemed “the black day of the German Army” by Ludendorff himself,35 it 
seemed prudent to discover why, plus it was the last battle of the campaign to be fought 
before the rains came. Most assaults after this were dictated more by the weather and the 
morass that became the battlefield than the evolution of tactical thought. This finally excluded 
Second Passchendaele from the list, and established Broodseinde as the 1917 assault for 
consideration. 
 
This left only 1918 from which to find two battles for study, and it was a year halved 
neatly between defensive and offensive campaigns. The German Spring Offensive, which 
began on 21 March and finally petered out at the end of May, was the defining feature of the 
first half of the year. It was therefore from the Hundred Days campaign that the final two 
battle studies would have to be chosen, and despite the short period of time the total switch 
from static to mobile warfare meant that there were many battles from which to choose. 
However, given the prerequisite factor of time between assaults to learn the lessons and 
mistakes, it seemed appropriate to choose battles early and late in the campaign. They 
practically chose themselves.  
 
By the summer of 1918, 21st Division was fighting in Julian Byng’s Third Army, 
which did not attack in the Hundred Days until the battle of Albert, nearly a fortnight after the 
opening assault at Amiens. The division distinguished itself well in the initial attack but, on 
the night of the 23-24 August, undertook a quite breathtaking assault on Miraumont, whose 
                                                 
35 W. Beumelberg, Flandern, 1917 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1928), p. 122. 
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capture was imperative to the advance of two different Corps. The Official History was so 
impressed by this feat it devoted over five pages to its narrative, whereas other battles at this 
time often warranted scarcely a paragraph. Similarly, the attack by 21st Division on 8 October 
against the Germans’ reserve system of defence, the Beaurevoir Line, almost shouted its 
merits for inclusion. The assault was to be made in three bounds, each in a different direction, 
pivoting on the second and third jumping-off points that were actually within the territory to 
be captured during the previous bounds. As one commentator noted, the attack “illustrated the 
improvement in tactical method since 1916”,36 and no other assault could claim to be a better 
conclusion to a thesis devoted to tactical evolution. 
 
Sources 
 
The most obvious starting point for any analysis of the Great War is the monumental Official 
History (henceforth OH). Begun almost as soon as the guns fell silent, the first of fourteen 
volumes assessing Military Operations, France and Belgium was published in 1922, the last 
in 1948. The opus-magnum of compiler Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, who wrote 
much of the text and jealously guarded his sources, even from other historians and authors, 
the OH has been the cause and subject of much controversy between Great War historians. Its 
findings and accounts have long since been regarded as inaccurate and biased, its impartiality 
called into question and Edmonds’ personal prejudices - particularly his pro-Haig stance – 
given increasing prominence. Edmonds personally completed the volumes on 1914 and 1915, 
and the space devoted to the exploits of the pre-war Regular Army - four volumes on the first 
seventeen months of the war compared with nine on the last twenty-seven, despite the 
immense difference in the scale of the fighting – suggests a subtle championing of their 
qualities over those of the vast ‘citizen army’ of 1917-18. This implication is reinforced by 
                                                 
36 Kelly, 39 Months, p. 145. 
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Edmonds’ concentration on the catastrophe suffered by the New Army on the Somme on       
1 July, which takes up much of the first volume on 1916. Nevertheless, the OH has a great 
deal of detailed, narrative information, particularly in the operational sphere, and pertaining to 
practically every unit in the BEF, and should not be ignored in any study of the Great War.37
 
The use of primary sources in this MPhil thesis is limited by the usual factors relating 
to the military historian: their availability; their reliability; and their accuracy. Primary 
sources concerning the First World War are to be found almost exclusively in the WO (War 
Office) class at the Public Record Office in Kew, the Imperial War Museum, the Liddell Hart 
collection at King’s College, London, and the National Army Museum. Excluding the official 
War Diaries, these primary sources are usually letters, diaries, memoirs, personal 
reminiscences and the like and, by their very nature, must be treated with some caution and 
scepticism by the historian.  
 
The official War Diaries are the most obvious source of information on the activities 
of a particular unit or formation. These documents were compiled on a daily basis in line with 
army-wide military standards, with the primary function of recording a unit’s actions and 
procedures in order that they might prove educative for future soldiers fighting future wars. 
They are now held in the PRO under the classmark WO 95. The diaries were maintained by 
one of the unit’s senior staff officers, and daily entries record where the unit was situated, the 
tasks that it undertook, casualties or the arrival of new drafts and any other occurrences 
deemed worthy of inclusion. This final point is important in understanding the value or 
otherwise of a specific diary; beyond a bald statement of location, personnel and activity it 
was very much up to the individual compiler whether any additional information was 
                                                 
37 See David French, ‘Sir James Edmonds and the Official History: France and Belgium’ in Brian Bond (ed.),  
The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 69 – 86. 
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included. This means that the quality of War Diaries can vary enormously, even within the 
same unit, as different officers assumed responsibility for their maintenance. The daily entries 
can be just a single line or run to several paragraphs, sometimes including minute detail about 
the weather, the state of the trenches, the activity or otherwise of friendly and enemy artillery 
and aircraft, and descriptions of minor incidents. In contrast, some entries can be positively 
abrupt, particularly when the unit was out of the line, merely noting its location and the 
number of men allocated to the inevitable working parties.  
 
War Diaries are invariably of excellent use to the military historian for a day-to-day 
analysis, and much can be gleaned about a unit’s morale, strength, training, experience and 
everyday life from these sources. They are, however, of rather less use during times of battle, 
which are obviously of the utmost interest to the military historian. Diaries were seldom 
maintained with rigorous daily entries in times of protracted action, or even a particularly 
hectic or uncomfortable tour of duty in the front line, being compiled from notes at some later 
date. This delay in the diary’s maintenance raises another problem concerning its reliability 
and usefulness. In order to write a detailed account of an operation the officer responsible for 
the diary was usually forced to rely on those who took part for the story of events and, all too 
often, these were unavailable having themselves become casualties. Some battle reports were 
written from memory after the conclusion of the battle (or, in many cases, after an ‘action’ 
within a larger operation or campaign, such as Passchendaele or the Somme), and the full 
story of what had actually happened was lost and the account in the diary mere conjecture or, 
at best, a sketchy outline. The accounts could therefore be tainted by hindsight, retrospect and 
knowledge of the action’s successes, failures, and casualties – luxuries usually reserved for 
the military historian. Even when the diary was maintained regularly its routine nature 
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sometimes led to certain incidents, made significant by later events or the advantage of 
hindsight, either given insufficient prominence or being overlooked altogether.38
 
 For a divisional study it must be noted that it is the diaries of the subordinate units of 
brigades and battalions, rather than that of the division itself, that will be the most 
enlightening, as it is these diaries that record the action of the troops ‘on the spot’. However, 
one of the most obvious limitations of the War Diaries as a whole, and of smaller units in 
particular, is their concentration on officers and the lack of specific references to non-
commissioned officers and men. For the historian concerned primarily with tactics, the diaries 
pose other problems: intended to remain within the military sphere, the diaries were to be read 
by fellow soldiers and consequently expect the reader to be fully conversant with military 
terminology and procedures. Accounts of basic actions and tactics are seldom recorded, but 
much can be gleaned by studying the various appendices, after-battle reports, sketch maps and 
operational orders that are often attached to the diary. Again, the quantity and quality of the 
material varies between units, with some diaries containing little but the daily summaries 
whilst others list start lines and objectives, detail the positions and timings of barrages, the 
quantity and breakdown of support weapons, equipment and dress of the attacking troops, and 
a host of other highly relevant information, often including maps. However, it must not be 
forgotten that the map references and grid numbers that litter many of the diaries pertain to 
trench maps, rather than actual positions and places on Ordnance Survey maps and those 
others available to the historian, which can make tracking a unit’s position extremely difficult 
and frustrating.  
 
                                                 
38 It should be remembered here that after-action reports were not solely for the education of future soldiers, but 
were of great importance for operational analysis both at divisional and corps level, and the prosecution of 
campaigns during the war itself were often altered on the basis of these reports. 
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 In short, the War Diaries are the most logical points of reference for narrative and 
tactical information on various units, personnel and battles, and offer much in the way of 
useful information. However, their limitations must not be forgotten or their reports viewed as 
unequivocal truth, and the historian can and should balance one report alongside another to 
glean a more accurate picture than is possible from the individual diaries alone. 
 
 Similarly, private and personal memories are seldom as useful as they at first appear, 
written either in hindsight, or a tidied-up version of wartime jottings after the event by a gifted 
and prosaic diarist or biographer. The historian must also consider the author’s purpose in 
writing (and/or publishing) his memoirs, and the audience he anticipates for them. This is 
particularly pertinent considering the date of production, as the passage of time since the 
conclusion of the war has witnessed several shifts in popular perceptions of the war. One must 
also question the intended purpose of these sources: personal exoneration, accusation, or 
highly-exaggerated, overly bloody, and flamboyant in order to sell – sources such as these 
seldom have a quest for knowledge and truth at the top of their agenda.  
 
The bibliography that concludes this thesis demonstrates the wealth of secondary 
sources consulted in its research: books studying particular battles or individuals, those 
examining tanks, guns and aeroplanes, and the vast majority discussing tactical evolution and 
the perceived learning curve of the BEF. Some have been outlined above,39 but to discuss 
their relative merits and shortcomings would be a thesis in itself; yet it is their ideas that have 
shaped my views on the Great War. They will, obviously, be referred to as needs arise.   
 
 There is one other genre of Great War literature, originating in the amateur tradition, 
which can prove useful for the soldier’s view of battle. Historians, some might say compilers, 
                                                 
39 See pp. 1-5. 
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have portrayed, often through the personal reminiscences of ageing veterans, the day-to-day 
life in the trenches of the ‘two-a-penny Tommy’.40 Again recorded with the luxury of 
hindsight, these accounts must be approached with caution by the historian in search of 
‘facts’, yet the view of the man on the spot can sometimes add the life and colour missing 
from the brittle and distanced narrative of the War Diaries.  
 
Methods of Assessment 
 
The assessment of battles and the basis for analytical comparison will be a number of 
different factors, loosely divided into three groups. The first group includes those factors that 
were beyond the control of British planners; the second encompasses those dictated to the 
division, and therefore its brigades and battalions, from Corps and Army level; and the final 
set includes those factors which can be directly attributed to the division or the units within it. 
 
 Those factors beyond the control of British planners as a whole include elements such 
as the weather, and the impact this had on the ground. Although the British had 
meteorological reports coming in twice daily, the weather then was as changeable and 
unpredictable as now, and had the ability to ruin an assault or cause a massive turnaround in 
fortune. The onset of bad weather in Flanders in the autumn of 1917 is a prime example. The 
six weeks of good weather throughout August and September broke in the first week of 
October, during the third of Plumer’s four-step, bite and hold attacks, the Battle of 
Broodseinde, examined in Chapter 2. Although the deteriorating weather may have been to 
                                                 
40 See Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the First World War, Book of the Somme, Book of 
1918 – The Year of Victory (London: Sidgwick & Jackson); Sir John Hammerton (ed.), The Great War… ‘I was 
there!’ – Undying Memories of 1914-1918, 3 vols. (London: The Amalgamated Press Ltd); Martin Middlebrook, 
The First Day on the Somme (London: Allen Lane, 1978); Jonathan Nicholls, Cheerful Sacrifice: The Battle of 
Arras 1917 (London: Leo Cooper, 1990); Terry Norman, The Hell They Called High Wood: The Somme 1916 
(London: Kimber, 1984); and the many works of Lyn Macdonald, including 1914: The Days of Hope, 1915: The 
Death of Innocence, Somme, They Called it Passchendaele, To the Last Man: Spring 1918, 1914-1918: Voices 
and Images of the Great War (London: Penguin Books). 
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the advantage of the British by concealing the troops’ arrival from the enemy, the increasing 
rain turned the Salient into the muddy quagmire that is synonymous with the name of 
Passchendaele.41 The state and ‘going’ of the ground, more often than not caused by the 
weather, also had a massive impact upon the success or failure of an attack. Continuing with 
the example of Third Ypres, Prior and Wilson note that  
despite the fact that there had been exceptionally dry weather in September, the 
continuous shelling had destroyed the drainage system of the many small streams 
which were characteristic of the area. Even without rain these watercourses had 
become bogs or swamps that provided obstacles for attacking troops. On 4 
October units from 5, 21, 3 Australian and NZ Divisions, along with XIV Corps, 
had reported losing the barrage because of bad going. Without exception, all of 
these formations suffered heavy casualties as a result.42
 
Similarly, although early-morning mist was often favoured as it concealed the movement of 
assaulting infantry, if the sun was not strong enough to burn it off, the mist often hindered the 
attack later on, particularly in the smoke and fog of war. A frequent occurrence was that the 
mist caused a loss of either direction or the barrage, and also concealed some enemy outposts, 
which could then turn and fire on the attacking troops from their rear, causing many 
casualties.  
 
 The enemy, of course, is an enormously significant factor in the success or failure of 
an assault, and must be given a great deal of consideration in the analytical comparison of 
battles. However, it must be remembered that, for the most part, this was beyond the control 
of the divisional planners at least, and more often, that of the higher command as well. The 
                                                 
41 For a discussion of the increasingly unfavourable weather at Third Ypres, see Philip Griffiths, ‘The Effect of 
Weather Conditions on the Third Battle of Ypres, 1917’, BA Dissertation, School of Geography, The University of 
Birmingham, 1988. 
 
42 Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele – The Untold Story (London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 
137-8. 
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‘enemy’ is a rather broad term, and encompasses three main points: the enemy personnel, the 
enemy position and method, and the enemy response.  
 
Enemy personnel describes the defenders of the areas and trenches under attack. The 
interrogation of prisoners, captured during trench raids, patrols or earlier offensives within the 
same campaign, could give British Intelligence some idea as to which enemy units were 
opposing them in the line. However, there could be no guarantee that these units would 
remain in position; they could be relieved in the normal rotation of troops through the front 
line or, in instances of protracted battle periods, units could be removed from the battle zone 
altogether, leap-frogged by fresh troops for the assault. In addition, regardless of whether the 
expected units remained in the line, it must not be forgotten that this was still beyond the 
control of the British – knowing the enemy, and thus its reputation, strengths and weaknesses, 
was a very different matter from being able to choose it.  
 
The manner in which these units actually defended their position is described as the 
enemy method. As the belligerent most likely to remain on the defensive, the Allies having 
been committed to their repulsion from French and Belgian soil,43 the German trench systems 
were constructed and maintained to be a more or less impenetrable line of defence. They took 
advantage of any high ground in the area, positioning their guns and unit headquarters on the 
reverse slope, so as to be beyond the reach of the Allied artillery. The strength of these 
positions, designed to stand firm against whatever the might of two armies could throw at 
them, was formidable, including accretions such as wire belts, fortified woods and concrete 
pill-boxes. The German defences on the Somme, for example, were well entrenched on the 
comparatively high ridges of the undulating countryside, in the valley of the river which gave 
                                                 
43 See John Terraine, The Western Front 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1964), pp. 16-7. 
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the area its name, puckered with the river’s tributaries, streams and peat-soaked land. They 
were also behind  
barbed-wire entanglements, thoroughly staked and employing the type of wire 
that did not spring apart should the stakes be uprooted by bombardment. The 
trenches [were dug] in the accommodating soil to a depth of ten feet. And, 
perhaps of greater importance, beneath their trenches they constructed dug-outs to 
a depth of thirty feet or more. These dug-outs were not just hidey-holes. Many had 
electricity, piped water, forced ventilation, and living quarters.44
 
Such dug-outs contrasted sharply with the field fortifications encountered in the Ypres 
Salient, organised by Fourth Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Friedrich von Lossberg, and which 
were adapted to suit the difficult nature of the ground. Abandoning the tactics of the Somme, 
which tried to stop British assaults in the front trenches, German divisions east of Ypres were 
deployed in depth.45 The low-lying ground and the drainage system devastated by constant 
shelling meant that trenches, as could be described, were little more than a connected line of 
shell-holes and craters. The main system of defence was the pill-box, a concrete structure 
designed to house both machine-gunners and riflemen, and sited alongside others to give 
mutual support. Attacking these fortifications was no longer a matter of breaking through 
subsequent lines of defence, but developing a method of flanking these structures and 
capturing the garrison from behind. The pillboxes were “to be tackled by sections of men 
armed with Lewis guns and grenades, the former to provide covering fire while the bombers 
worked their way forward and lobbed grenades through the loopholes or rear door – another 
version of fire-and-movement tactics”.46 However, it was often the case that troops attacked 
one pillbox, only to find themselves under fire from flanking positions. In October 1917 
                                                 
44 Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), p. 319. 
 
45 The new German doctrine of elastic defence in depth was not only applied in the Ypres Salient, but elsewhere 
during 1917 – particularly at Arras. 
 
46 Robin Neillands, The Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914-18 (London: Robinson, 1999), p. 376. 
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Ludendorff advocated the use of the much-vaunted defence-in-depth system, a strategy which 
employed two main features. Firstly, it incorporated a greater concentration of machine-guns 
and a stronger system of defence generally in the forward areas designed to break up an attack 
before it could overwhelm the defenders and, secondly, it advocated the positioning of 
counter-attack divisions behind the main battle zone. On other occasions, the Germans sited 
small units far forward in no man’s land as soon as British artillery opened fire in order to 
place German troops on the Allied side of the barrage, from whence they could inflict heavy 
casualties on attackers as they were leaving their trenches.47
 
 The third enemy factor to consider is perhaps the most important: the actual reaction 
of the enemy to the assault, which is arguably the decisive factor as to the success or failure of 
an assault. On 1 July 1916, for example, the enemy response was entirely and unhappily 
astonishing to the British infantry. Unsurprisingly, the attackers had expected the week-long 
bombardment, during which 1.5 million shells fell on the German positions, to have virtually 
annihilated the bulk of the enemy defenders and trench-dwellers. The reality was, of course, 
murderously different.48 The enemy response, particularly in this case, can be measured in 
terms of the intensity and method of the fire, whether this came only from the troops in the 
line or the artillery as well, and whether the fire came from the front or flank. The number, 
ferocity, and speed with which the enemy launched their counter-attacks must also be 
considered, as should the willingness or otherwise of soldiers to surrender. Evidence of 
ferocious counter-attacks can be found in the attack to be examined in Chapter 4, during 
                                                 
47 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare – Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914 – 1918 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 145. 
 
48 It should not be forgotten that 1 July 1916 did witness some British success, particularly on the southern flank 
at Montauban, where local commanders had found means to ameliorate the problem of getting attackers across 
No Man’s Land before the enemy had time to emerge from his dug-outs and man his defences. However, this 
issue has more relevance and is discussed further in Chapter 1, p. 55. 
 
 33 
 
which 64th Brigade of 21st Division took its the first objective, the Château des Angles, with 
little difficulty. Yet although the château itself was taken, it was lost twice by counter-attack, 
and retaken only to be abandoned until enemy mines had been made harmless, and finally 
reoccupied late in the day.49
 
 The second group of factors contributing to the success or otherwise of an attack are 
those elements dictated to the division by the higher command, namely from Corps and Army 
level. Perhaps the most important of these factors is the state of the division at the time of the 
attack. This can be measured in terms of battle-weariness – how long the division had been in 
or out of the line or, in times of protracted battle campaigns, how long it had been fighting. 
The two 1918 battles examined in Chapters 3 and 4 were both individual assaults within a 
larger campaign, the battles of Albert and Cambrai respectively, in which the division had 
recently attacked and would swiftly afterwards attack again. A division exhausted by 
extended periods either in the front or the firing line would clearly be less rested and refreshed 
than one which was brought into the line specifically for the battle, as was happily the case for 
21st Division at Broodseinde, discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
 The strength of the division is inextricably linked to its battle-fatigue. Attacking the 
enemy obviously caused casualties, as did a simple spell holding the front-line trenches, 
although fewer, and a division seriously depleted by casualties and exhausted survivors would 
obviously not perform to the same level as one rested and refreshed. Drafts brought into the 
division, although boosting numbers, were often inexperienced, seldom knew the sector, and 
                                                 
49 Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Volume V (London: HMSO, 1947) p. 
202. See also the War Diary of 15th Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2161. 
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could not, by their late arrival, share the esprit de corps of the existing unit.50 It must also not 
be forgotten that ‘unit strength’ was not the same as ‘fighting strength’.  
 
 Other factors imposed from higher command included the frontage of attack and the 
objective distance. These elements more or less dictated the terrain and enemy of the 
divisional assault, factors discussed above. It is obvious that the wider the attack frontage, the 
more troops were needed for each stage of the assault, simply to cover each yard of ground. 
Similarly, the depth and number of the objectives dictated the number of troops which needed 
to be held back from the first assault, in order to take objectives further onward in the 
advance. It is also obvious that a wide attack frontage combined with objectives deep in 
enemy territory would be far more difficult to achieve than limited and attainable objectives 
on a narrow frontage, if only due to the overstretched resources of manpower. The success of 
Plumer’s ‘bite and hold’ tactics against Gough’s more ambitious, thrusting style at Third 
Ypres is clear testimony to this assertion.51
 
 The artillery supporting these attacks, whether wide, deep or narrow, was almost 
always determined by the higher command. Divisional artillery aside, the number of guns, 
and the ratio of field guns to heavies and howitzers, were allocated amongst the attacking 
formations by the Corps and Army commanders. The number of guns per yard of attack 
frontage - a useful barometer for the comparison of battles – was dictated to the division in 
this way. Similarly, the preliminary bombardment and any barrage put down during the 
assault were usually part of a Corps-wide scheme to ensure success on the entire frontage. 
                                                 
50 Small unit morale and esprit de corps were however, constantly and often swiftly regenerated. 
 
51 For this comparison see Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele – the untold story, chapters II and III; Peter H. 
Liddle, Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo Cooper, 1997); A. Wiest, ‘Haig, 
Gough and Passchendaele’ in Gary Sheffield, ed., Leadership and Command in War (London: Brassey’s, 1997). 
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These factors relating to artillery support, perhaps more than any other, are particularly good 
for analytical comparison, in that they offer a range of statistical data: number of guns, ratio 
of field artillery to heavy artillery, duration of bombardment, timing and method of the 
barrage, number of belts of fire,52 the use of barrages put down by machine-guns or trench-
mortars, and the use and quantity of gas or smoke in the bombardment. The use of other 
elements in the attack, like these last-mentioned and also including aircraft, tanks, mines and 
so forth, all important factors in the success or failure of an attack, were again dictated to the 
division by Corps and Army commanders.  
 
 The time of the attack is the last factor dictated by the higher command, and obviously 
has a huge impact on the outcome of an attack. Although not a significant factor in the failure 
of the 1 July attack, it cannot be disputed that to attack in broad daylight was unwise: zero 
hour was set for 7.30am and, in the words of one veteran,  “it was really a pity to have a war 
on July 1st, for in all my time in France it was the most beautiful day we had. The sky was 
cloudless and the sun shone”.53 The attack on Bazentin-le-Petit, examined in Chapter 1, was 
chosen for analysis primarily for its night assembly and dawn attack, and the contrast with the 
opening day, just a fortnight earlier, is remarkable. Dawn and dusk attacks grew in frequency 
throughout the war until they were the norm, and night attacks the daring exception. The 
                                                 
52 Plumer, ever the advocate of artillery belts, used them to devastating effect, again at Third Ypres. For the first 
of his ‘bite and hold’ advances, at the Menin Road Ridge on 20 September 1917, he utilised a creeping barrage 
of no less than five belts of fire, including three walls of high explosive, a belt of shrapnel and a curtain machine-
gun barrage. This moving inferno was fully 1000 yards deep, and played an enormous part in the success of the 
attack. 
 
53 Unnamed soldier, quoted in Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the Somme (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1996) p. 62. There were, however, several commanders who believed in daylight attacks, 
often around noon, with the intention of lulling the Germans into a false sense of security by not attacking at 
dawn. This allowed enough light for the assault, and gave troops the opportunity to consolidate the newly-won 
position during the hours of darkness, when German counter-attacks were less likely to succeed. Ivor Maxse, 
often considered to be the greatest trainer of troops during the war and who was later promoted to Inspector-
General of Training, BEF, was a firm believer in daylight attacks such as these. I am grateful to one of his 
greatest fans, Peter Simkins, for this point. 
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attack at Miraumont, discussed in Chapter 3, was such an assault, and the comparison 
between the two examples should demonstrate the relative benefits of each method and style 
of attack.  
 
 The final set of factors offering data for analytical comparison encompasses those that 
are directly attributable to the division itself. Though limited, they are extremely important as 
they offer the most undiluted facts by which to compare and analyse the division against 
itself. The factors, as such, revolve around one main crux: the units within the division and 
how they were utilised. One major and obvious point is the choice of brigade (and the 
subordinate units of battalion, company, section, and platoon) for a particular assault. It would 
be concrete evidence of the ‘learning curve’ if a brigade or battalion that had proved itself 
proficient in dealing with a particular strongpoint – say, a concrete pill-box or a machine-gun 
nest – were chosen for the next attack when such a strongpoint was encountered. Similarly, a 
unit that had found advancing behind a shrapnel barrage a particular stumbling block would, 
hypothetically, not be deployed in the same manner again until training and practice attacks 
under these conditions had taken place. Likewise, a unit that had proved itself capable of 
adapting to unforeseen circumstances – such as losing the barrage or encountering particularly 
stubborn resistance – might be considered a particularly adept and skilful unit, henceforth 
given difficult or uncertain tasks, trusting its initiative and clear thinking under fire.  
 
 Other issues relating to divisional planners include the actual method of advance: 
whether to have one or two brigades ‘up’; the number of platoons in the front line; artillery, 
snake or square formation; whether the troops were able to rehearse the advance prior to the 
actual assault – all key issues which were capable of tilting the balance between success and 
failure.  
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Once all these issues have been considered in turn, the execution of each attack was 
examined through battalion and brigade reports, and the findings of the Official History, as it 
is the actual outcome of the attack that is the real yardstick for analytical appraisal. The 
problems experienced by the attacking infantry will be considered alongside those problems 
foreseen by the planners, the relative success or failure of the attack measured against the 
objectives set, and the progress made by flanking divisions. The casualties of men and 
materiel will be compared with the enemy losses, including prisoners taken and guns 
captured, and the losses of other British units for the attack.  
 
 The assessment of 21st Division’s performance in these four battles, by the methods 
described above, indicates the degree or otherwise of tactical evolution – an avoidance of 
earlier mistakes and the employment of lessons learnt in previous battles. In short, the 
‘learning curve’ that current British historians argue was witnessed during the wartime 
experience of the British Expeditionary Force as a whole and, given the ‘typical’ nature of the 
21st Division, the conclusion is brought that the success or otherwise of the division to utilise 
these lessons within its fighting methods, is typical of the British Army on the Western Front. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Bazentin-le-Petit – 14 July 1916 
 
The British assault on 14 July 1916 was a night assembly and dawn attack against the German 
Second Position on the Somme battlefield. After the disastrous opening day of the offensive, 
the attack was not only important strategically, but also for the morale and the perception - by 
the British, their allies, and their enemies - of the British Armies on the Western Front. The 
assault by 21st Division was delivered by the newly transferred 110th Brigade, marking its 
‘baptism of fire’ in the war. This battle demonstrates the level of tactical skill displayed by 
inexperienced troops early in the war, through the execution of a complex manoeuvre within 
the otherwise rigid confines of the set-piece battles so characteristic of the Somme campaign. 
This battle study will provide a base from which to make comparisons and contrasts with 
assaults later in the war. 
 
Sources 
 
The source material for the assault on Bazentin-le-Petit is plentiful, as it is for most battles 
within the Somme campaign. Primary sources are mainly to be found at the Public Record 
Office in Kew (hereafter PRO) under the classmark WO 95, which holds the War Diaries. 
WO 95 / 2130 holds documents relating to 21st Division, and includes the Operation Order 
pertaining to this battle, O.O. No. 59, and its appendices. The diary also contains ‘Information 
Regarding the Enemy’, a short, typed account of information gleaned from German POWs, 
noting the confusion within enemy ranks and the fact that many had been rushed into the area 
with little idea of why or where they were going. An ‘Account of Operations of 21st Division, 
July 11th – July 18th, 1916’ outlines the timing and detail of the assault, taken from messages 
received at divisional GHQ and after-action reports from the battalions involved. There is also 
an impressive, three-page document, signed by the BGGS X Corps, outlining lessons learnt 
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from the “recent fighting”, including the importance of keeping up with the barrage, the need 
to issue sketch maps, difficulties of attacking over the open, the importance of patrols, co-
operation with aeroplanes, and the mopping-up and consolidation process.54  
 
 Documents from the higher levels of command, XV Corps and Fourth Army, can be 
found in the classmarks WO 95 / 921 and 431 respectively. There is little in Fourth Army 
papers that relates directly to 21st Division, but those of XV Corps are particularly useful. 
Operation Order No. 17, issued on 11 July, outlines the objectives and divisional boundaries 
for 7th and 21st Divisions, and an appendix gives artillery timetables. This, however, is of little 
use without the artillery map and tracings which, unfortunately, are missing from the diary. 
Two documents give an insight into the opposing German forces: ‘Enemy Situation on Corps 
Front, 11th July 1916’ and ‘Prisoner Reports’ both testify to the confusion of German troops in 
the line, with the latter also offering evidence as to the “deplorable” condition of the trenches, 
the state of the wire, and the success or otherwise of the British artillery. Finally, XV Corps 
diary gives a detailed account of the assault on the entire corps frontage, but contains little 
pertaining to 21st Division that cannot be found in its own diary and those of the subordinate 
units. 
 
 War Diaries of 110th Brigade and the Leicester battalions, the main units involved, can 
all be found in WO 95 / 2164. The diary of 6th Leicesters is particularly detailed, including a 
type-written appendix, ‘Narrative of Action of 6/Leicestershire Regiment 14th - 17th July 
1916’, which outlines the timing of the actual assault, the battalion’s position at various times, 
and gives detailed casualties. Both 7th and 8th Leicesters give detailed narratives, although 
both are taken from the diaries’ official, hand-written entries, which accounts for some 
                                                 
54 See Appendix I, pp. 153-6. 
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indecipherable gaps in the text. Both give extremely detailed casualty lists. The diary of 9th 
Leicesters gives a somewhat shorter account, noting various times and positions, and lists 
officer casualties by name, but offers no other rank casualty figures at all. The diary of 1st East 
Yorks, which sustained casualties of 460 on 1 July but was nevertheless attached to 110th 
Brigade for the Bazentin assault, offers little more than a paragraph, stating merely that 
attacks were carried out under heavy shelling, and notes an unfortunate incident of the British 
artillery shelling its companies from the rear. 
 
 The diaries of 21st Division’s other battalions also contain information of note. That of 
12th Northumberland Fusiliers, 62nd Brigade (2155), reports on the possible tapping of the 
wireless by the Germans and notes a bogus order given out to try and convince the enemy that 
there was not to be a British attack. The diary also cites casualties of over 100, primarily 
sustained whilst carrying bombs to the ammunition dump for 110th Brigade, indicating the 
high level of hostile shelling during the day. Its sister battalion, 13th Northumberland 
Fusiliers, 62nd Brigade, notes a strong German patrol on the morning of the 13 July, possibly 
to ascertain whether the reports of an assault were correct, and notes the use of lachrymatory 
gas in the hostile bombardment of the same day, whilst the 15th Durham Light Infantry, 64th 
Brigade (2161), noted the “evil use of tear shells” during the evening of 14 July. The 9th 
KOYLI, 64th Brigade (2162), notes the attack of 110th Brigade, and that the battalion was 
ready to reinforce if necessary. The diary also states that “the attack was preceded by the most 
intense bombardment and was entirely successful in reaching and capturing the objectives.” 
Finally, the diary of the 1st Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, (2154) shows how keenly the battalion 
wished its role in the assault to be made known, despite the fact that it did not actually attack: 
“A message was sent from 110th Brigade to 62nd Brigade which read as follows: - ‘Will you 
please thank in the name of the 110th Brigade the OC 1st Lincolns for his great help in 
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bringing up SAA for the use of this Brigade.’ The Battalion can therefore claim to have done 
its ‘bit’ in the great victory which the British scored over the Germans on this date.” 
 
 As part of the Somme campaign, the attack on Bazentin-le-Petit is well-documented in 
the secondary literature. Volume II of the British Official History (hereafter OH), Military 
Operations France and Belgium 1916, compiled by Captain Wilfred Miles, (London: 
Macmillan, 1938) describes the planning of the Bazentin offensive after the catastrophe of the 
first day on the Somme. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson’s Command on the Western Front – 
The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) offers an excellent 
narrative of the assault, giving a particularly useful insight into the operational and planning 
side of the operation. Matthew Richardson’s The Tigers – 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th (Service) 
Battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), gives an extremely 
detailed account of the Leicester Brigade’s first assault, using the War Diaries and written 
reports from the Leicester Records Office as source material. Terry Norman’s The Hell They 
Called High Wood: The Somme 1916 (London: Kimber, 1984), focuses primarily on the High 
Wood campaign itself, but gives a useful narrative of the opening assault on Bazentin. 
Anthony Farrar-Hockley’s The Somme (London: Batsford, 1964) and Tim Travers’ The 
Killing Ground (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) also have some useful information. 
Eyewitness accounts can be found in Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the 
Somme, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1996), Sir John Hammerton (ed.), The Great War… ‘I 
was there!’ – Undying Memories of 1914-1918, 2 (London: The Amalgamated Press Ltd) and 
Lyn Macdonald, Somme (London: Penguin Books). 
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Context 
 
On 1 July 1916 the British Expeditionary Force in France launched its biggest offensive to 
date on the Western Front. Its results are infamous: over 57,000 casualties including nearly 
20,000 dead, most of whom were probably killed in the first few minutes of the assault, with 
little ground gained to make the human losses tolerable. For many, it epitomises the grim and 
bloody futility of the war.55  Yet 1 July saw some success: the explosion of la grand mine at 
La Boisselle had afforded a small advance just south of the Albert – Bapaume road, whilst 
astride the Anglo-French boundary in the south the Germans had been forced from their first 
position, with the capture of Mametz and Montauban. It became increasingly clear to Field 
Marshall Sir Douglas Haig and General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the Fourth Army commander 
and principal progenitor of the Somme offensive, that the campaign could not continue 
without fresh forces and a complete rethink of objectives. “Despite the calamity that had 
befallen Rawlinson’s forces on 1 July, there was never any doubt that the offensive would 
continue. The imperatives that had occasioned the battle in the first place required that, 
however lamentable its opening, it should not be terminated.”56 Haig wanted the offensive to 
be renewed as soon as possible in order to wear down German resistance and to secure a line 
from which to attack the enemy’s Second Position. There followed a series of piecemeal 
                                                 
55 The first day on the Somme is not under discussion here. Volume I of the British Official History (hereafter 
OH), Military Operations France and Belgium 1916 (compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, 
London: Macmillan, 1932) is devoted almost entirely to the disastrous opening day of the campaign. See also 
A.H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme (London: Batsford, 1964); John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin 
Books, 1983) pp. 207-289; Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme (London: Allen Lane, 1971); 
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 137-185; and 
T.H.E. Travers, The Killing Ground (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
 
56 Prior and Wilson¸ Command on the Western Front, p. 185. The “imperatives” described are discussed in 
greater detail in the above works, but for the purposes of this work a short summary appears necessary: the Great 
War was a coalition war, in which British aims were almost entirely subordinated to those of her allies, 
particularly the French, who had been bled white at Verdun since February. The need to divert German troops 
away from the ‘mincing machine’ on the Meuse, coupled with the fact that the Germans were entrenched on 
French and Belgian soil and therefore required repulsion to appease Britain’s allies, demanded her action on the 
Western Front in the summer of 1916. 
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attacks by the Fourth Army between 2 and 13 July, trying to take this line. The assault on 14 
July, in which the 21st Division lined up in front of Bazentin-le-Petit, was the attack against 
the Second Position. 
 
Aims57
 
The primary objective of the Fourth Army operation was to capture the German Second 
Position on the southern sector of the front where Rawlinson’s attack had witnessed some 
success on 1 July. The task allocated to XV Corps was the capture and consolidation of 
Bazentin le Grand and Bazentin le Petit Woods, and Bazentin le Petit village. XIII Corps was 
to capture and consolidate Bazentin le Grand village, Delville Wood, and Longueval. The task 
of 21st Division within XV Corps was to assault the German Second Line on Bazentin Ridge, 
and capture the enemy front and support trenches between Mametz Wood and Bazentin-le-
Petit Wood. The second objective was to capture the portion of Bazentin-le-Petit village west 
of the Bazentin-le-Petit – Martinpuich road, and to capture Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, 
establishing themselves on a line from the northern edge of the village, thence to 
Contalmaison Villa and along the north and west edges of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood.58 As it 
happened, the division was also forced to clear Bazentin-le-Petit village, despite the fact that 
it was not in the divisional sector, owing to their right flank being exposed. 
 
Method 
 
Rawlinson’s plan for the capture of the German Second Position did not differ considerably 
from his method for the 1 July attack. He again placed great emphasis on the role of the 
artillery, but this time did not demand a week-long bombardment which could only signal to 
                                                 
57 See Maps I and II, pp. 145 and 146. 
 
58 XV Corps Operation Order No. 17, 11th July, 1916, PRO, WO 95 / 921. 
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the enemy a forthcoming attack, but instead concentrated on trench destruction and the cutting 
of enemy wire over a period of three days. The ratio of shells per yard of trench was also 
significantly more favourable than on 1 July, as Prior and Wilson have calculated: 
Rawlinson planned for a three-day bombardment during which almost half a 
million shells would be fired. The component of the bombardment devoted to 
trench destruction (that fired by the howitzers) consisted of 62,000 shells 
weighing about 12 million pounds. This meant that 660lb of shell would fall on 
every yard of trench attacked, an intensity of fire five times that achieved before 
the 1 July attack. Clearly then, the assaulting infantry would find the German 
trenches and their defenders in a far more impaired condition than had been the 
case of 1 July.59
 
 Far more novel than the attack on 1 July, however, was Rawlinson’s plan for a night 
assembly and dawn attack, hoping to catch the Germans unawares and make the capture of 
objectives therefore easier. This was certainly a difficult manoeuvre, particularly for 
inexperienced troops, and Haig was initially unconvinced as to the plan’s merits against the 
difficulty that would be encountered in achieving it. Rawlinson, however, was determined that 
the preservation of secrecy was paramount for the success of the attack and the plan went 
ahead. It was agreed that white ‘jumping-off’ tapes should be placed all along the line by the 
Royal Engineers, in order to make the assembly somewhat easier. 
Attacking by night was neither as novel, nor as potentially decisive, as is 
sometimes suggested. Attempted night attacks between 2 and 13 July had met 
with no success. And there could be no cause for believing that the proposed night 
operation on 14 July would prosper should the barbed wire remain intact and 
enemy machine guns be available against British forces assembling in no-man’s 
land. As ever, all would depend on the ability of the British artillery to suppress 
the German defences long enough for the attacking infantry first to traverse no-
man’s land and then to enter the enemy positions.60
 
                                                 
59 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 191-2. 
 
60 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 190-1. 
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Order of Battle61
 
XV and XIII Corps of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army lined up, left to right, for the assault on the 
German Second Position. 21st Division was on the extreme left of the attack, in Lieutenant-
General Sir H.S. Horne’s XV Corps. On its left was Major-General H.E. Watts’ 7th Division. 
This flanked the 3rd and beyond that the 9th and 18th Divisions of Lieutenant-General W.N. 
Congreve’s XIII Corps. Horne’s divisions attacked on a one-brigade frontage, Congreve’s 
with two brigades in the front line. 
 
The attack of 21st Division was to be carried out by Brigadier-General W.F. Hessey’s 
110th Brigade, transferred from 37th Division in place of 63rd Brigade, shattered in the fighting 
on 1 July. Although this was now the only brigade that could legitimately be called ‘rested’, 
both 62nd and 64th Brigades having been involved to some degree of the fighting on 1 July, it 
must also be remembered that this was a ‘green’ brigade – one that had yet to see battle. The 
entrusting of this strategically important assault to an untried brigade is indicative of the 
confidence that still remained in the New Army formations, to 21st Division staff at least, 
despite the calamity suffered on 1 July. As noted above,62 110th Brigade was unusual in its 
composition – comprising four service battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment. In the front 
line, from left to right, were to be the 6th and 7th battalions, each with a Stokes mortar 
attached, with one company (D) of the 8th battalion. The remainder of the 8th was in support, 
with 9th Leicesters and 1st East Yorks (64th Brigade) in reserve. In view of the fact that the 
division was on the extreme left of the British assault, the left flank of the Leicesters’ advance 
was to be covered by 110th Machine Gun Company. 
 
                                                 
61 See Appendices II and III, pp. 157 and 158. 
 
62 See Introduction, pp. 14-5. 
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Resources 
 
The Fourth Army arsenal for the assault on 14 July consisted of 1,000 artillery pieces, of 
which 311 were heavy howitzers or guns. Despite the fact that this offered 500 fewer pieces 
than for the attack on 1 July,  
the task facing the artillery on the 14th was, proportionately, altogether less 
formidable. On 14 July the front of the attack was approximately 6,000 yards, as 
against 22,000 yards on 1 July. Even more significant, the German trench systems 
behind the front on 14 July amounted to no more than an additional 12,000 yards, 
compared with the 300,000 yards of supporting trenches on 1 July. In total, then, 
the artillery on 14 July with two-thirds the number of guns that had been at its 
disposal on 1 July would have to demolish only one-eighteenth of the length of 
trench.63
 
 The OH figures for the guns on Fourth Army front are more generous than given here. 
They included twenty 4.7” guns, sixty-eight 60 pounders, fourteen 6” guns, eighty 6” 
howitzers, thirty-six 8” howitzers, two 9.2” guns, thirty-six 9.2” howitzers, one 12” gun, two 
12” howitzers, with sixty-nine miscellaneous guns, anti-aircraft and the like, a total of 328 
heavy guns and howitzers. Assuming that the artillery statistics stated above are accurate, that 
leaves approximately 670 field guns. Divided between the five assaulting units, each division 
appears to have been supported by sixty-six heavy and 134 field guns. Allowing for the very 
approximate attack frontage of 600 yards,64 this gives an average of one gun per 3 yards. The 
ammunition available daily to these guns was given ‘as required’ for the 18 pounders and 4.5” 
howitzers, 250 rounds per gun for the 6” howitzers, 110rpg for the 8” howitzers, 50rpg for the 
9.2” howitzers, 70rpg for the 12” howitzers and 25rpg for the 15” howitzers.65 Stokes Mortars 
were to be used on the same principle as the artillery batteries - moving by bounds from one 
suitable position to another, rather than moving blindly on with the advancing infantry. 
                                                 
63 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 191. Artillery statistics are taken from ‘Battle of the 
Somme: Artillery Notes and Statistics’, Rawlinson Papers 5201 / 33 / 71, National Army Museum.  
 
64 Taken from Captain Wilfred Miles, Military Operations France and Belgium 1916, Volume II – 2nd July to the 
end of the Battles of the Somme (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1938), Sketch 10, facing p. 67.  
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In terms of resources, the artillery was of course the most important and plentiful. 
Tanks had yet to be used in combat, making their first appearance towards the end of the 
Somme campaign, at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September. In terms of infantry equipment, 21st 
Division orders stated that every man was to carry two Mills grenades and 220 rounds of 
small arms ammunition (SAA), whilst those men detailed specifically for carrying up 
grenades were ordered to carry only 50 rounds of SAA. Ammunition carriers going forward 
with the attack were to carry two buckets each containing ten grenades, whilst those following 
up the attack were to carry two buckets with 18 grenades in each. Battalion raiders and 
platoon grenade parties were allocated 20 bombs each, whilst a proportion of NCOs were 
designated to carry a packet of cartridges for rifle grenades in his pocket. Finally, every 
company was to carry 20 picks and 20 shovels, along with SOS and field flares to signal 
either aeroplanes or the artillery from the front line.66  
 
It is clear that Rawlinson placed as much emphasis on concealment and secrecy as on 
the artillery preparations. Once his plan for the customary half-hour preliminary 
bombardment became known, the artillery commanders of 9th and 3rd Divisions (Brigadier-
Generals H.H. Tudor and E.W.M. Powell) informed him “that this procedure practically 
warned the enemy to get ready and put down his protective barrages”67 and a hurricane 
bombardment of five minutes immediately preceding the infantry attack was substituted for 
the original plan. In a similar vein, it was hoped that the night assembly and dawn attack 
would maintain the element of surprise - ensuring that the enemy machine-gunners would 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
65 ‘Programme of the Preliminary Bombardment’ issued with Fourth Army Operation Order No. 4 of 8 July, in 
XV Corps Appendices for 9 July, PRO, WO 95 / 921. 
 
66 Appendix to 21st Division Operation Order 59, dated 11-7-16, PRO, WO 95 / 2130. 
 
67 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 66. 
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have as little light as possible to determine the whereabouts of the attackers, whilst allowing 
enough to ensure the attacking troops could distinguish friend from foe and maintain 
direction.  
Every possible precaution had been taken to ensure secrecy; it was known that the 
enemy possessed means of overhearing telephone conversations, and there was 
danger that he might have received some hint. On the morning of the 13th came 
the discovery that he had been tapping the telephone communications of the 62nd 
Brigade; accordingly, at 9 p.m. that night, after a verbal warning of its purpose 
had been given, a bogus order stating ‘operations postponed’ was telephoned to 
companies of the brigade in the front line. It is possible that the ruse succeeded, 
for there was hardly any hostile machine-gun and rifle fire until the British were 
almost in position, it is certain that the enemy made not the slightest attempt, by 
patrols or raiding parties, to ascertain if all was normal on his front. When 
questioned about this want of enterprise, officer prisoners stated that the failure to 
push our reconnoitring parties was due to there being no reliable NCOs left to lead 
them: in the German Army this was not officers’ work.68
 
Terrain 
 
The terrain over which the Leicester brigade was to cross is fairly well documented. It was to 
assemble on a line one hundred yards outside the northern edge of Mametz Wood, and about 
four hundred yards from the enemy position. The OH notes that “everywhere, except on the 
extreme left in front of Mametz Wood, where the ground was flat, the first advance would be 
uphill”.69 No Man’s Land consisted of a gentle slope and was devoid of cover. The fact that 
the sector of front allocated to 21st Division was in front of Mametz Wood, suggests that the 
Leicesters’ advance could have been the easiest of the British attacks. However, it must be 
noted that the ground to which the brigade had to advance was very high on the undulating 
Somme battlefield.70 Neither must it be forgotten that Mametz Wood was over three thousand 
yards behind the German front line of 1 July, and its capture, less than 24 hours before the 
                                                 
68 OH 1916, Volume II, pp. 68-9.  
 
69 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 67. 
 
70 Arthur Banks, A Military Atlas of the First World War (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1998), p. 156. 
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main assault on 14 July, had been a long and bitter struggle. Possession of Mametz and 
Trônes Wood, 3,500 yards to the east, was necessary to secure the flanks for the advance on 
14 July. Yet the attacks had been piecemeal; with only a few battalions at a time attacking 
complex and well-defended trench systems. Casualties were high71 and the state of the woods 
testifies to the bitterness of the struggle. David Kelly, a Second-Lieutenant with the 6th 
Leicesters, viewed the recently-won Mametz Wood before the Bazentin assault: 
The wood was everywhere smashed by shell-fire and littered with dead – a 
German sniper hung over a branch horribly resembling a scarecrow, but half the 
trees had had their branches shot away, leaving fantastic jagged stumps like a 
Dulac picture of some goblin forest. It was the type of all woods blasted by really 
heavy shell-fire, Bazentin, Delville, and even the more uncanny woods one knew 
East of Ypres in the autumn of 1917… All the old ‘rides’ through the wood were 
blocked by fallen trees and great shell-holes, and over all hung the overwhelming 
smell of corpses, turned-up earth, and lachrymatory gas. The sinister aspect of the 
wood was intensified that night by the incessant whistling and crashing of shells 
and the rattle of machine guns and illuminated by the German flares, Very lights, 
and the flash of bursting shrapnel.72
 
It does not require much imagination to visualise the scene, nor military experience to deduce 
the state of the ground beyond the wood, that over which the Germans retreated and the 
British would have to advance – shell-pocked, cauterised with trenches, sighted by machine-
guns. A Lieutenant with 9th Leicesters later described the trench systems the Brigade had to 
combat: 
Behind the German first line of this ‘second system of defence’ ran the great 
wood, Bazentin-le-Petit, which itself was spanned at intervals by three successive 
lines of trenches, each with its separate wire protection. Between these lines were 
short lengths of trench, so it was a veritable maze…. It was impossible to march 
on the intervening ground at the double, so choked with fallen timber, so full of 
huge shell holes that it was all climbing, jumping, scrambling and sprawling.73
 
                                                 
71 See Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 187-9. 
 
72 D.V. Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’ - The 110th Infantry Brigade (London: Benn, 1930), pp. 28-9. 
 
73 Lieutenant A.C.N.M.-P. De Lisle, unpublished contemporary account, ‘The Story of a Leicestershire 
Company in the Great Push’. 
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The fact that it was devoid of cover merely added to the task facing the Leicesters. Another 
significant topographical feature was a narrow gauge light railway track, which had been laid 
and used by the Germans for transporting supplies prior to the opening of the offensive. It ran 
through Mametz Wood, across No Man’s Land, and into Bazentin Wood, following roughly 
the direction the attackers were to take.74 What should be noted from this is that, given its 
significance for the attackers, the railway almost undoubtedly held similar importance for the 
defenders, who presumably had machine-guns sighted on its passage.  
Enemy 
 
The enemy personnel facing 21st Division on 14 July comprised a number of different units. 
The German 183rd Division was in the line, but prisoners captured during the assault 
identified the Lehr Regiment, 16th Bavarian Regiment, 91st Reserve and 16th Bavarians. This 
last regiment, which had all its three battalions in the front line, lost nearly 2,300 officers and 
men. It is unclear exactly which units faced each other in the line, but there is a significant 
point, which could not have been anticipated by the British, that is worth noting. During the 
night of 13-14 July, the Germans had decided to relieve their 183rd Division with 7th Division 
in the Bazentin-le-Petit Wood – Pozières sector. As the British opened their attack, the 
leading columns of this latter division were just to the north of Flers, some 3-4 miles away, 
and as news of the British offensive reached the German higher command, troops from this 
division were sped towards the battle arena. Its three regiments, 26th, 27th and 165th, were 
hastily thrown into the battle, reinforcing beleaguered troops along the entire front. Other 
troops out at rest, including units from 185th, 12th Reserve, 26th Reserve and 3rd Guard 
Divisions, along with companies of 55th Landwehr Regiment, were sent up for the same 
purpose. Therefore, although the equivalent of fourteen German battalions reinforced the front 
                                                 
74 Matthew Richardson, The Tigers – 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th (Service) Battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment 
(Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), p. 120. 
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line, they were extremely confused and intermingled, with prisoners owning to the fact that 
they have been hurried up to the front line with little or no idea of where they were going and 
what they were to do.75 Most sources generally agree that the troops opposite the 21st 
Division were primarily Bavarians.76
Results 
 
The Leicester brigade, only recently arrived in the divisional area,77 moved up to assembly 
positions during the night of 13-14 July. Moving from Fricourt Wood, the battalions made 
their way along a blasted trench on the west side of Mametz Wood, from which “protruded 
the arms and legs of carelessly buried men, and as (the) men moved up that night to attack 
dozens of them shook hands with these ghastly relics”.78 As laid out by Rawlinson in his 
plans for the night assembly, covering parties with Lewis guns were sent out to take up 
positions on the crest line before midnight. Marking parties from 98th Field Company RE 
followed to place white tapes along the line on which the main body of troops was to 
assemble. The assaulting troops began the march to ‘jumping-off’ positions just after 
midnight. By 3.15 a.m., zero – ten minutes, 110th Brigade was in position to the east of 
Mametz Wood, between 300 and 500 yards from the enemy front line. The brigade was drawn 
in four lines, but “owing to uprooted trees and other obstacles, only the fourth line of the 6th 
Leicestershire could be placed inside the wood, although the last three lines of the 7th were 
hidden there”.79 The 8th Leicesters, on the left of the attacking line, were to skirt around the 
                                                 
75 ‘Information Regarding the Enemy, 13-7-16’, taken from 21st Division War Diary, PRO, WO 95 / 2130. See 
also OH 1916, Volume II, pp. 88-9 f. 
 
76 See Richardson, The Tigers, p. 123. 
 
77 The Brigade, stationed at Gommecourt on 1 July, arrived at the Quadrangle, about 3,000 yards north-west of 
21st Division, in the sector manned by 1st Division on 11 July. 
 
78 Kelly, 39 Months, p. 29. 
 
79 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 74. 
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northern edge of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, whilst the 7th in the centre and the 6th on the right 
were to enter the wood itself.  
 
 All four battalions noted the difficulty with which the assembly took place, carried out 
under the last few hours of the British bombardment. However, although this did much to 
conceal the troops’ arrival from the enemy, it was not the easiest of circumstances under 
which to move to assembly positions, particularly as the Germans also gave the area a liberal 
shelling throughout the night, directed not on the troops but on Mametz Wood itself. The 
diary of 7th Leicesters notes that one platoon of C Company lost over half its number, and that 
the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Drysdale, was also wounded during the march 
to assembly positions. It must be noted that 21st Division was the only assaulting unit to be 
affected in this way: the OH remarks that “except near Mametz Wood, nothing more serious 
than an occasional field-gun shell had come over”.80 Thirdly, the night assembly, although 
not an unprecedented tactic,81 was certainly an extremely difficult first action for the troops to 
carry out. Despite his initial doubts about the timing of the attack, Haig later described the 
success that was achieved. 
The whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in 
any case. The decision to attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an 
Army, the bulk of which has been raised since the beginning of the war, was 
perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of our troops. It would 
not have been possible but for the most careful preparation and forethought, as 
well as thorough reconnaissance of the ground which was in many cases made 
personally by Divisional, Brigade and Battalion Commanders and their staffs 
before framing their detailed orders for the advance.82
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
 
81 Rawlinson had employed night attacks since the second day on the Somme, although the times of actual 
assemblies are seldom noted. See Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, pp. 190-1. 
 
82 Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1979), p. 28. However, given that Haig had 
raised considerable objections to Rawlinson’s plans for the 14 July attack, this generous tribute from the 
Commander-in-Chief should perhaps be treated with some scepticism.  
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  The OH is eloquent in its narrative of the initial events. “When the barrage lifted at 
3.25 a.m. the leading companies… all New Army battalions (except one of the 13) rose and 
advanced through the ground mist at a steady pace. There was just light enough to distinguish 
friend from foe. Surprised by the shortness of the intensive and most effective bombardment, 
by the deployment of the stormers so near in the dark, and by the creeping barrage of high 
explosive, the enemy made but a feeble and spasmodic resistance to the first onslaught. The 
leading British wave reached the German wire before a shot was fired, and in the hostile 
trenches the only serious opposition came from men who rushed from dug-outs and shelters 
after the first waves had passed to engage those which followed.”83 Yet this appraisal, though 
piling lauds on the attackers, is a general statement of the four assaulting divisions. For the 
110th Brigade, though successful, the advance was difficult and troubled. 
 
 Having reached the jumping off point, the Leicesters did not have to wait long for 
their first taste of battle. Once in position, it was barely five minutes before Rawlinson’s 
hurricane bombardment opened. “At 3.20 a.m. the whole sky behind the waiting infantry of 
the four attacking divisions seemed to open with a great roar of flame. For five minutes the 
ground in front was alive with bursting shell, whilst the machine guns, firing on lines laid out 
just before dark on the previous evening, pumped streams of bullets to clear the way.”84 To 
soldiers yet to be battle-hardened, it was “one continual roar of guns and shells whistling and 
shrieking through the air… a perfect avalanche of destruction, and how any Bosche could 
have been alive to withstand the infantry attack was beyond comprehension.”85
                                                 
83 OH 1916, Volume II, pp. 78-9. 
 
84 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 78. 
 
85 D.A. Bacon, unpublished typescript account, Leicester Records Office, p. 60. 
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  Yet withstand it they did, for 7th Battalion War Diary notes that the assaulting troops 
were in a race to reach the German front line before the trench dwellers could man their 
machine guns to defend it, and “as a result the advance was rather ragged”.86 On the right, A 
Company worked in conjunction with 6th Battalion, and had little difficulty in reaching the 
trench, which was very “knocked about”. Between twenty-five and thirty prisoners were taken 
there.87 On the left, D Company was briefly held up by machine gun fire but managed to keep 
up close to the barrage and rush the line. The two centre Companies, B & C, were held up for 
about twenty minutes by machine guns, before the pressure was relieved by successful parties 
from 6th Battalion working down the flanks in a pincer movement. The centre companies were 
then able to rush the trench. The enemy initially put up some resistance but many were caught 
in their dug outs, and the rest, seeing that they could not halt the British advance, retreated 
into the wood. There was little resistance in the second line, known to the British as Forest 
Trench: according to 6th Battalion War Diary, there were comparatively few Germans in the 
second line. 
 
 On the right of 7th Battalion, the advance of 6th Battalion was similarly dogged by 
enemy machine-guns, sited in both Bazentin-le-Petit and Bazentin-le-Grand Woods, which 
caused a good many casualties in the two right companies. The latter wood was on the front 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
86 Narrative of 7th Leicesters, 14-7-16, PRO, WO 95 / 2164. The ‘race to the parapet’ is an interesting analogy, 
explored in depth for the attack on 1 July by John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathon Cape, 1976), 
pp. 237-8 and 247-58. In no uncertain terms, he states the gravity of such a race: “a race for which the British ran 
from their own front trench to the other side of no-man’s-land, for the Germans from the bottom to the top of 
their dug-out steps. Whoever first arrived at the German parapet would live. The side which lost the race would 
die, either bombed in the recesses of the earth or shot on the surface in front of the trench.” This is not solely 
restricted to the 1 July; any battle in which the Germans were aware of an impending attack – i.e. before which 
the British fired a lengthy bombardment – had a similar race. The attack on 14 July was no exception. 
 
87 Appendix I (Narrative of Action of 6/Leicestershire Regiment 14th/17th July 1916) PRO, WO 95 / 2164. 
 
 
 55 
 
of 7th Division to the right, and had yet to be cleared. The third and fourth lines of 6th 
Leicesters, therefore, rushed the positions, killed the detachments and captured the guns.  
 
 Meanwhile, the second and third lines of 7th Battalion were advancing, and carried the 
remainder of the first line with them on to Forest Trench. By this time, the casualties were 
mounting, particularly amongst the officers: both B and C Companies had only one officer 
with them, Second-Lieutenants Evans and Reed respectively, whilst all the officers from D 
Company were out of action. The Commander of 8th Battalion, 46-year-old Lieutenant-
Colonel Mignon, was killed “leading a bombing party like a subaltern”,88 and D Company, 
which had gone over in the first wave, lost its commander, Captain F. Ward, almost instantly. 
The battalion had to be led by its NCOs, one of whom, Company Sergeant Major Ben 
Stafford, later wrote a matter-of-fact report of his company’s battle and losses in a letter to the 
wounded Captain Ward.89  
 
 By 4 a.m. the second line had been taken along the entire divisional frontage, by all 
accounts with little resistance. The diary of 8th Battalion states that “very little opposition was 
encountered as Villa Trench was reached, dug outs were immediately bombed and the Lewis 
Guns which followed up closely took up a position in Villa Trench and caused a considerable 
number of casualties amongst the retreating enemy. Although the majority of the raiders had 
been knocked out, the remainder did excellent work in bombing outwards towards the left 
                                                 
88 Kelly, 39 Months, p. 32. 
 
89 CSM Ben Stafford, letter of 20-8-16. This letter can be read in full in Malcolm Brown, The Imperial War 
Museum Book of the Somme (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1996), pp. 133-5. Extracts can be found in 
Richardson, The Tigers, pp. 122 and 130. Brown notes that “Stafford’s letter is a remarkable document of the 
time, for the simple clarity of its description, for the light it casts on officer/other-rank relationships, also perhaps 
for the powerful impact of its litany of names, but above all for the attitude of stoic determination and 
willingness to continue on despite adversity which was a widespread characteristic of those fighting on the 
Somme, certainly at this hopeful stage. Disenchantment undoubtedly existed and would grow, but there were 
countless officers and men, arguably the large majority, for whom their only thought was that the struggle had to 
be carried forward and pressed home.” pp. 132-3. See Appendix IV, pp. 159-60. 
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flank and blocking Villa and Aston trenches”.90 Meanwhile, parties from 6th and 7th Battalions 
were sent back to consolidate the first line, and to ensure that it was clear of the enemy. 
Contact with 1st Division of III Corps was established on the left.  
 
 At 4.25 a.m., leaving a few platoons consolidating the second line, the brigade 
advanced over the 450 yards of No Man’s Land towards Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. The diary of 
7th Battalion noted that “no resistance was met with on the right, but on the left considerable 
trouble was caused by a machine gun and by snipers and close by the observation point in the 
tree both Captain Clarke and Lieutenant Wakeford were hit. This left the assaulting line 
without an officer.”91 Meanwhile, C Company of 8th Battalion moved the along the west side 
of the wood as far as Forest Trench, eventually advancing as far as its north edge, bombing 
the enemy dug outs in the wood during the advance. Contact with 7th Division on the right had 
been lost fairly early in the advance, and the right company of 6th Battalion had to extend a 
defensive flank facing east to prevent the enemy fleeing from Bazentin-le-Grand Wood to 
Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. 
 
 By 6 a.m. the brigade was in almost full possession of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, except 
for the north-western corner, in which a pocket of enemy resistance held out all day and 
caused considerable casualties, particularly to 8th Leicesters and to 1st East Yorks, which had 
come up in support. Reinforced by platoons from 9th Leicesters, the brigade advanced on 
Bazentin-le-Petit village, although not in its sector, and joined hands there with 2nd Royal 
Irish of 7th Division which had finally come up on the right. After handing over the eastern 
portion of the village to advancing troops of 7th Division, the 6th Battalion retired a short 
                                                 
90 Narrative of 8th Leicesters, 14-7-16, PRO, WO 95 / 2164. 
 
91 Narrative of 7th Leicesters. Clarke won the MC for leading his company in the attack and for rallying his men 
to assault the third objective – the assault in which he was injured. 
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distance, occupying and then consolidating the line from the northern end of the village, 
southwards to the north-eastern point of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood, and then along the northern 
edge of the wood towards the railway. Meanwhile, the other battalions had been occupied in 
consolidating the wood and, given the presence of the enemy in the north-western corner, an 
assaulting party of 7th and 9th Leicesters was organised to clear them out. “The bushes and 
trees were very thick round this part which necessarily made progress slow, the enemy 
evacuating and manning a trench about 30 yards from the wood, before our men could get 
through. We suffered several casualties from a machine gun in the aforementioned trench.”92 
The fight for complete control of the wood continued throughout the day and was not entirely 
cleared of the enemy until 7 p.m., and even then he clung to a machine gun post fifty yards 
beyond the edge.93
 
 In terms of set objectives, the assault was now more or less complete. Thrilled with 
this initial success, Lieutenant-General Horne, commanding XV Corps, began planning an 
exploitation assault, in which 21st Division was to move northwards and clear the German 
communication trenches between Bazentin-le-Petit and the light railway to Martinpuich, in 
order to facilitate the capture of the German Second Position between the corps boundary and 
Black Watch Alley by III Corps. A combined attack between 21st Division and 1st Division of 
III Corps was planned for 2.30 p.m., but was postponed for two hours owing to the difficulties 
experienced by the Leicesters in clearing Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. At 3 p.m. a heavy German 
counter-attack, supported by artillery, made an assault on the XV Corps position, particularly 
the village and the northern face of the wood, and the combined operation was cancelled. 
“The infantry of the 21st Division was now so reduced in numbers – the 62nd Brigade could 
                                                 
92 Narrative of 7th Leicesters.  
 
93 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 86. 
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only muster 1,200 rifles – that all idea of further offensive movement was abandoned, the    
III Corps deciding that the 1st Division could not act alone.”94
 
The heavy counter-attacks against XV Corps, although anticipated by the British to be 
made by local reserves, were of a severity and number that could not have been foreseen. The 
German decision to relieve its 183rd Division, as described above, allowed reserves to arrive 
in large numbers throughout the day, in far greater numbers than the British command had 
reason to expect. The German 7th Division was just to the north of Flers when news of the 
British attack came through, and the leading columns rushed to the battle arena. “Elements of 
these formations (totalling probably 5,000 men) arrived piecemeal in the area of the Bazentins 
between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. It was these troops that carried out the counter-attacks which 
occupied XV Corps for most of the day.”95
 
Casualties 
 
Despite the success of the assault, with the capture of objectives and their consolidation, and 
in the face of severe counter-attacks, this success was bought for a high price. David Kelly 
remarked that “it had been a gruelling experience for the Brigade, which had lost 2,000 
casualties out of 3,300 effectives”.96 The breakdown of figures is difficult to ascertain, as 
three of the assaulting battalions gave their casualty lists for the period 13-17 July, and 9th 
Battalion War Diary does not give any figures at all. In total, the division sustained losses of 
2,894, with each Leicester battalion losing in the region of a hundred men killed with a further 
two hundred wounded or missing. 1st East Yorks, which was only deployed in the late 
                                                 
94 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 85. 
 
95 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p. 200. 
 
96 Kelly, 39 Months, p. 32. 
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morning and early afternoon to help dispel the German counter-attacks around Bazentin-le-
Petit Wood, had six officers wounded and other rank casualties of 348.97 The overall 
divisional losses were the highest on the Fourth Army front.98
Conclusions 
 
During the assault on Bazentin-le-Petit 21st Division achieved all its objectives, and even took 
ground not allocated to its sector. Advancing with only a machine gun company on the left 
flank, 21st Division made swift progress over the open ground, outstripping 7th Division on its 
right, therefore leaving 110th Brigade in a somewhat precarious and isolated position. 
Nevertheless, only one small pocket of enemy resistance held out – on the north eastern 
corner of Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. The capture of all objectives was even more remarkable 
given the overwhelming superiority in enemy forces, as German relief troops were rushed into 
the battle zone throughout the day. Finally, these would be considered striking achievements 
by experienced forces, but the fact that this was an assault made by ‘green’ troops makes it all 
the more notable. However, it is worth mentioning that the response of the enemy was hardly 
                                                 
97 Narrative of 1st East Yorkshire Regiment, 64th Brigade, 14-7-16, PRO, WO 95 / 2161. 
 
98 9th Division sustained losses of 1,159, 3rd Division suffered 2,322 casualties, and 7th Division 2,819, compared 
to 21st Division’s 2,894. OH 1916, Volume II, p. 88 f. 
 
 Officers Other ranks   
  Killed Missing Killed Missing Total 
 
Wounded 
 
Wounded 
Battn. Strength        
1/Lincs 22; 650 - - - - 14 2 16 
12 NFs  1 2 - 11* 92 106 
E. Yorks c14; 560 - 6 - 36 186 126 354 
c11; 520    4*   4 
 
9/KOYLI 
6/Leics  7 20 - 13* 487 527 
7/Leics  10* 8 154* 381 553 
8/Leics  5 12 - 66 310 39 432 
9/Leics c30; 950 5*   78*   83 
Total 2075  28 48 362 1637 
 
* Figures taken from the CD-Rom, Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-1919. Those figures calculated from 
these cannot be considered definitive. 
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ferocious: described as “feeble and spasmodic” by the OH,99 any initial resistance was swiftly 
quashed by the attackers trapping them in their dug-outs, whilst the remainder, seeing that 
they could not halt the British advance, retreated towards Bazentin-le-Petit Wood. 
 
In terms of comparative data, the division captured a quarter of one square mile, with 
the cost of just under 3,000 casualties – the highest of any assaulting division. This was 
certainly a meagre gain for the losses incurred, although the limited advance was primarily 
due to orders from High Command not to advance beyond the Bazentins.100 Yet the assault is 
generally viewed as a success. Lieutenant-General Congreve, GOC XIII Corps, noted in his 
diary that 
 
Haig came to see me and was very complimentary and grateful for our success 
yesterday, and indeed it was a good operation. I do not think so great a force was 
ever before got into position within 300 yards of an active enemy for a dawn attack, 
and our losses before the advance were very small. Our advance was over 1,400 
yards of open ground. The arrangements of the Brigade staffs, the discipline of the 
battalions and the effectiveness of our artillery are the causes of our success. I think 
it will be a text book operation. I am told it is the most successful of the war and I 
planned it!101
 
 Rawlinson was similarly satisfied with the operation, and convinced as to the cause of 
its success, writing to his wife that “there is no doubt that the success of the enterprise must 
be attributed in a very large measure to the accuracy and volume of the artillery 
                                                 
99 OH 1916, Volume II, p. 78. 
 
100 This is one of the most infamous missed opportunities of the war. Brigadier-General H.C. Potter, GOC 9th 
Brigade, 3rd Division, later wrote to the Official Historian, Sir James Edmonds, “I had been very strictly enjoined 
not to push the advance beyond the final (infantry) objective laid down, which just included Bazentin-le-Grand.  
Leaving the consolidation proceeding on that line, I walked out alone to examine the ground in front.  It was a lovely 
day; the ground was very open and sloped gently up to a high ridge in front, so I wandered on until I found myself 
approaching a large wood which continued over the crest of the ridge.  There was no sign whatever of the enemy, so 
I walked into the edge of the wood but saw no sign of a German, nor any defensive works...  The wood reached by 
me I afterwards knew as High Wood, and it is a great regret to me that the advance was not pressed that day and the 
hundreds of thousands of casualties afterwards expended in the capture of the position possibly avoided.” PRO, CAB 
/ 45 / 190, 20 March 1930. 
 
101 The diary of Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve VC, 15 July 1916. 
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bombardment. The enemy’s wire, as well as his front and second line trenches, was smashed 
to pieces. The morale of the defenders had been greatly reduced by the din and concussion of 
the constant explosions, and it was clear from the number of dead that were found in the 
trenches that he had likewise suffered heavy casualties from the artillery bombardment”.102 
This was certainly borne out by evidence from 21st Division. Battalion reports commented on 
the poor state of the trenches, and that enemy resistance was spasmodic and easily combated. 
In this sense, the role of the artillery was clearly definitive. “On 14 July it was the elimination 
of the trench-defenders by the artillery which allowed the British to assemble in no-man’s 
land unhindered; even the best staff work could not have protected these troops if significant 
numbers of German machine-gunners had survived the bombardment. And it was the 
destruction of the barbed wire which enabled the attackers to reach the German positions so 
swiftly.”103  
 
 Yet for the purposes of this study it is not the artillery that should be considered a 
defining feature. Although clearly of vital importance in this battle, particularly due to the 
highly favourable ratio of one gun per three yards of trench, the artillery should really only be 
considered an assisting tool of the infantry. It is the success or otherwise of the infantry – the 
actual assaulting force – that provides the real evidence of tactical evolution. Given that this is 
the first of four battle studies, the assault on Bazentin-le-Petit necessarily provides a template 
assault - made by inexperienced troops early in the war - from which further comparisons can 
be drawn.  
                                                 
102 Rawlinson to Lady Rawlinson, Wigram, Cowans, Archibald Murray, Bagot, and Derby 18-7-16, Rawlinson 
Papers 5201 / 33 / 18, NAM. 
 
103 Prior and Wilson, Command on the Western Front, p.198. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Broodseinde – 4 October 1917 
 
The assault on Broodseinde is particularly useful for the analytical study of 21st Division as it 
demonstrates the ability of the troops on the ground to adapt to extremely trying and 
unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, it was undertaken by those brigades of the division 
that did not attack in the first battle studied, at Bazentin in July 1916, thereby offering useful 
comparisons between brigades and then against themselves in future battles. 
 
Sources  
 
The source material for the assault on Broodseinde is plentiful, principally due to the huge 
volume of literature covering the Passchendaele campaign. Primary sources are mainly to be 
found at the Public Record Office in Kew (hereafter PRO) under the classmark WO 95, which 
holds the War Diaries. WO 95 / 2132 contains documents relating to 21st Division, including 
the Operation Order concerning this battle, O.O. No. 132, and its appendices, of which there 
are twelve. The diary also contains several intelligence summaries, which were compiled on a 
daily basis. The summary for the period ending noon 2 October is useful in that it notes 
enemy artillery and aeroplane activity, both of which were “persistent and severe” and 
demonstrates the use at this time and the reliance upon meteorological reports. An ‘Account 
of Operations of 21st Division’ outlines the timing and detail of the assault, taken from 
messages received at divisional GHQ and after-action reports from the battalions involved.  
 
 Documents from the higher levels of command, X Corps and Second Army, can be 
found in the classmarks WO 95 / 853 and 275 respectively. As with the records of Bazentin, 
there is little in Second Army papers that relates directly to 21st Division, apart from ‘Second 
Army Summary of Operations during period 27th September, 1917, to 4th October, 1917’. 
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Although far too broad to offer much information relating to 21st Division, this document 
does list the enemy troops facing Second Army and its subordinate units, and states the 
disorganisation within the enemy ranks. It is, again, documents from Corps level that offer the 
most information directly relating to 21st Division. The Operation Order relating to 
Broodseinde is inexplicably missing from X Corps War Diary, which proves particularly 
frustrating for detailed analysis. There is, however, a document entitled ‘Second Army 
Operations (3rd Stage), X Corps Instructions’, which gives instructions as to the assembly of 
troops, the extension of divisional boundaries, precautions of ‘dulled helmets’ and the 
restriction of tanks to the rear of the forward zone in order to maintain surprise. Another 
document, actually dated 4 October and entitled ‘Brief Plan of Operations’, details the 
timetable intended for the battle, listing plans for all three divisions of X Corps, the artillery 
action, including the use of gas and smoke, and other arms such as tanks and aeroplanes.104 
Also in X Corps War Diary is a particularly useful document, a ‘Report on Country and the 
Enemy’s Defences opposite X Corps Front’, which outlines the natural features of the ground 
over which the corps was to advance, but also the siting of enemy MG posts in hedges, the 
positioning of sunken roads, and all manner of tiny details which would assist both soldiers 
and historians in the analysis of the battle. Finally, X Corps diary gives a detailed account of 
the assault on the entire corps frontage, but contains little pertaining to 21st Division that 
cannot be found in its own diary and those of the subordinate units. 
 
 War Diaries of 62nd and 64th Brigades and their subordinate battalions, the main units 
involved, are to be found in WO 95 / 2154-6 and 2161-62 respectively. The diary of 10th 
Yorkshires, 62nd Brigade (2156), notes one of the key features of this battle, the difficulties 
with which the battalion struggled to the assembly point, and its subsequent replacement in 
                                                 
104 See Appendix V, pp. 161-3. 
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the front line by 1st Lincolns. The diary of that battalion (2154) gives an especially detailed 
account of the battle and the difficulties in reaching the assembly point, and is particularly 
useful in that it lists battalion strength before, during and after the battle, citing very detailed 
casualties. An account of the battle in the diary of 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers, 62nd 
Brigade (2155), is long, detailed, and particularly helpful, whilst that of the 3/4th Queens 
(Surrey) Regiment, 62nd Brigade (2156), is only a short account, but gives very detailed 
strength and casualty figures. The diaries of sister battalions 9th and 10th KOYLI, 64th Brigade 
(2162), both offer detailed accounts of the assault, listing names, places, times, objectives 
gained, and losses incurred. The account of 10th KOYLI was written a week after the assault 
by its commanding officer, and gives a clear insight into the difficulties posed by the 
operation. The diary of 15th Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade (2161), is surprisingly short, 
given the tremendous difficulties encountered by the battalion and its subsequent withdrawal 
from the attack. It states only that casualties were such that the battalion was amalgamated 
into AB and CD companies, which then extended the brigade flank after the capture of 
objectives to assist in the consolidation process. The diary of 1st East Yorkshire Regiment, 
64th Brigade (2161), the battalion that took its place in the attack, gives a detailed account, 
again written a week after the assault. This document is particularly pertinent given that the 
battalion was not due to attack and its preparations for the assault were therefore 
exceptionally hurried. The account also cites casualty figures, notes the weather and even 
gives battalion strength, thus proving it very helpful. 
 
 The diaries of 110th (Leicester) Brigade (all WO 95 / 2164), which did not take part in 
the assault, offer an insight into how little battles were regarded by those not involved. The 
diary of 6th Leicesters notes an officer going on leave, a few casualties owing to hostile 
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shelling, and the weather as “fair”, whilst that of 7th Leicesters records 4 October as “Z day of 
the divisional attack”, but contains interesting summaries from 1 October that demonstrate life 
in the Ypres Salient at this time. The diary notes the relief and dispositions of the battalion, 
plus a hostile attack made on the evening of 1 October and the hurried consolidation 
afterwards. The diaries of 8th and 9th Leicesters are practically identical, making no reference 
to the assault whatsoever, merely noting that “On this day the 8th and 9th Battalions Leicester 
Regiment were amalgamated on account of the weak state of the two battalions, and came 
under the command of Major R.R. Yalland, 6th Battalion Leicester Regiment”. 
 
 As part of the Passchendaele campaign, the attack at Broodseinde is well-documented 
in the secondary literature. Volume II of the British Official History (hereafter OH), Military 
Operations France and Belgium 1917, compiled by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, 
(London: HMSO, 1948) describes the Broodseinde offensive within Plumer’s four-step 
campaign to take the Passchendaele ridge. Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson’s Passchendaele: 
The Untold Story (London: Yale University Press, 1996), although inferior to their study of 
Rawlinson, gives a useful narrative of the entire campaign, including the Broodseinde assault 
within the four-step offensive. A collection of essays covering the Third Ypres campaign 
edited by P.H. Liddle, Passchendaele in Perspective: The Third Battle of Ypres (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1997), offers many diverse insights into attacking in the Salient, focusing particularly 
on the problems and difficulties this posed. Chris McCarthy’s Third Ypres, Passchendaele: 
The Day-by-day Account (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995) is also very useful, simply 
for its meticulous detail. John Terraine’s The Road to Passchendaele (London: Sidgwick & 
Jackson, 1977) and Philip Warner’s Passchendaele  – The Story Behind the Tragic Victory of 
1917 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987) both offer decent narrative accounts, though the 
latter is slightly florid. 
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Accounts of the Broodseinde assault through regimental histories can be found in H.C. 
Wylly’s The Green Howards in the Great War (privately printed, 1926), gives a detailed 
account of the assembly of troops, noting the battalion’s difficulty in reaching the jumping-off 
point and its subsequent replacement by the 1st Lincolns. It also includes detailed information 
about the night itself plus the difficulties and problems posed by attacking within the Ypres 
Salient. An account of the DLI’s abortive attack can be found in The Durham Forces in the 
Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of the D.L.I. (London: Cassell, 1920), by Captain 
Wilfred Miles. It is a written narrative, offering much from hindsight that the diaries cannot 
give, but focusing mainly on the battalion’s role in the consolidation process rather than the 
assault itself. R.C. Bond’s The History of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the 
Great War (London: Percy Lund, Humphries, 1930) offers a similarly narrative account. E. 
Wyrall’s The East Yorkshire Regiment in the Great War (London: Harrison, 1918) is based 
almost entirely on information from the War Diaries and, as such, offers little more than the 
diary narrative but in better prose. Other eyewitness accounts can be found in Malcolm 
Brown, The Imperial War Museum Book of the First World War (London: Sidgwick & 
Jackson, 1991); Sir John Hammerton (ed.), The Great War… ‘I was there!’ – Undying 
Memories of 1914-1918, 2 (London: The Amalgamated Press Ltd); Lyn Macdonald, They 
Called it Passchendaele (London: Penguin Books) and Nigel Steel and Peter Hart, 
Passchendaele – The Sacrificial Ground (London: Cassell & Co., 2000). 
 
Context 
 
The Passchendaele campaign of autumn 1917 has long entered the rhetoric as the most evil of 
all Great War offensives, still attracting bitter criticism and controversy over eighty years 
after its conclusion. Although the first day on the Somme epitomises for many the futility of 
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the war, Passchendaele symbolises the ultimate horrors of war and the apparently blithe 
barbarity of the British high command, which prolonged the battle and sent its troops to be 
swallowed alive in the stinking, sucking mud particular to this most sinister of battles. It is 
also the most misunderstood campaign of the war, which is perhaps due to its evil reputation. 
Third Ypres, as the battle is officially known, began at the end of July 1917 with Gough’s 
assault on the Pilckem Ridge. When all attempts to capture the Gheluvelt Plateau failed, in the 
face of increasing German bombardment from the Passchendaele Ridge, the battle was called 
off at the end of August and its execution handed over to Plumer. A meticulous planner and 
advocate of artillery, Plumer spent five weeks in preparation before reopening the offensive. 
Haig had been insistent that the campaign should be conducted on the “principle of advancing 
step by step with limited objectives and overwhelming artillery power”.105 The battle of the 
Menin Road Ridge, launched on 20 September, was the highly successful opening assault, the 
first in a four-step series of attacks based on this sensible premise. The battle of Polygon 
Wood followed in the same vein on 26 September. Another successful attack, towards 
Broodseinde on 4 October, was the third step, to be followed on 9 October with Poelcappelle, 
an unfortunate assault compared to its three predecessors. The main reason for this was 
simple: after six weeks of fine weather, the rains came at the beginning of October, and did 
not abate throughout the rest of the Passchendaele campaign, which ended with the capture of 
the ruined village in mid-November.  
 
 Yet despite the mud and Gough’s mishandling of the opening phase, Plumer’s assaults 
were careful, precise, and overwhelmingly successful. His four-step campaign demonstrated 
the flip-side of Great War leadership, and deserves further examination. 21st Division lined up 
                                                 
105 Sir John Davidson, Haig, Master of the Field (London: Peter Nevill, 1953), p. 40. Davidson was Haig’s 
Director of Operations 1916-1918, and made frequent but usually unsuccessful objections to the grandiosity of 
Haig’s schemes.  
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for both the Polygon Wood and Broodseinde assaults, but only in reserve for the former. It is 
therefore the Battle of Broodseinde, on 4 October 1917, the day the weather broke, that will 
be examined here. 
 
Aims106
 
The primary objectives of the Battle of Broodseinde were the capture of the ridge of the same 
name, between Noordemhoek and Nieuwemolen astride the Moorslede road, and the capture 
of the Gravenstafel spur to the north, both of which were on the high ground towards the 
Passchendaele Ridge. These objectives were entrusted to the four divisions of I and II Anzac 
Corps, Second Army, with Fifth Army on the left flank advancing towards Poelcappelle, and 
X Corps, also of Second Army, on the right flank facing the eastern edge of the Gheluvelt 
Plateau. The capture of Reutel village and the valley overlooking it, on the south-eastern 
corner of the plateau, were the objectives given to 21st Division, the securing of which Haig 
stressed as essential for observation of the enemy and for a more effective defence of ground 
already won.107
 
Method 
 
Plumer’s plan for the style of attack differed little from the assaults on the Menin Road Ridge 
and Polygon Wood: limited objectives on a narrow frontage – the ‘bite and hold’ tactic that 
had proved itself so well on the previous two attacks. Yet one factor differed enormously: the 
artillery did not fire a preliminary bombardment, instead crashing down at zero hour with the 
infantry assault. Plumer hoped to maintain surprise as to the date and hour of the attack, 
assuming that the Germans were preparing their troops and defences for another British 
                                                 
106 See Maps III and IV, pp. 147 and 148. 
 
107 Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1917, Volume II – 
Messines and Third Ypres [Passchendaele] (London: HMSO, 1948) p. 299. 
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onslaught. In line with this, the artillery preparation consisted of the usual counter-battery 
action and the destruction of strongpoints. In an additional deceptive measure, full-scale 
practice barrages, of the kind fired on the previous outings and including gas shell, were laid 
at various hours on several days between 27 September and 3 October.108 Plumer’s barrage 
and the massed arsenal are discussed below. 
 
 One particular innovation witnessed at most of the Passchendaele offensives was that 
the assault was generally delivered by platoons instead of the old-style lines of sections and 
companies. The platoon was a small, highly efficient unit, with sufficient men and munitions 
to be capable of independent fire and movement. These autonomous units were, technically, 
under their own authority, but until 1918 were still fairly dependent on command from above. 
However, the platoon enjoyed far greater flexibility than the old ‘line’ formations, and were 
therefore deployed to take specific strong-points, such as machine-gun nests and pill-boxes. 
Without the restriction of prearranged lines and sections, the platoons could work their way 
round these strong-points, flanking and capturing them from behind. The General Staff 
training manual SS 143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917, 
outlined the shift from line and wave tactics to small platoons relying on integral firepower: 
 
a self-contained unit which is divided into a small platoon HQ plus four fighting 
sections, each with its own speciality. The first section has two expert bomb-
throwers and three accomplices, the second has a Lewis gun with thirty 
ammunition drums and nine servants, the third has nine riflemen including a 
sniper and a scout, while the fourth section has a battery of four rifle-grenades – 
called ‘the infantry’s howitzers’ – manned by a further nine men. The platoon is 
thus a complete and independent ‘tactical unit’.109
 
                                                 
108 OH 1917, Volume II, pp. 300-1. 
 
109 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (London: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 77-8.  
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The reorganisation of platoons was a great innovation within the BEF, as assaulting 
troops were no longer entirely dependent on command from the highest authority, which was 
usually stationed at divisional, Corps and Army headquarters way behind the front. Poor lines 
of communication hampered offensives once begun, as reports from the front often took hours 
to reach GHQ. Return orders were usually several hours out of date and therefore redundant 
by the time they reached the troops intended to implement them. The reorganisation of the 
platoon alleviated this problem, allowing commanding officers within each unit to make swift 
decisions with the benefit of local judgement and information – in short, to exercise their 
initiative. This decentralisation of command was not fully realised until the Hundred Days 
campaign in the autumn of 1918, as will be seen in the next two chapters; the higher 
command had hitherto proved unwilling to relinquish its authority during an offensive – the 
literal act of war. Nevertheless, the reorganisation of the platoon was an important first step 
towards this, and also helped a great deal in the capture of enemy positions. 
 
 One final point worth mentioning is the decision to time the assault to begin at 6 a.m. 
Telegrams found in X Corps War Diary indicate a clear influence by divisional commanders 
as to the timing of the assault. One from Campbell, dated 1 October, states that “If meteor is 
able to give any reasonable assurance that weather will be suitable I agree to Zero being at 4 
a.m. If there’s any chance of bad light, I am strongly of opinion that Zero should not be before 
6.10 a.m.”110 Major-General R.B. Stephens, commanding the flanking 5th Division, concurred 
on the following day, writing “I do not want to attack during darkness. 4 a.m. is considered a 
suitable hour for Zero provided ‘Meteor’ can predict a clear sky. If he cannot do this, I would 
prefer to have the attack timed for 6 a.m.”111 The influence of the divisional commanders is 
                                                 
110 Found in X Corps ‘Telegrams’, PRO, WO 95 / 853. 
 
111 Ibid. 
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clear: A.R. Cameron, BGGS X Corps, wrote to Second Army on 3 October outlining their 
preference for an attack by moonlight, as long as a clear night was predicted. The conclusion 
of this correspondence was Second Army’s Instructions to X Corps, delivered in the early 
evening of 3 October, stating that “Zero Hour will be 6 a.m.” What is particularly interesting 
is that the time of the assault had been hand-written, whilst the rest of the document was 
typed, indicating that the time of the assault had been added only once the preferences of 
Campbell and Stephens had been received. This is clear proof that the advice of divisional 
commanders had finally influenced decisions made at the very highest level.  
 
Order of Battle112
 
XIV and XVIII Corps of Gough’s Fifth Army lined up, left to right, alongside II and I Anzac, 
X and IX Corps of Plumer’s Second Army. 21st Division was the middle division of 
Lieutenant-General Sir T.L.N. Morland’s X Corps, the only Corps to utilise three divisions. 
Major-General T.H. Shoubridge’s 7th Division was again on the flank, this time on the left, 
with I Anzac Corps on its left flank; on the right of 21st Division was Major-General R.B. 
Stephens’ 5th Division, flanking 37th Division of IX Corps. As on 20 September, each division 
attacked on a two-brigade frontage, with each brigade employing one battalion to take the first 
objective, and two for the short advance to the final objective. This was to ensure that a strong 
force of fresh infantry on the entire attack frontage would be available to meet the anticipated 
enemy counter-attacks. Each battalion deployed three companies for the assault, with one 
company held as a reserve against counter-attack. Each company had one platoon in advance 
to follow the barrage, two platoons utilised for mopping-up duties, and one platoon in reserve, 
all of which moved in small groups of section columns. 
 
                                                 
112 See Appendices VI and VII, pp. 164 and 165. 
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21st Division deployed 62nd and 64th Brigades for the assault. 62nd Brigade on the left 
entrusted the first objective to 3/4th Queen’s Regiment, who went in with B Company 
between A and D Companies with C Company in close support. The second objective was to 
be taken by 1st Lincolnshire Regiment and 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers. The Lincs went 
in with D Company on the left front, C Company on the right front, with B and A Companies 
covering them off respectively; whilst the Fusiliers deployed D Company on the right, C 
Company on the left, with A and B Companies in support respectively. The companies were 
composed of three platoons and were formed up each on a one platoon front echeloned in 
depth.  
 
64th Brigade on the right deployed 9th and 10th Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
(KOYLI) for the first and second objectives respectively, with 15th Durham Light Infantry 
(DLI) as brigade reserve. The 9th KOYLI attacked with D Company on the right and C 
Company on the left, each Company being on a one platoon frontage. B Company was in 
support behind D Company; A in Reserve behind C Company; each on a single platoon front. 
From the front to the rear of the battalion the distance was 160 yards, instructions having been 
issued that the whole unit should keep as close as possible to the barrage without leading to 
confusion of or within the Companies. Platoons attacked in lines of section in file at equal 
intervals to cover the front, with about 30 yards between each. The 10th KOYLI went in on a 
two-company front, with C Company on the right, B Company on the left, with D and A 
Companies in respective support. 
 
Resources 
 
Available resources were allocated to the division from the higher commands of Corps and 
Army, commanded at Broodseinde by Morland and Plumer respectively. Plumer was an 
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advocate of artillery, and the arsenal he amassed for the Third Ypres campaign was hitherto 
unprecedented. It seems prudent, therefore, to consider the artillery support for this battle 
before anything else. 
 
 Plumer accumulated for his Second Army artillery support of 796 heavy and medium 
and 1,548 field guns and howitzers. From this arsenal, 152 heavy and medium and 192 field 
guns and howitzers were allotted to I Anzac Corps, with 227 heavy and medium and 384 field 
guns allocated to II Anzac Corps.113 By these numbers, that left 417 heavy and medium and 
972 field guns for X and IX Corps. Divided equally between the five divisions, that allows 
roughly 83 heavy and 195 field guns each, for an attack frontage of around 700 yards.114 
These figures demonstrate an average of one gun per 2.5 yards of attack frontage. For 
comparison, the division had approximately one gun per 3 yards under Rawlinson at 
Bazentin-le-Petit. 
 
Plumer fired no preliminary bombardment, hoping to achieve total surprise when the 
barrage was laid with massed strength at zero hour. The form of the barrage, a thousand yards 
deep, was not altered from those at Menin Road and Polygon Wood, with the first belt laid 
just 150 yards in front of the jumping-off tapes. After three minutes the barrage was to creep 
forward by 100-yard lifts every four minutes for the first 200 yards, and then every six 
minutes to the protective line at the first objective, 200 yards in front of the infantry halt. 
During the pause the barrage was to wander a thousand yards deeper into the enemy position 
to break up counter-attacks, and then suddenly return. At zero + 130 minutes it was to creep 
                                                 
113 OH 1917, Volume II, p. 300. 
 
114 The attack frontage for X Corps’ attack was 1,400 yards. Given that both the 7th and 21st Divisions had to 
negotiate the eastern parts of Polygon Wood, it must be assumed that the attack frontage was divided equally 
between the two divisions. The average distance of the attack by X Corps was around 1,200 yards, to include the 
dominating observation areas near Reutel and In de Ster. See OH 1917, Volume II, p. 299, for more details and 
Sketch 26. 
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forward again in front of the infantry by 100-yard lifts every eight minutes to the final 
objective line. After a pause, it was to creep forward, at intervals of about an hour, up to 
fifteen hundred yards deeper into the position. The protective barrage by the first two belts 
(field artillery) was to cease at 11.20 a.m. apart from SOS signals, and the two back belts 
(heavy and medium artillery) at 1.44 p.m.. The rates of fire were to be two rounds a gun a 
minute for the 18-pdrs, one-and-a-half for the 4.5” howitzers and one to two for the heavier 
guns and howitzers.115  
 
H.W. Newcombe, 21st Division’s BGRA, added another two points to the 
arrangements for the barrage, specifically to neutralise particular problems facing the 
advancing divisional infantry. Firstly, as 64th Brigade was not to assault alongside 62nd 
Brigade but slightly to the rear of its right flank, the barrage covering the former brigade was 
to keep 100 yards south of the brigade boundary, so as not to interfere with the advance of 
62nd Brigade. Once the first objective had been reached, the two barrages would join up on the 
same line. Secondly, once the barrage reached this first objective the artillery was to fire a 
proportion of smoke shells with the artillery belt to indicate the objective to the assaulting 
troops.116 This, presumably, gave the added bonus of extra protection against enemy counter-
attacks during the consolidation process on this first objective. 
 
The ammunition supply required for artillery barrages of such magnitude was of 
astonishing proportions, as was that provided for the advancing infantry. The emerging 
reliance on the platoon, with its different sections and arms, lead to a far greater need for 
small arms ammunition, and in increasingly large quantities. For the assault on Broodseinde, 
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21st Division ordered the massing of 1.2 million rounds of small arms ammunition (SAA) –
possibly due to the increasing use of the Lewis Gun, eight thousand Mills bombs, five 
thousand rifle grenades, and huge quantities of similar supplies, including Very lights, flares, 
and SOS signals.117  
 
21st Division was also allotted four tanks for the capture of its objectives, which 
demonstrates that both Second Army and X Corps deemed the terrain over which the division 
was to advance suitable for tank action. Neither of the flanking divisions, 7th on the left and 
5th on the right, were allocated tanks owing to the state of the ground. There is clear evidence 
to support this decision: one tank allotted to 21st Division lost direction and wandered onto the 
front of 5th Division, and there assisted the infantry in the capture of Cameron Covert. It 
eventually ditched in the marshy ground at the junction of two brooks near the objective, 
confirming the decision that the ground was unsuitable for tanks in this sector.118
 
In terms of infantry resources, it is clear that the emphasis on surprise was maintained 
all the way down to the individual soldier. X Corps Operations instructed that   
 
Special precautions must be taken that the assembly of the troops is not betrayed 
by the moonlight. Tanks will not go within half a mile of the front line down a 
forward slope. Care will be taken that helmets are dulled or covered and bayonets 
will not be fixed until Zero.119
 
Similarly, the diary of 10th KOYLI notes that the morning of the 2 October was devoted to 
issuing Operation Orders, and going into the exact detail of the attack, so that every man 
knew his role within the assault. All packs were dumped with the Quartermaster before the 
                                                 
117 Ibid. See Appendix VIII, p. 166. 
 
118 The fate of the other three tanks allotted to 21st Division is discussed below, pp. 82-3. 
 
119 X Corps Instructions, PRO, WO 95 / 853.  
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march to assembly positions, so as to maximise the speed and stealth with which the men 
would attack. The Green Howards noted bombs as “necessary equipment”, with the DLI 
noting that the troops were issued with “ground flares, bombs etc” and generally prepared for 
the attack.120 Given the emphasis placed upon the platoon, troops were no longer equipped 
with every tool of war, simply those required by the individual’s role. One minor point worth 
mentioning, given the stress placed on stealth and secrecy, is the state of the troops once in 
assembly positions. The fact that the area was heavily shelled by the enemy would clearly 
have an effect on the troops’ morale, but it must not be forgotten that the assaulting infantry 
were in assembly positions two hours before zero, lying on the wet ground. It stands to reason 
that their clothes would have become cold, sodden, and increasingly clingy and heavy, which 
cannot have helped morale or the ease and speed of the attack. 
 
Terrain 
 
The most significant factor determining the terrain and the state of the ground was the impact 
of the weather, particularly in Flanders during the Passchendaele campaign. The autumn of 
1917 was exceptionally wet,121 and the British would have struggled wherever they fought on 
the Western Front that autumn. It was the culmination of a dreadful year in which a long, cold 
winter, succeeded by a late spring, was followed by a short summer and a sodden autumn.122 
The high water-table of the Ypres Salient and the destruction of the delicate drainage system, 
primarily due to Plumer’s meticulous bombardments, turned the ground into the morass for 
which the campaign is remembered. Yet the swallowing, sucking mud that gave 
Passchendaele its sinister reputation had yet to reach its zenith by the battle of Broodseinde. 
                                                 
120 War diaries can be found at the PRO, WO 95 / 2156, 2164, 2161. 
 
121 See John Terraine, Douglas Haig – The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson, 1963), pp. 348-9. 
 
122 J.M. Bourne, Britain and the First World War (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 76. 
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In fact, the spell of fine weather broke momentarily on the eve of the assault, and then began 
in earnest during the afternoon of 4 October; by dawn on the next day, it was coming down in 
torrents. “The Germans were waiting anxiously for the autumn rains to come to their aid; the 
commander in Flanders, Field Marshal Crown Prince Rupprecht, called the rain ‘our most 
effective ally’, and he was right.”123 Broodseinde was the last action during the campaign 
fought in relatively dry conditions. 
 
 The X Corps Report on Country and Defences noted that the natural features of the 
ground over which the Corps was to attack included a large plateau, the valleys of the 
Polygonbeek and the Reutelbeek and a spur of the Gheluvelt Ridge pointing north-east. It 
remarked that  
 
the ground presents no formidable natural obstacles. Going should be extremely 
good on the high ground, and though the low ground is rather wet in places, and 
the Reutelbeek and the Polygonbeek are broken up by shell fire, it ought not to be 
difficult to make headway. On the Plateau there are no trees and the woods at the 
head of the valley and on the Polderhoek spur are thin. Numerous hedges, 
however, still exist and it must not be forgotten that these may conceal wire 
entanglements and be enfiladed in consequence by machine guns.124
 
 The sector allotted to 21st Division was in the southern flank of the X Corps operation, 
between Polygon Wood and the Menin Road. This sector was broken by the Polygonbeek, 
between Reutel and Cameron Covert, and the Reutelbeek, which drained this south-eastern 
corner of the Plateau. Normally a few feet wide and a few inches deep, the beds of these 
brooks, broken by shell-craters, had become belts of oozing mud of uncertain depth; joining 
near the objective, they formed a muddy valley over half a mile wide between Reutel village 
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and Polderhoek spur to the south.125 A 21st Division document, entitled ‘Notes on Area 
Ahead’, with many points drawn from a captured German map, noted the presence of a steep 
ravine between the Polygonbeek and Jetty Warren, and that “the land for several yards on 
each side of the beek is damp but there is nothing to show that this is in any way impassable 
except in isolated places”, which are then indicated.126  
 
Battalion reports of the assault were mixed in their notes of the weather and terrain: 6th 
Leicesters noted the weather as “fair”, whilst 1st Lincolns experienced “very inclement 
weather” throughout the operations. 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers noted the ground as 
“boggy”; 10th KOYLI concurred, noting it as “marshy”, whilst its sister battalion, 9th KOYLI, 
described “a veritable death trap; we were up to our knees in slush”.127 H.C. Wylly, writing 
the history of the Green Howards, noted that “the conditions in the trenches were very bad, 
the men standing in upwards of a foot of mud and water, and the task of the stretcher bearers 
was rendered extremely difficult owing to the ground being badly cut up and in many places 
quite impossible by reason of the heavy rain which had fallen”.128 However, an infantry 
brigadier opposite Poelcappelle noted that “the going was not too bad on the 4th, infantry had 
no difficulty and we had no tanks ditched, in fact they (the tanks) were elated. Shells 
ricocheted too, showing the ground was hard in places”.129 What may be deduced from these 
somewhat conflicting accounts is that the smattering of rain during the night of the 3-4 
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October was not sufficient to turn the ground uniformly into the swampy quagmire that it was 
later to become. “Despite the fact that there had been exceptionally dry weather in September, 
the continuous shelling had destroyed the drainage system of the many small streams which 
were characteristic of the area. Even without rain these watercourses had become bogs or 
swamps that provided obstacles for attacking troops… (the small amount of rain that had 
fallen on the night of 3 October) had made the going in the non-swampy areas heavy and 
slippery.”130
 
Enemy 
 
A Second Army Summary of Operations noted the enemy order of battle on its front of attack 
from north to south as 10th Ersatz Division, 20th Division, 4th Guard Division, one Regiment 
of 45th Reserve Division, one or more battalions of 16th Division, 19th Reserve Division, and 
8th Division.131 Enemy personnel facing 21st Division at Broodseinde was 19th Reserve 
Division, with 17th Division in close reserve, defending the sector between Polygon Wood and 
the Menin road.132  
 
However, the British assault was unknowingly timed to coincide with a German 
attack, with the objective of regaining ground lost during the battle of Polygon Wood. The 
British assault preceded this counter-attack by ten minutes, but the German preparatory 
bombardment caused the British many casualties. There were also a great deal more enemy 
troops in the front line than could possibly have been anticipated, with three battalions of the 
German 212th Reserve Regiment assembled on a 2,000 yard frontage between Polygon Wood 
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and Zonnebeke, backed by three regiments of the 4th Guard Division.133 Having seen Plumer 
turn the ‘new’ defensive tactics, with their reliance on organised counter-attacks to restore 
defensive positions, against them, the Germans’ only response had been to thicken the 
garrisons of their lines and to move the counter-attack formations closer for a quicker 
response.134 The enemy losses, horrifyingly increased by these new tactics, are discussed 
below. 
 
 The nature of the German defences in this area was known to the British through aerial 
photographs. The X Corps report on the Country and Defences remarked that the trenches 
appeared more formidable on the map than on the air photos, with most of them very shallow 
and much dilapidated.135 A 21st Division report noted that “a careful examination of 
photographs reveals no wire anywhere, but this does not necessarily mean none exists, and 
any hedges are probably wired in some way or other”. The document also states that “in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be assumed that all buildings are either 
converted into concrete emplacements or fortified in some way. The village of Reutel is a 
case in point, but although the houses to the Eastern end have shown no definite fortification, 
there are four distinct trenches leading to them as evidence of occupation.”136 The Germans 
had also constructed a series of strong points from the network of trenches that existed, from 
Juniper Cottage northwards over the centre of the Plateau to Jay Cottage. This was certainly 
the enemy’s main line of defence. 
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Results  
 
On the left of 21st Division’s attack, 3/4th Queens of 62nd Brigade, in action for the first time, 
were detailed for the first objective. Moving up at 4.30 a.m., the battalion assembled with B 
Company between A and D Companies, with C Company in close support. The relatively 
early assembly time meant that the manoeuvre was carried out swiftly and without the added 
difficulty of hostile shelling which plagued the other battalions. On its right was 9th KOYLI of 
64th Brigade; on the left was 1st Staffords of 7th Division. 
 
 At zero the battalion advanced across the Polygonbeek. The battalion War Diary states 
that this was achieved with “a certain amount of difficulty (and) only slight opposition was 
offered”, primarily from a concrete fortress on B Company’s front of attack. The OH, 
however, is less ambivalent about the difficulty of this task, stating that the Queens and the 
flanking KOYLI  
 
crossed the slough of the Polygonbeek in the face of fire from a number of 
unsuspected pillboxes on the opposite bank. Despite heavy casualties, with the 
support of one tank which moved by the Hooge – Reutel road, these two 
battalions most gallantly worked round and captured these strongpoints – an 
outstanding feat in the circumstances.137  
 
Four tanks had been allotted to this operation, to assist the infantry in working around the 
main German strong-points. The light rain that had fallen during the night had made the going 
extremely difficult for the two remaining tanks  - a “rain-sodden quagmire from edge to edge 
of the shell-holes. What had once been a road was now, of course, a mass of broken cobbles, 
muck and debris, human and mechanical”. They were therefore led to the objective by 
Captain Clement Robertson, attached Queens, because 
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if a tank missed the way it missed the battle too, for there was no recovery once 
the so-called track was left. Strait was the way and narrow, and Robertson walked 
alone in front of his tanks, otherwise no-one would have escaped submersion. He 
was no light-hearted boy doing a stunt. He knew what it meant, but it was up to 
him to bring his tanks into action at any and every cost. The swampy nature of the 
ground made it necessary to test every step of the way to prevent the tanks being 
ditched. Captain Robertson walked in front of his leading tank, prodding the 
ground with his stick, in spite of machine-gun bullets and heavy shell-fire against 
the tanks. He must have known that under these conditions his devotion to duty 
meant, sooner or later, certain death for him. He knew, however, that the success 
of the attack depended on his making sure of the ground over which his tanks 
were to go. They had crossed the stream, and were approaching their objective 
when he was killed by a bullet through the head while still leading. He was 
awarded a posthumous VC.138
 
 Once these obstacles were overcome, the objective was captured to time and quickly 
consolidated. At zero + 130 minutes the barrage advanced towards the second objective, and 
1st Lincolns on the left and 12/13 Northumberland Fusiliers on the right advanced through the 
Queens and the KOYLI to make the assault on the second objective.  
 
 9th KOYLI of 64th Brigade were to advance on the right of the Queen’s, next to 1st 
Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry of 5th Division on their right. During the night of 2-3 
October the battalion had moved from Clapham Junction and relieved the Leicesters in the 
front line in Polygon Wood, suffering about fifty casualties from enemy shelling during their 
subsequent stint in the line. By 5 a.m. on the morning of 4 October, the battalion was in 
position in the assembly trenches, again avoiding the heavy shelling about Blackwatch Corner 
that so affected the follow-through troops. The battalion attacked with D Company on the 
right of the attack and C Company on the left, with B and A Companies in support and 
reserve respectively.  
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Just before 6 o’clock all was more or less quiet, at zero the barrage opened with a 
fearsome noise and we leapt from our shell holes and went forward in snake 
formation. It was the darkness that precedes the dawn and one could recognise 
nobody. We are thankful to say that we were far away from our assembly 
positions before the full force of the German barrage descended – but were 
immediately subjected to a withering machine gun fire; shells were falling right 
and left but who cared? – our one idea was to get forward. Joist Farm proved to be 
our first stumbling block and was a tough nut to crack. Even when our left had 
reached the swamp, lights were being fired at us from this point, which was 
eventually mopped up by two sections of D Company under Captain Sykes and 
one section of B Company under Sergeant Pyott. This place was found to contain 
one Officer, twelve men and four machine guns. 
 
The swamp proved a veritable death trap; we were up to our knees in slush and at 
the same time subjected to enfilade machine gun fire from the right. A small 
strongpoint, not concrete, and immediately on the west bank of the swamp we 
took by surprise and the garrison surrendered without firing a shot. On this same 
bank were a considerable number of German bivouacs constructed of ‘elephants’ 
and filled with Germans, most of these had been blown in by our bombardment. 
The remainder containing Germans were bombed by our men and the Germans 
shot as they ran out. On the east side the ground rose rapidly and contained a 
number of concrete strong-points, two of which were in our area. These fired at us 
until we were within 50 yards. The garrisons then surrendered, the majority of 
them being bombed and shot. The left strong point turned out to be Battalion HQ 
and was an elaborate concern. Each contained two machine guns. 
 
Juniper Farm was strongly held but the garrison preferred to retire rather than 
fight. Second Lieutenant Spicer by a quick manoeuvre cut off the majority of 
these who gave themselves up to him. On the right the garrison showed a little 
more pluck and attempted to counter attack us. They were immediately squashed 
by D Company, after attacking these strong points we received little opposition 
until our objective was reached. All the troops of the Brigade were mixed up and 
we had a considerable number of Northumberland Fusiliers and Queens with us. 
During the one hour and forty minutes bombardment we were considerably 
troubled by a strong point on the east edge of Reutel which was eventually 
knocked out by a tank. It was at this time that we realised that our right flank was 
absolutely in the air… We were (soon) joined by the remnants of one company of 
the 15th DLI and one company of the East Yorks; these were sent out to the right 
to form a defensive flank. It did not take the enemy long to realise our position 
because we were immediately subjected to a heavy bombardment which 
continued through the day.139
 
 The ‘follow-through’ battalions were detailed to be 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers 
and 10th Yorkshire Regiment (Green Howards) on the front of 62nd Brigade, and 15th Durham 
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Light Infantry on 64th Brigade front. Circumstances were to prove that only the Fusiliers were 
in a state to be able to carry out their orders.  
 
1st Lincolns, detailed as the reserve battalion of 62nd Brigade, had dug into position in 
Polygon Wood during the night of 3-4 October, when its Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel L.P. Evans DSO, returned from reconnoitring the assembly position and ordered the 
battalion to move up and take over the role of 10th Green Howards. This battalion had come 
under an extremely heavy hostile barrage at Blackwatch Corner in Glencorse Wood on the 
march to the assembly position and, without guides, had lost touch with the other assaulting 
battalion, 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers. Colonel Evans, reconnoitring the position, had 
found this gap in the front line, realised the difficulty the Green Howards would have finding 
the assembly position before zero, and therefore moved his battalion into the gap. The report 
from 1st Lincolns states that “the whole battalion was delighted when Colonel Evans gave off 
this information”.140  
 
 The battalion passed 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers and assembled immediately to 
their north. These two battalions were to be deployed as the ‘follow-through’, detailed for the 
division’s final objective. D Company was on the left front, C on the right, with B and A 
Companies covering them off respectively. Each company was in close column of platoons, 
with six yards between companies. The battalion was actually in this assembly formation by 
Zero – five minutes, carried out undisturbed by enemy shelling. 
 
 At Zero the battalion moved forward en masse. A few casualties occurred very soon 
afterwards from machine gun fire and ‘shorts’ from the British barrage. By the time the first 
platoons reached the first strong-point there were gaps in the line. Colonel Evans ordered C 
                                                 
140 See narrative of 1st Lincolns 4-10-17, PRO, WO 95 / 2154. 
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and D Companies to push through and catch up the barrage whilst A and B Companies 
followed by platoons to the first objective, which was captured by C and D Companies at 
about 6.40 a.m. 
 
 Soon after Zero, about the German front line, a few ‘friendly’ shells fell amongst the 
two leading Companies. It was discovered later that an 18 pounder was firing short; one shell 
wounded two officers and six men. 200 yards further a burning pill box was encountered, 
presumably hit by the barrage, and the leading waves passed without encountering resistance, 
but one compartment on the north side had escaped observation. A machine gun opened fire 
from here, inflicting casualties until Colonel Evans silenced it by firing his revolver through 
the loophole, forcing the garrison to surrender.141 The Germans then came out with their 
hands up but were not sent back as prisoners. Unlike the Somme battles, no men seemed to 
want to take them back, and those that did go were invariably escorted by wounded men only. 
Germans who did not surrender ran mostly without equipment or rifles, so that bayonet work 
was impossible, but very good use was made of rifles. Men showed a decided preference to 
use the rifle rather than the bayonet.142
 
Upon reaching the objective, the barrage remained standing for an hour and forty 
minutes. Under this protective barrage, the Lincolns reorganised in Judge Trench, in touch 
with the Fusiliers to the south and troops of the 91st Brigade to the north. Before the attack 
recommenced, Colonel Evans moved A Company up in between C and D Companies as 
prearranged, with B Company remaining in reserve. By this time there were only six officers 
besides the CO with the battalion. Other ranks, however, had not suffered very heavily. 
                                                 
141 Lieutenant-Colonel Evans was awarded the VC for this act. See Biographical Index, p.174. 
 
142 Narrative of 1st Lincolns. 
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 Once the attack resumed, the final objective was taken reasonably smoothly, although 
fairly heavy casualties were caused by a machine gun and snipers from the vicinity of Judge 
Copse. One platoon of B Company, in battalion reserve, was sent up to reinforce the right 
flank of the attack, and the objective was reached. Further casualties occurred during the 
consolidation, chiefly from snipers. After dark contact was established with 12/13th 
Northumberland Fusiliers to the south and with troops of 91st Brigade to the north, and 
communication was established between the various posts of the front line. At this time there 
were, as far as could be ascertained, four officers and 160 other ranks with the battalion, 
which had gone into action with 22 officers and 570 strong. The final casualty officer list was 
five killed and 11 wounded. Losses in the other ranks amounted to 24 killed, 167 wounded 
and 36 missing; a total of 126 officers and 227 other ranks. These figures were thought light 
in the face of the fact that the German artillery fire in this battle was considered to be the 
heaviest and most concentrated of the whole war.143
 
 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers, the only battalion detailed for the second objective 
to go over the top, moved to its assembly positions immediately in rear of the Queens at 2 
a.m. The battalion was in position by 5.20 a.m., having encountered the enemy barrage 
between Glencorse and Polygon Woods, but suffered relatively few casualties. D Company 
was on the right front, C Company on the left, with A and B Companies supporting them 
respectively.  
 
 The final objective detailed to the Fusiliers was a line drawn from the southern end of 
Judge Copse on the right to Judge Cott on the left. At zero, the battalion moved forward close 
behind the Queens, encountering opposition for the first time from the shell holes of the 
                                                 
143 Ibid.  
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original German front line, in which remnants of the enemy appeared to have been passed 
over by the leading battalion. These pockets of enemy resistance caused several casualties.  
 
After crossing Juniper Trench the battalion came under fire from both flanks; on the 
right by a strong point that had yet to be cleared. Second Lieutenant Edmonds immediately 
moved A Company up on the right flank of the Battalion, attacked and captured this strong 
point, taking between 30 and 40 prisoners. A party of the KOYLI who came up shortly 
afterwards was left in this strong point as a garrison and A Company resumed its position in 
support of D Company. Meanwhile, on the left flank, C and B Companies had suffered 
casualties from a strong point near Juniper Trench, near the battalion’s junction with the right 
flank of 1st Lincolns. In conjunction with this latter battalion, the strong point was captured.  
 
Upon continuing the advance, the battalion became somewhat scattered owing to the 
boggy nature of the ground, primarily on the left flank. Heavy rifle and machine-gun fire was 
now directed against the battalion from the opposite ridge and a strong point near Judge 
Trench, causing heavy casualties. Using rifle grenades to good effect, C Company captured 
the strong point and its garrison.  
 
The battalion was still suffering heavy casualties from machine-gun fire from the front 
and right flank. Lieutenant-Colonel S.H. Dix MC therefore reorganised the left half of the 
battalion, and led B Company into the front line to strengthen C Company, but was killed 
leading the remaining men of these two companies up to the first objective. Captain G.B. 
Riddell, who was already wounded, took command and gave orders to consolidate the first 
objective. During the consolidation Captain Riddell was severely wounded, and the command 
of the Battalion passed to the Lewis Gun Officer, Lieutenant T. McKinnon, as all officers 
senior to him had become casualties. Only one officer now remained with each company. 
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Before the barrage moved on D Company found it necessary to attack a strong-point on the 
right of the battalion front which was causing trouble; a large number of the enemy were 
killed at this point and their machine-guns captured. 
 
At 7.40 a.m., zero + 100 minutes, the barrage moved on according to plan to allow the 
capture of the final objective, with the Fusiliers on the right and the Lincolns on the left. The 
battalions pushed on towards their respective objectives, still under heavy machine-gun and 
shell fire directed from the ridge opposite. Having reached a point about 250 yards short of 
the final objective the battalion dug in and consolidated, in line with the Lincolns on the left 
but considerably in advance of 64th Brigade on the right. Their flank being in the air, a 
defensive flank was immediately formed on the right by A Company, who eventually 
obtained touch with 9th KOYLI. Consolidation of the position was satisfactorily completed by 
dusk and A Company withdrew into close support in Judge Trench.  
 
The total advance effected by the Fusiliers was 1100 yards from the original front line, 
but at a terrible cost. Casualties suffered amongst the officers were seven killed and 12 
wounded; with 44 killed and 320 wounded amongst the other ranks.144 The OH notes that 
before midday on 4 October, the Fusiliers had lost its commanding officer and all four 
company commanders.145
 
 15th DLI, detailed to carry the second objective of 64th Brigade, had relieved the 
Leicesters in the front line on 2 October, in the vicinity of Glencorse Wood. The shelling that 
caused the Green Howards so many problems was felt even more keenly by troops already in 
the line and exposed to the barrage, with no option but simply to endure it. The battalion 
                                                 
144 Narrative of 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers, PRO, WO 95 / 2155. 
 
145 OH 1917, Volume II, p. 314 f. 
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sustained such casualties - 20 officers and 410 men146 - as to be deemed unable to attack, and 
10th KOYLI was brought forward for the assault. An NCO serving with the DLI later wrote to 
his fiancée 
 
we didn’t go in ‘til October the 2nd. Our Battalion was to have gone over the top 
and taken the final objective. Oh, it was a lovely ‘baptism of fire’ that night. We 
had to dig ourselves in, and early in the morning Fritz started strafing… I had 
twelve men when we went in, I came out with three… That October the fourth 
‘do’ I shall never forget. Our Battalion lost so heavily during the third from shell 
fire whilst lying in reserve preparatory to going over on the following morning 
that we could not attempt our job and consequently we remained in support till the 
attack was over.147
 
 By around 9 a.m. the objectives allotted to 21st Division had been largely taken, 
allowing complete observation of the Reutel valley to the south-east, and completing the 
security of the southern flank of the main Broodseinde battle front. “The value of the position 
was not altered by the fact that later in the day, owing to constant machine-gun and artillery 
fire from Polderhoek spur, at a thousand yards’ range across the valley, the right brigade, after 
suffering severe losses, had to withdraw slightly to more sheltered ground. The final objective 
was not gained, but the casualties show with what stubborn courage this important sector of 
the battlefield, at the eastern edge of the Gheluvelt plateau, was captured and held.”148
 
Casualties 
 
Despite the capture of set objectives at Broodseinde, the cost of its success was enormous. 
Officer casualties of 21st Division amounted to ten killed, 51 wounded and ten missing; those 
among the other ranks numbered 2,545, of whom 364 were killed, 1,699 wounded and 482 
                                                 
146 Captain Wilfred Miles, The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of the D.L.I. 
(London: Cassell, 1920), p. 191. 
 
147 Letter of 5 January 1918, by D.L. Rowlands, 15th DLI, 64th Brigade, IWM 93/20/1. His underlines.  
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missing. The overall divisional losses were the highest on Second Army front.149 Of the 86 
officers of 62nd Brigade who went into action, 74 became casualties during the period 3 – 8 
October. The three leading battalions each lost over 40 per cent of their effective strength, and 
no battalion had more than six officers left in action by 8 October. The casualties suffered by 
64th Brigade were similarly heavy, totalling 61 officers and 1,293 other ranks in the few days 
of the battle period. Neither KOYLI battalion lists its casualties, although 10th battalion came 
out of the line just 150 strong.150
 
Conclusions 
 
                                                 
149 The OH states other divisional casualties for Second Army as: 1st nd Australian – 2,448; 2  Australian – 2,174; 
3rd Australian –1,810; NZ Division – 1,643; 7th th Division – 2,123; 5  Division – 2,557; 37th Division – 818; 
compared with 21st Division losses of 2,616. OH 1917, Volume II, p. 315 f.  
 
150 OH 1917, Volume II, p. 314 f. Unit reports from the PRO give casualties as follows: 
 
Other ranks    Officers 
  Killed Missin
g 
Total KILLED M
issing 
 
Woun
ded 
 
Woun
ded 
Strengt
h 
       Battn. 
1/Lincs 22; 570 5 11 - 24 167 36 243 
- 7 12 - 44 320 383 NFs 
41; 904 3 6 - 49 184 19 261 Queens 
- 1 10 - 74 249   334* 10/Yorks 
E. 
Yorks 
615 3 5 1 36 172 73 290 
15/DLI - 4 16 - 38† 372     
430** 
- 1† unknown 89† unknown 90 
 
9/KOYLI 
- 4† unknown 75† unknown 79 
 
10/KOYLI 
 
 
28 
 
60 
 
1 
 
429 
 
1,592 
 
Total 
 
2,110 
 
10 
 
51 
 
10 
 
364 
 
1,699 
 
OH figures 
 
482 
 
2,616 
 
† Figures taken from the CD-Rom, Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19. Those figures calculated from these 
cannot be considered definitive. 
* Casualty figures for 10th Yorks are taken from Wylly, The Green Howards in the Great War, p. 346.  
** Figures taken from Miles, The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, p. 191.  
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As always, an offensive can be judged by one fundamental principle: gains versus losses. 
Gains are measured in terms of ground taken, prisoners of war, materiel and munitions 
captured, and in terms of the losses inflicted on the enemy. British losses can really only be 
measured by casualty figures, and whether they are judged to be tolerable given what has 
been achieved. At Broodseinde, as Prior and Wilson have noted,  
 
X Corps achieved its objectives but only at high cost. In some areas the mud and 
tangled wire in the woods was so bad that the troops immediately lost the 
protection of the barrage and were subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from the 
pillbox defences. In other areas the creeping barrage could hardly be distinguished 
from the heavy enemy bombardment from unsubdued guns on the right of the 
attack. Only by repeated frontal assaults was the line advanced the required 800 
yards. The total casualty list was 8,000 men.151
 
Yet the cost to the Germans was undoubtedly as high, if not more so. Ludendorff later 
deemed 4 October 1917 one of the ‘black days’ of the German Army152 and the Chief of Staff 
to Crown Prince Rupprecht, H.J. von Kühl, noted Broodseinde in his diary as “quite the 
heaviest battle to date”.153 Certainly, the German losses were appalling. Opposite I Anzac 
Corps, 45th Reserve Division lost 83 officers and 2,800 other ranks. Foot Guard Regiment No. 
5 described it as the worst day yet experienced in the war.154 The Australian Official History 
stated that “early reports which had come in gave clear evidence of the morning’s 
achievement, but by noon it was obvious that an overwhelming blow had been struck and 
both sides knew it”.155 Companies of 212th Reserve Regiment, one of the units brought in for 
the German assault on Tokio spur, and 4th Guard Division holding the same line opposite X 
                                                 
151 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele – the Untold Story, p. 135. 
 
152 W. Beumelberg, Flandern, 1917 (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1928), p. 122. 
 
153 German Official Account, Volume XIII (Berlin: Mittler, 1942) p. 79. 
 
154 OH  1917, Volume II, p. 316 f. 
 
155 C.E.W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume IV – The Australian 
Imperial Force in France in 1917 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson), p. 875. 
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Corps, lost 95 per cent of their effective fighting strength.156 A Second Army Summary of 
Operations concluded that  
as a result of recent operations it is estimated that seven Battalions of each of the 
4th Guard and 19th Reserve Divisions; six Battalions each of the 10th Ersatz and 
20th Divisions; five Battalions of the 45th Reserve Division; four Battalions of the 
8th Division and three Battalions of the 16th Division have all suffered so heavily 
as to be of little further fighting value. The thickening up of the line by the 
bringing in of Battalions and Regiments of other Divisions, the confusion of units 
and the lack of cohesion in the counter attacks proves how completely our former 
attacks have disorganised the enemy and with what haste he has been compelled 
to throw in his reinforcements.157  
 
In terms of prisoners, Second Army captured during the day’s fighting 114 officers and 
4,044 other ranks; Fifth Army took 12 officers and 589 other ranks. This brought the total for 
Plumer’s ‘three steps’ to over 10,000. Messages stressed the demoralised state of the 
survivors.158 Enemy dead littered No Man’s Land, and many British observers said they had 
never seen so many German corpses on a battlefield.159  
 
The reasons for these high losses are simple. Firstly, the Germans had sent large 
numbers of counter-attack troops into the front line for an assault of their own; and secondly, 
Ludendorff himself had advocated the thickening of garrisons in the front line, positioning his 
counter-attack divisions to within striking distance of the battle zone, to catch the attacking 
British infantry as they emerged from the protective barrage. However, this defensive tactic 
had served merely to increase German casualties, as they were exposed in greater numbers to 
the increasing weight and deeper thrust of the British artillery. “In this third of Plumer’s 
                                                 
156 OH 1917, Volume II, p. 305 f. 
 
157 Second Army Summary of Operations during period 27 September to 4 October, 1917, PRO, WO 95 / 275. 
 
158 OH  1917, Volume II, pp. 315-6 f. 
 
159 See Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1986), pp. 475-6. 
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measured blows, it merely created horrendous losses for a German army reeling from a string 
of tactical defeats.”160 Prior and Wilson have noted that some of the features of Broodseinde 
were “the product of ill-judgement and sheer bad luck on the part of the enemy. These were 
unlikely to be regular features of future operations. For example, it was improbable that the 
enemy would once again pack additional men into the front zone to be numbered among the 
dead and prisoners. And Plumer could hardly bank on the Germans again being about to 
launch an attack of their own when the British bombardment commenced.”161
 
In terms of advancement, gains and losses, the assault on Broodseinde seems to have 
yielded the worst results: 2,616 casualties for the meagre gain of 0.2 square miles.162 Yet the 
attack on 4 October is generally viewed as a success. Although the ground won was less than 
in the other assaults, this was primarily due to the setting of limited objectives. This is clear 
evidence of the problems of the Ypres Salient, as is the huge amount of difficulty experienced 
by the division during the move to assembly positions. 21st Division was never more severely 
shelled during the war than at Broodseinde, and in conditions that were arguably the least able 
to sustain such bombardment. In line with this, the British ratio of 2.5 yards per gun was 
highly favourable, as was the accumulation of 1.5 million rounds of ammunition for the 
division, which begs the question: why did both belligerents rely so heavily on artillery in the 
sector of front which was least able to sustain such shelling? The answer may well imply a 
military vicious circle: it is possible that both British and German High Command believed 
that a systematic bombardment of enemy positions combined with a comprehensive multi-belt 
                                                 
160 Lee, ‘The British Divisions at Third Ypres’, pp. 220-1. 
 
161 Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele – the Untold Story, p. 137. 
 
162 This calculation is based on the average advance of 800 yards along the 700 yard frontage allocated by X 
Corps to its two divisions. See above, p. 74. 
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barrage were the only methods of protecting the infantry from hostile fire whilst they 
struggled through the sucking mud that was, of course, created by the constant shelling. This 
was arguably true of Plumer, an advocate of artillery, and who always took what measures he 
could to protect his attacking infantry. The extraordinary use of tanks in this assault also 
implies a reliance on technology in this difficult sector to protect the assaulting troops. The 
fact that the offensive was unknowingly timed to coincide with a German counter-attack 
accounts for the enormous weight of enemy shelling, and for both British and enemy 
casualties during the day, simply due to the hugely increased number of troops in the forward 
area. However, the coincidental timing of the two assaults is a clear indication that the half-
light of dawn was the best time to ensure a successful attack in this area.  
 
 The achievements of 21st Division at Broodseinde do not demonstrate much in terms 
of tactical evolution, although this is arguably due to the huge problems encountered by all 
British forces in Flanders in late 1917. The reorganisation of the platoon into a more 
autonomous unit does indicate the beginning of the devolution of command process, but the 
difficulties imposed by the Ypres Salient meant that troops were clearly more dependent on 
orders from High Command rather than local initiative. There is some evidence of 
independent thought during the difficult march to assembly positions, particularly at battalion 
level, but this is arguably before the battle took place and therefore still within the control of 
higher command. The performance of 21st Division at Broodseinde demonstrates more the 
ability of the British infantry to adapt to unforeseen circumstances and the determination of 
all ranks to succeed in the worst of conditions rather than a further step in the learning curve 
of tactical evolution. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Miraumont – 24 August 1918 
 
The assault on Miraumont is particularly important in the study of the evolution of 21st 
Division. The capture of Miraumont was imperative to the advance of two separate Corps, 
and the advance was therefore so strategically important that the Brigadier himself chose to 
lead the attack, in order to be able to command most efficiently. This is the first indication – 
in this study, at least - of the decentralisation of command experienced by the BEF,163 and the 
success of this new style of leadership is displayed by the deftness with which the division 
was able to advance with both flanks in the air, and then consolidate and maintain its isolated 
position in the face of repeated German counter-attacks. The attack was also undertaken in the 
darkest midnight hours, and with very little artillery support, making it an ideal comparison 
with the previous dawn attacks under substantial barrages. Finally, as the attack was over the 
old Somme battlefield, it offers much in the way of analytical material to compare with the 
attacks at Bazentin and, in the next chapter, on the Beaurevoir Line.   
 
Sources  
 
One of the huge discrepancies within the literature of the Great War is that so much of it is 
focused on the early battles of the war, particularly those of 1916 and 1917. The public 
fixation with the disasters that befell the BEF, particularly the first day on the Somme, 
muddy, bloody Passchendaele, and the near-collapse in the German Spring Offensive, is due 
in part to a subconscious need to reinforce the old stereotype that the Great War was ‘a bad 
thing’. The Hundred Days campaign of autumn 1918, which eradicated entirely the German 
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1918, during which the formal command systems of 1916-17 swiftly broke down. 
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gains of the war and caused the virtual collapse of her armies, was a series of spectacular 
offensives demonstrating the extent of tactical reform and skill within the BEF during the 
war. Yet the campaign is virtually unknown, particularly within the national consciousness. 
There are two explanations for this: firstly, that to emphasise the successes of the BEF - and 
these were arguably the greatest in British military history - would conflict with the public 
view of the war as pointless, futile, and intolerably costly, both financially and in human 
terms. The second explanation has more basis in the actual facts of the time: there is very little 
secondary literature on this part of the war simply because there is scarcely enough primary 
evidence to use as a foundation. This is easily borne out by the scarcity of literature relating to 
this battle. Any primary sources available can be found at the Public Record Office in Kew 
(hereafter PRO) under the classmark WO 95, which holds the war diaries. WO 95 / 2133 
contains documents relating to 21st Division, including the Operation Order pertaining to this 
battle, O.O. No. 210, and its seven appendices. The diary also contains a ‘Summary of 
Operations from August 1st to 31st 1918’, which is particularly useful in that it delineates the 
forces opposite 21st Division, and describes the confusion in the enemy ranks due to the blows 
dealt on 21 and 23 August. The fact that there is so little information other than this bare 
minimum is demonstrative of the hurried business of waging war at the time. 21st Division 
had attacked on these two previous days, and would be engaged again three times before the 
end of August. To expect the level of battle documentation such as was found earlier in the 
war would perhaps be asking too much, but this deficit is clear evidence as to the dearth of 
secondary literature pertaining to this battle. 
 
 Documents from the higher levels of command, V Corps and Third Army, can be 
found in the classmarks WO 95 / 750 and 372 respectively. The only document of note in 
Third Army Papers is a ‘Summary of Operations’, a very bare account of the battle but useful 
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in that it notes the times of orders sent, received, and acted upon, thus recording the timetable 
of events. Again, it is documents from V Corps that are particularly useful. V Corps 
Operation Order No. 233 is another very bare account, which simply details the objectives 
allocated to its three divisions, leaving their Commanding Officers to make their own plans. 
This is very much in line with Haig’s telegram that each division should be allocated a far 
objective and instructed to reach it regardless of flanks or specific orders from above, and 
demonstrates the devolution of command at this time. Also to be found in V Corps diary is a 
‘Narrative of Operations From August 21st to November 11th 1918’, a detailed document 
outlining the necessity of the action, and the difficulties foreseen in its achievement, plus the 
manner in which the attack was to take place. This document also outlines the ‘Problems of 
the V Corps’, a very useful appendix, which describes the obstacles facing the corps, 
particularly the deliberate flooding of the Ancre by the Germans and the defence methods 
employed by the enemy on the high ground beyond the river. 
 
 War Diaries of 64th Brigade and its subordinate units are to be found in WO 95 / 2161 
and 2162. The diary of 1st East Yorks (2161) is particularly detailed under the protracted 
circumstances of battle, and is very useful in that it lists casualties on a daily basis, so the 
historian can compare battalion losses against the other battles during this period. The diary of 
9th KOYLI (2162) is also fairly detailed for the time, noting the difficulties of the brigade 
assembly and, unusually amongst these accounts, it actually describes the assault. The diary 
of 15th Durham Light Infantry (DLI) gives a very sketchy account, presumably due to the 
difficulties of its maintenance at this time, but is very useful in that it states 7 p.m. on 23 
August as receipt of the Operation Order, and listing detailed casualties. However, given that 
the DLI’s commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Holroyd-Smyth, took control of the 
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brigade after Brigadier McCulloch was wounded, one might have expected a slightly more 
detailed account. 
 
 Accounts taken from other battalions of 21st Division are similarly sketchy. The diary 
of 1st Lincolns, 62nd Brigade (2154), gives a very brief outline of 64th Brigade’s attack but 
little else, while that of its sister battalion, 2nd Lincolns, is little more than useless for the 
attack, but does summarise the enemy forces facing 21st Division prior to the fighting on      
21 August. The final battalion of 62nd Brigade, 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers (2155), 
usefully details both battalion and fighting strength, but devotes very little narrative to the 
attack on 24 August as it was involved in attacks on other days. This same reason accounts for 
even less notice made by the battalions of 110th Brigade. The dairy of 6th Leicesters (2164) 
makes no reference to the attack, and that of its sister battalion, 7th Leicesters, simply notes 
that the battalion was ordered move forward in the line as part of everyday warfare. This was, 
in fact, to reinforce the isolated 64th Brigade, but the benefit of hindsight and the importance 
of this reference clearly escaped the diarist. Finally, the diary of 1st Wiltshires notes the 
battalion’s role in assisting 64th Brigade, but very little else. 
 
 As has been noted, the Hundred Days campaign is shamefully neglected in the Great 
War literature. This assault was, however, recognised by the Official History (hereafter OH), 
as an astonishing feat, and was so impressed it devoted over five pages to its narrative, 
whereas other brigades assaulting on the same day received only two paragraphs of coverage. 
See Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Volume IV compiled by Brigadier-
General Sir James Edmonds, (London: Macmillan, 1947). An excellent secondary source 
recently published is J.P. Harris’ Amiens to the Armistice – The B.E.F. in the Hundred Days’ 
Campaign, 8 August – 11 November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998). The attack on Albert, 
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however, is not even mentioned, despite its importance and striking success. Matthew 
Richardson’s The Tigers – 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th (Service) Battalions of the Leicestershire 
Regiment (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), devotes a few pages to the battle’s narrative, mainly 
through eye-witness accounts, and a brief synopsis of 110th Brigade’s role in the assault. H.R. 
Cumming’s A Brigadier in France, 1917-1918 (London: Cape, 1922), which also only 
recounts the role of 110th Brigade, is very detailed in its narrative of the assault, but David 
Kelly, whose 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’ - The 110th Infantry Brigade (London: Benn, 1930) 
appeared so useful, was infuriatingly on leave in mid-August, and missed “an action of the 
brigade for the first and last time” (p. 135). One final eye-witness account can be found in 
Captain Wilfred Miles’ The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of 
the D.L.I. (London: Cassell, 1920), which offers a good, detailed narrative account, although 
lacking the trench names and intimate knowledge of the ground to be of great use alongside 
the other battalion reports. One fact that is particularly interesting is that the account was 
clearly not taken from the battalion War Diary – there is far more detail than in the diary – 
and Miles must have taken it from eye-witness accounts later on that were unavailable to both 
the diarist and myself. 
 
Context 
 
The German Spring Offensive, begun in March 1918 with the ‘Michael’ assault on the 
Somme, had been the defining feature of the year to date. It achieved a degree of penetration 
hitherto unmatched in the history of trench warfare, almost forty miles, and caused the virtual 
collapse of the British Fifth Army. The Germans, under Erich Ludendorff, followed this 
remarkable attack with a series of swift, intended knock-out blows on the Lys, the Aisne, and 
the Marne, but never repeated the success of ‘Michael’, as their depleted and exhausted troops 
met with increasingly fortified defences. By July the Germans were spent; struggling with 
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manpower, rifle and food shortages, as well as physical and moral exhaustion. Yet their 
leaders, realising that though they could not win the war the Allies still had to defeat them, 
were unready to sue for peace. An Allied attack seemed imminent, but the British were the 
only force in a position to deliver a successful offensive – “the only really effective fighting 
force on the Allied side, for the Americans, though courageous, were still inexperienced and 
the French were now in an exhausted and war-weary condition”.164  
 
On 8 August 1918 Rawlinson’s Fourth Army launched an assault east of Amiens, 
beginning the Hundred Days campaign that would eventually win the war. Supported by a 
massive concentration of armour - 530 British and 70 French tanks165  - and undertaken by 
the exceptional Australian and Canadian infantry, the assault was a huge success, retaking 
almost the entire Somme battlefield.166 Ludendorff called 8 August the “black day of the 
German Army”,167 but it was only the beginning of a three-month campaign that would 
eventually defeat the Germans. After the initial gains and two days of heavy fighting, 
Rawlinson’s forces were exhausted; the advances became increasingly slight and unable to 
off-set losses in personnel and munitions. With the Germans in retreat, the offensive had to be 
                                                 
164 Robert Blake (ed.) The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), 
p. 322. 
 
165 John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson, 1996), p. 440. 
 
166 The British III Corps also played an important, if less spectacular, role in the attack on 8 August, on the north 
of the Dominion attack. There were sound operational reasons why III Corps was not as successful as the 
Canadians and the Australians, including the disruption of preparations by a German attack on 6 August and the 
significant difficulties posed by the proximity of the Chipilly spur. For more information, see J.P. Harris with 
Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice – The B.E.F. in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August – 11 November 
1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998), pp. 95-98. 
 
167 Erich Ludendorff, The Concise Ludendorff Memoirs 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), p. 290. See also 
Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp. 103-4. 
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continued, and Rawlinson felt that the main lines of assault should be shifted to his flanks.168 
In the south, the French began preparing their troops for an assault, whilst Haig gave orders 
for Horne’s First Army to finalise plans for the capture of La Bassée and the Aubers Ridge, in 
conjunction with an attack of Plumer’s Second Army on Kemmel Ridge and a push by 
Byng’s Third Army towards Bapaume. 
 
 This assault by Third Army, the battle of Albert, opened on 21 August with 
remarkable success. Its aim was the capture of the Albert - Arras railway which, in the south, 
ran very close and parallel to the British line but swung away eastwards to a distance of nearly 
three miles in the centre. On every part of the front the British took their first objectives, with 
IV Corps advancing to within striking distance of the furthest section of the railway. Yet it 
had been a hot day, and Byng’s troops were understandably fatigued. 22 August was spent 
repelling German counter-attacks ordered by General Otto von Below, commander of the 
Seventeenth Army, who clearly believed that the British were spent. However, unknown to 
von Below, the attack had merely been paused and was reopened on the following day. 
Clearly irritated by Byng’s caution, Haig had demanded that the offensive be renewed at the 
earliest moment possible,169 and the attack was more aggressive than Byng would otherwise 
have ordered. It was, nevertheless, extremely successful. By nightfall, the Third Army was in 
almost full occupation of the railway, and the villages of Ervillers, Gommecourt and Achiet-
le-Grand had all fallen to British troops. With the Army’s distant objective being the capture 
                                                 
168 The diary of General Sir H.S. Rawlinson Bt., 10 August 1918, National Army Museum. “Hostile resistance is 
stiffening ... [now] is the time to extend the battle front and put in further attacks by Armies on the flanks, [Foch] 
strongly advised D.H. to make the III Army attack as I suggested a week ago and I think it will be done.” 
 
 
169 Haig, Private Papers, p. 324. See also Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 
– The Franco-British Offensive, Volume IV, (London: HMSO, 1947) Appendix XX, ‘Commander-in-Chief’s 
Telegram of 22nd August, 1918’, pp. 587-8. 
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of Bapaume, only the capture of the remaining section of railway, unfortunately on the front 
of V Corps, and the village of Miraumont were required for a relatively unobstructed route to 
Bapaume.170 On the night of 23-24 August, 21st Division of V Corps was detailed for the 
capture of Miraumont. 
 
Aims171
 
Byng’s orders to V Corps were issued at 5.35 p.m. on 23 August, stating that troops were to 
advance towards Rocquigny and Morval, about eight miles ahead, south of Bapaume, 
mopping up any remaining pockets of enemy resistance between the southern Army boundary 
and the Ancre.172 This zone was familiar to 21st Division, including Mametz Wood and the 
Bazentins, whose capture a little over two years previously witnessed the first action of 110th 
Brigade. However, although nearby, the division was not destined for this area, being on the 
northern flank of V Corps, facing Grandcourt and Le Sars.  
 
Method 
 
The plan of attack outlined by Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute, commanding V Corps, was 
based on the need to avoid certain areas of the Corps frontage. The Ancre valley, as is 
outlined below,173 was particularly marshy and there existed a flooded area from Aveluy on 
the southern corps boundary to about seven hundred yards north of Authuille, in the centre of 
the corps frontage. In order to overcome this, Shute decided to make convergent attacks from 
north and south of this flooded area, which would join up on the line la Boiselle – Ovillers – 
Grandcourt, about 1,500 yards to the east of the original start line. In addition, this plan also 
                                                 
170 See Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, pp. 121-43, particularly the map on p. 128. See also OH 1918, Volume 
IV, Sketch 14. 
 
171 See Maps V and VI, pp. 149 and 150. 
 
172 OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 242. See also Sketch 14.  
 
173 See pp. 108-9. 
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had the advantage of avoiding a direct attack on the strong Thiepval position, which lay just to 
the north of the sector protected by the flooded area.  
 
The attacks were to be made at 1 a.m. The southern advance, north-eastwards, was to 
be made by the right of 38th Division, in conjunction with the left of 18th Division of             
III Corps, Fourth Army. The northern assault was to be directed south-eastwards, by the 
centre and left of 38th Division, one brigade (50th) of 17th Division and 21st Division. The aims 
of this attack were to capture Thiepval from the flank, plus the high ground beyond, and 
Grandcourt; and from there join up with the southern attacks about half a mile north-north-
east of Ovillers. From this first objective, success was to be exploited to a line running from 
Contalmaison via Pozières to the high ground a thousand yards south-east of Miraumont, with 
Morval as the objective of a farther advance.174  
 
In the event, 21st Division was not to advance at 1 a.m., as designated by V Corps. 
During the evening of 23 August it became clear that the enemy was still holding out in 
Miraumont and had checked the advance of IV Corps to the left. Third Army, therefore, 
deemed it imperative that the high ground south-east of Miraumont should be seized as early 
as possible in order to link up with the right of the IV Corps. Rapidity on the part of 21st 
Division was therefore essential to facilitate the advance of IV Corps and, in conjunction with 
those forces, to encircle the village of Miraumont and occupy it before the garrison had time 
to withdraw or destroy the bridge within the village over the Ancre. Under instructions from 
Third Army, 21st Division was therefore ordered to advance at 11 p.m., with the objective of 
                                                 
174 OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 243, and Sketch 14. 
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the knoll 1,500 yards south-east of Miraumont, and not wait for the 1 a.m. zero hour fixed for 
the rest of V Corps’ attack to the right.175
 
Order of Battle176
 
The Australian and III Corps of Rawlinson’s Fourth Army lined up, right to left, alongside V, 
IV and VI Corps of Byng’s Third Army. 21st Division was the left of three divisions of 
Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute’s V Corps, with 17th Division immediately to the right and 
38th Division beyond that, on the extreme right of Third Army’s frontage.177 Flanking 21st 
Division on the left was 42nd Division of Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper’s IV Corps. 
 
 Brigadier-General A.J. McCulloch’s 64th Brigade, already in the line, was selected for 
the assault. The offensive was allocated to 1st East Yorks on the left and 9th KOYLI on the 
right, both less one Company. Their two detached companies and one available from 15th 
Durham Light Infantry, which was in the line and could not safely be relieved in time for the 
assembly, were to form the brigade reserve, assisted by eight machine guns. “Behind a 
brigade guide in the centre, each battalion had two companies in front line with the third in 
support, and each company moved in square formation, that is with a platoon at each angle of 
a square, with 20 yards between the platoons each way. A similar distance separated the 
companies.”178
 
                                                 
175 V Corps Narrative of Operations from August 21st to November 11th 1918, ‘The forging of the Ancre and the 
capture of Thiepval Ridge’, PRO, WO 95 / 751. 
 
176 See Appendices IX and X, pp. 167 and 168. 
 
177 38th Division included the now-famous 2nd th Royal Welsh Fusiliers within its 115  Brigade. This battalion has 
since found literary fame through its celebrated sons, Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves and Frank Richards, as 
well as an outstanding account of the battalion’s wartime experience, compiled by its Medical Officer, J.C. 
Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919 (London: Abacus, 1998). An account of this offensive can be 
found on pp. 512-5. 
 
178 OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 245. 
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 Given the difficulty of the assault, and the fact that the brigade was to advance ahead 
of zero, there were no troops on either flank, but 110th Brigade on the right and 127th 
(Manchester) Brigade of 42nd Division on the left would follow on at the original zero hour of 
1 a.m. and connect with 64th Brigade on the final objective. The fact that the division was to 
advance with both flanks ‘in the air’ was in line with a general message from the 
Commander-in-Chief that all ranks should act with the utmost boldness. Divisions were to be 
given a distant objective which each must reach independently of its neighbour, even if, for 
the time being, its flanks were exposed. Reinforcements were to be directed to the points 
where troops were gaining ground and not where they were checked.179
 
Resources 
 
The barrage for the convergent attacks was to be fired by 144 field guns and 60 heavy guns; a 
small number for a front of over 8,000 yards, but sufficient to satisfy the infantry at this stage 
of the war.180 This gave rise to a ratio of 39.2 yards of attack frontage per gun. The artillery 
was under direct orders of the respective divisions, although barrages in depth were arranged 
Corps-wide to cover the advances, as were protective barrages formed in front of the various 
                                                 
179 Haig to the Armies, 22 August 1918, OAD 911, PRO, WO 158 / 241. Haig’s telegram can be found in full in 
OH 1918, Volume IV, Appendix XX, pp. 587-8. 
 
180 OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 243. See also V Corps Narrative of Operations. The figures it cites make interesting 
reading, as follows: 
 
  113th Bde. 114th Bde. 50th Bde. 64th Total  Bde. 
18 pounders 24 18 30 36 108  Field Guns 
4.5” hows. 6 6 12 12 36 
60 pounders 8 6 8 8 30  Heavy Guns 
6” hows. 8 6 8 8 30 
Total Field Guns 30 24 42 48 144 
Total Heavy Guns 16 12 16 16 60 
Total 46 36 58 64 204 
 
What is interesting is that 64th st Brigade, the assaulting unit of 21  Division, was allotted significantly more guns 
than the other assaulting brigades, almost double that of 114th, which adds further weight to the theory that this 
was the most challenging assault on the Corps front. Whether 21st Division was chosen for the assault simply 
because it was in the line or was moved into position because it was thought equal to the task is debatable. 
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bounds. In addition to the main artillery the right and left assaults were supported by eight 
heavy howitzers that engaged selected enemy points of resistance. It must be assumed, given 
that it was the left assaulting force, that the attack of 21st Division was supported by these 
extra guns, although the literature does not give any indication either way. The creeping 
barrage was to be fired by 21st Division artillery, XCIV and XCV Brigades RFA, and 16 guns 
of XVII Brigade RGA.181 The remainder of the heavy artillery were to keep the area to be 
nipped off by the converging attacks under heavy fire until 115th Brigade, 38th (Welsh) 
Division, was in a position to mop it up and begin the consolidation process. One 
contemporary historian noted that the British barrage had been ineffective, but that the enemy 
appeared to have little idea of what was happening.182
 
 21st Division also utilised its Machine Gun Companies for the assault, allocating       
12 guns to assist 64th Brigade in the consolidation process, and 16 guns for that of 110th 
Brigade. The Operation Order states that once the barrage for the initial assault had been 
completed, “20 Guns will revert to the 62nd Infantry brigade for the defence of the ground 
north of the Ancre. 12 Guns will revert to Divisional Reserve.”183 However, none of the 
battalion or brigade diaries report state the use or assistance of these guns, although this may 
have more to do with the brevity of the reports themselves than the appearance or otherwise 
of the machine guns. 
 
In terms of other resources, there is very little in the literature or the unit reports to 
give any real indication. An appendix to 21st Division Operation Order 210 instructs troops to 
                                                 
181 OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 244. 
 
182 Captain Wilfred Miles, The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of the D.L.I. 
(London: Cassell, 1920) p. 322. 
 
183 Appendix III to 21st Division Order No. 210 – Machine Gun Arrangements, PRO, WO 95 / 2133. 
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be “as lightly equipped as possible… The 64th Infantry Brigade will carry two bombs per 
man; the 110th Infantry Brigade will carry rifle grenades, but not bombs… The exact 
proportion of tools to be carried is left to Brigadiers, but the proportion will be kept low. It is 
the Divisional Commander’s intention to improve existing trenches and connect up shell 
holes, rather than to dig new trenches.”184 A further appendix instructed the troops to “go into 
action carrying at least 170 rounds of SAA,” and that 62nd and 110th Infantry Brigades will go 
into action carrying rations for August 24th and 25th, in addition to the Iron Ration. 64th 
Infantry Brigade will carry rations for August 24th in addition to the Iron Ration.”185 In 
addition, the DLI’s official historian noted that “few tools were to be carried, as existing 
trenches and shell-holes could be adapted for defence when the objective was won and it was 
essential that the troops should be lightly equipped for the difficult advance”.186 It must be 
assumed from this that the commanders were finally placing greater importance on the 
capture of objectives, and placing the task of the consolidation process with troops 
specifically designated for that purpose rather than demanding it of the infantry that had just 
taken the objective and were understandably fatigued. 
 
Terrain 
 
The area over which the division was to advance was only a few miles to the north-west of the 
ground assaulted on 14 July 1916, yet the terrain was markedly different. There were two 
main features; firstly, the River Ancre and the valleys either side; and secondly, the rising 
slopes towards Martinpuich. The Ancre, generally an inconsiderable stream, had been flooded 
intentionally by the enemy and was 300 yards wide in a great part of its course. The western 
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185 Appendix VIII to 21st Division Order No. 210 – Administrative Instructions, PRO, WO 95 / 2133. 
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banks were low and boggy, and all bridges had been destroyed by the considerable 
bombardment from both belligerents. The main stream, although only fifteen to twenty feet 
broad, was six to eight feet deep, and was indistinguishable from the rest of the flooded area. 
This stretch of bog and water was covered throughout by a tangle of fallen trees, branches and 
coarse reeds, with wire – almost unnecessarily – added to make it a more difficult obstacle.187  
 
Beyond the river to the east lay the high ground from Tara Hill above Albert to the 
Thiepval Heights south of Grandcourt, with Martinpuich near its highest point, and there a 
spur overlooking Miraumont. The difference in height between the river valley and the final 
objective, about half a mile north-north-east of Ovillers, was around four hundred feet, a 
particularly high rise, although the incline of the slope is unspecified.188 The heights were a 
continuous mass of trenches, dugouts, fallen trees and wire, pitted with shell craters, seamed 
with old trenches and intersected by deep gullies.189 The high position afforded the Germans a 
commanding view of all the British trenches, which meant that any move was witnessed and 
drew fire. The importance of the position lay in this siting above the British: it was obvious 
that neither the left of Fourth Army could advance eastward from Albert, nor could IV Corps 
on the left advance on Miraumont until this formidable position was in British hands.190  
 
 The summer of 1918 had also been fairly hot, and though the Somme valley was 
bisected with tributary streams and rivers, the land was dry. The weather throughout the 
Battle of Albert had been exceptionally warm, although 24 August was cooler. The news of 
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the night attack, as opposed to the burning heat of the day, must have been a huge relief to 
battle-weary men exhausted by the heat and the sun, particularly given that there was very 
little shelter in the open.  
 
Enemy 
 
The enemy troops opposite V Corps were universally agreed to be in a state of great 
confusion. 21st Division War Diary notes that at the opening of the battle, on 21 August, there 
were eight divisions in the line opposite Third Army, with two known to be in reserve. In 
addition, divisions that had fought in the battle of Amiens on 8 August were known to be on 
their way to rest in the Bapaume – Cambrai areas, and train activity from Lille to Cambrai 
indicated the arrival of fresh divisions from the north. It is generally accepted that these 
factors boosted the number of divisions to thirteen on Third Army’s front. However, it was 
the success of operations between 21 and 23 August that had caused the state of great 
confusion, as both fresh and tired divisions were thrown liberally into the fight to stem the 
advance. Prisoners testified to the confusion that existed behind the enemy lines, and 
attributed the British success to the fact that the hammering blows of the attack gave them no 
time to rest and reorganise their troops.191 Prisoners also stated that the enemy was 
withdrawing to the Hindenburg Line, with the intention of holding up the British advance 
with rearguard troops for a sufficient length of time to rest and reorganise the main body of 
troops away from the brunt of the fighting.192 The confusion behind enemy lines was borne 
out by the fact that troops from at least twenty German divisions were captured by V Corps 
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192 Prisoner Interrogation Reports, V Corps War Diary, PRO, WO 95 / 751. 
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alone, of which eight were identified by 21st Division.193 Nominally, 16th Reserve Regiment 
and the 3rd Naval Division of the German Seventeenth Army, both of which had already been 
identified by 21st Division, were in the line on the night of the 23-24 August. However, the 
state of the enemy troops, as confessed by their own captured men, would suggest that the 
pockets of resistance to be encountered by attackers from 21st Division could be from any 
units opposite Third Army.194
  
Results 
 
The task of 21st Division was altered by Army instruction to move as soon as possible towards 
Miraumont, with the objective of seizing the high ground to the south-east of it in order to cut 
off the village and prevent the garrison from destroying the bridges over the Ancre and 
withdrawing. The OH is in no doubt as to the difficulty of the task: “to make a night advance 
to attack a line known to be held and seize an objective over three thousand yards beyond it 
was an exceptional task”,195 and devotes much space to describing how it was accomplished. 
 
 It was 5.30 p.m. on 23 August before Brigadier-General McCulloch, part of whose 
64th Brigade was in the front line, was informed of the change to the operation. Before leaving 
for divisional headquarters to discuss the alterations he issued a warning order modifying his 
previous instructions for the 1 a.m. advance, to the effect that the brigade, less 15th Durham 
Light Infantry (DLI) which could not safely be relieved until dark, was to concentrate in the 
ruins of St Pierre Divion as soon as possible, with all the machine guns of the company 
attached to the brigade which could be collected in time. The section of Field Company RE 
                                                 
rd193 Namely the German 3  Naval Division, 16th Reserve Division, 52nd Division, 49th Reserve Division, 44th 
Reserve Division, 14th Reserve Division, 163rd th Division, and 87  Division, from Summary of Operations from 
August 1st to 31st 1918, 21st Division War Diary, PRO, WO 95 / 2133. 
194 An admittedly ‘inexhaustive’ list of these troops can be found in the OH 1918, Volume IV, p. 262. An 
appraisal of their ‘class’ can be found on p. 181 f.  
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(probably 98th) attached to the brigade was to continue work at the crossings over the Ancre, 
and the brigade light trench-mortar company was warned to be prepared to bombard the 
German positions on the railway that passed north of Grandcourt. 
 
 The brigade assembly took place in extremely difficult conditions; in pitch blackness 
and moving over very rough ground, as well as passing through the line of 62nd Brigade. 
Shortly after midnight, the brigade entered Battery Valley that runs from Thiepval towards 
Grandcourt. Some casualties were caused here by the barrage firing short,196 and it was also 
here that the brigade encountered the first enemy resistance, from about fifteen yards’ range. 
These outposts were rushed immediately, with several Germans being killed and some thirty 
taken prisoner, before the advance was continued to the mid-way objective, the Grandcourt – 
Thiepval Road. This advance was made in good order, with the troops full of confidence, 
continually rushing small parties of Germans and taking prisoners until the intermediate 
objective was reached at about 1 a.m., when reorganisation had become necessary. The diary 
of 9th KOYLI notes that “the men were with some difficulty held back, on account of their 
eagerness to proceed”.197 A line of consolidation was established, Grandcourt was mopped-
up, and the brigade was reorganised for the second bound of the attack, towards Boom 
Ravine. 
 
However, owing to the rapidity of the brigade’s advance, it was in an extremely 
isolated position, being unable to maintain touch with 17th Division to the right and also due 
to the absence of the third battalion, 15th DLI, which did not come up until 2.15 a.m. In view, 
therefore, of the isolated position of the brigade, and the number of Germans around, 
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Brigadier-General McCulloch decided to postpone further advance until 3.15 a.m., when he 
hoped 110th Brigade would have arrived. Meanwhile, the enemy had begun taking advantage 
of the detached position of 64th Brigade, and was counter-attacking from all sides. In spite of 
this the brigade succeeded in maintaining its position, beating off all attacks until 2.30 a.m., 
when 110th Brigade, having fought their way through successive enemy positions between the 
left of 17th Division and 64th Brigade, finally established itself on the right and connected up 
with 17th Division a thousand yards north-west of Courcelettte.198  
 
Once the DLI had moved up into position, the advance was resumed in the moonlight, 
this time on a three-battalion front with the DLI on the right. The brigade moved via Boom 
Ravine to assault Hill 135, south of Miraumont, an advance of some 2,500 yards. Some 
opposition was encountered from the ravine, but after a number of Germans had been killed 
or taken prisoner, the rest fled in all directions, discarding rifles and equipment - two field and 
several machine-guns were captured, along with one German officer and twenty men.199 The 
advance to the final objective was made “with exceptional dash and courage, as heavy 
machine-gun fire was encountered from both flanks and from the front but the advance 
continued, with nests of machine-gunners and small posts being cleared en route.”200 The 
KOYLI reached the final objective at 4.30 a.m.; the DLI arrived 45 minutes later and formed 
a defensive flank on the right. The East Yorkshires were not able quite to reach the final 
objective in line with the KOYLI, and therefore extended a guard towards the left flank. 
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The brigade was not entirely in position until daylight was breaking, when the troops 
came under very heavy machine-gun fire. Amidst a certain amount of confusion, the men had 
to take cover in shell holes. No touch had been gained with the flanks, hostile machine-gun 
fire and shelling was very heavy, and the enemy artillery was very active. The enemy kept up 
a vigorous sniping and movement became impossible until midday.201 It was at this point that 
the Brigadier, A.J. McCulloch, was hit and badly wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.R. 
Holroyd-Smith of the DLI took command. The enemy also attempted a few counter-attacks 
against the brigade, and calls to surrender were made to them by the Germans. The troops 
took no notice, however; every enemy attack was repulsed and the brigade held its position. 
Not until midday, influenced no doubt by the general British advance to which the attack of 
64th Brigade had been an important preliminary, did the enemy retire and leave the brigade in 
comparative peace.202
 
 A report of the arrival of 64th Brigade on the final objective, that the line was weakly 
held and the enemy working round the flanks, had reached Campbell at 8.45 a.m. An hour 
earlier he had ordered 110th Brigade, which had in the early morning concentrated in Battery 
Valley (between Thiepval and Grandcourt), to move by the quickest route to protect the right 
flank of 64th Brigade.203 The assembly of 110th Brigade had been carried out with remarkable 
ease, but as the leading battalion, 6th Leicesters, approached the valley it became clear that its 
southern end, and the trench line directly to the south, was still held by the Germans in some 
force. Lieutenant-Colonel Martyn, commanding the battalion, immediately realised the 
situation, and without hesitation or waste of time attacked at once and drove them out, 
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capturing three trench mortars and a number of prisoners, thus clearing the valley. The 
consequence of this was that only 7th Leicesters and 1st Wilts formed the attacking line, and 
6th Leicesters, after they had reorganised, followed in support.204 Attacking due east, the 
brigade made good progress towards the objective, despite the right being subjected to 
continual machine-gun fire from the unprotected flank. Brigadier-General Cumming, 
commanding 110th Brigade, wrote that  
 
At about 9 a.m. everything seemed going well and Brigade Headquarters moved 
from the high ground at Beaucourt, crossed the river, and after a short halt in 
Battery Valley, where they joined the 6th Leicesters, they pushed on across 
country in rear of the two leading battalions to where a peculiarly shaped, isolated 
bush grew on the bank of a sunken road, about 1,000 yards west of Boom Ravine. 
Here the attack was for a time held up, partially by our own barrage, which they 
had over-run, and partially from enfilade fire coming from the right flank. The 
64th Brigade was being hard pressed, and it was of the greatest importance to get 
across Boom Ravine and support their right; so the Brigadier, ordered the left 
battalion (1st Wilts) to push on, having sent back word for the guns to lengthen 
range; the 7th Leicesters were instructed to follow slightly in echelon on the right 
and to push out a company to the right to protect that flank.205  
 
 Although elements of 110th Brigade reached the isolated 64th Brigade by midday, the 
full objective was not gained until 3 p.m., when the position of the latter could finally be 
deemed secure. At no point in the day did any troops of the division gain touch with those of 
17th Division,206 and a battalion of 62nd Brigade sent up to protect the left flank did not arrive 
until after 1 p.m., although it did make contact with troops of 42nd Division on the left, which 
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was by that time in possession of the southern half of Miraumont.207 As co-operation had 
come so slowly, it seems likely that had 64th Brigade gone straight on to its original final 
objective, it might well have met with disaster.208 Cumming later called their action a “very 
brilliant one [which] justified the risk taken, as it materially assisted 42nd Division on the 
north and forced the early evacuation of Miraumont by the enemy”209 which, it must be 
remembered, was the whole purpose of the early attack. 
 
Casualties 
 
Accurate casualty figures for 24 August are difficult to ascertain. The OH gives none at all, 
and those taken from the War Diaries are inconclusive.210  The only leading battalion of 64th 
Brigade to cite its figures was 1st East Yorks - its total of ninety seeming incredibly few, 
                                                 
207 This battalion was the 1st Lincs, which had concentrated in the morning north of the river, just west of Bois 
d’Hollande. An hour later they moved to the Ravine, south-east of Grandcourt and, finding the village evacuated, 
moved up to the left of the 64th Brigade. See Major-General C.R. Simpson, (ed.), The History of the Lincolnshire 
Regiment, 1914-1918 (London: Medici Society, 1931), pp. 346-7. 
 
208 OH 1918, Volume IV, pp. 246-7. 
 
 
209 Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 209. 
 
210 War Diaries to be found at the PRO, WO 95 / 2154-5, 2161-2, 2164. 
 
 Officers Other ranks   
  Killed Missing Killed Missing Total 
 
Wounded 
 
Wounded 
Battn.        Strength 
1/Lincs *  4 5 - 31 166 20 226 
2/Lincs ** c 80% 2 1 - 21 71 15 110 
NFs *** 15; 593 1 4 - 8† 41 54 
15/DLI  7 9 1 POW 56 186 26 285 
E. Yorks  5 1  30 42 12 90 
9/KOYLI  1†   21†   22 
6/Leics  1†   4†   5 
7/Leics     2†   2 
1/Wilts   2  8 24  34 
Total 828  21 22 1 784 
 
* Casualties for the period 21 – 28 August. ** Casualties for the period 20 – 29/30 August. 
*** Figures given on 25 August.  
† Figures taken from the CD-Rom, Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19. Those figures calculated from these 
cannot be considered definitive. 
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considering that the DLI, who were only deployed for the final objective, had over two 
hundred casualties, including thirty-five killed. 9th KOYLI, the other leading battalion and 
which was deployed for both objectives does not specify its losses, but states that casualties 
were heavy, owing to the flank being in the air, and the repeated enemy counter-attacks 
inflicted heavy casualties. However, a remark at the end of this report testifies to the ferocity 
of the battle, noting that “enemy losses were found to have been very heavy – no less than 130 
dead being found before our lines.”211 Losses for 110th Brigade are sketchy; only the 
Wiltshire battalion recorded its casualties in the War Diary; losses for the two Leicester 
battalions are apparently completely unknown.212 62nd Brigade, which was only sent up to 
reinforce the left flank of 64th Brigade in the early afternoon, is the only brigade to have a full 
list of casualty figures, but as these are for a period covering up to ten days they cannot be 
considered conclusive evidence of losses for this particular battle. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Given the inconclusive nature of casualties and captures during the assault, it is difficult to 
gauge the success or otherwise at Miraumont through comparative data. In terms of the actual 
advance, 21st Division captured approximately 1.14 square miles for the cost of at least 800 
casualties.213 However, as the objective of this assault was the seizure of Miraumont rather 
than a straightforward advance, it therefore cannot be assumed that the ground captured 
during the advance was a square area from the start line to the objective line. The fact that 
                                                 
211 Narrative of 9th KOYLI. 
 
212 The latest work on the 110th Brigade devotes only four paragraphs to the action on 24 August, and cites no 
losses. One can only assume that were they available, the casualty figures would be noted at least in this book. 
See Matthew Richardson, The Tigers – 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th (Service) Battalions of the Leicestershire Regiment 
(Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 2000), pp. 252-3. David Kelly, whose 39 Months with the Tigers (London: Benn, 
1930), documents practically the entire war, was on leave during August, and missed ‘an action of the brigade 
for the first and last time’, p. 135.  
 
213 This calculation is based on the average advance of 1,000 yards along the frontage of nearly two miles. This 
figure is taken from the OH 1918, Volume IV, Sketch 14, and should be taken as extremely approximate. 
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Miraumont itself was taken dictates that the assault be deemed a success, but whether or not 
the attack is indicative of tactical evolution can be determined by the manner in which the 
assault was delivered. 
  
 The attack by 64th Brigade of 21st Division was of such a nature that it is difficult to 
pigeon-hole it into a set-piece battle. It was hurriedly-planned, with the Brigade commander 
himself only learning of the change to the original assault just a few hours before zero. The 
early start time meant that the brigade was to advance with both flanks in the air, and with 
very little artillery support – just one gun per 55 yards.214 The additional support of                
12 machine guns was only nominal, as had they been of any real assistance they would have 
been mentioned in the battalion reports. The march to assembly positions, in addition to being 
extremely hurried, took place in pitch blackness and over very rough ground, and was also 
dogged by the fact that the assaulting infantry had to pass through 62nd Brigade, which was 
already in the line. The advance also took place in the dark midnight hours, and over 
extremely difficult terrain: the Ancre, flooded intentionally by the enemy, a tangle of fallen 
trees and wire, and then the rising slopes towards Martinpuich. The brigade met with 
resistance from small outposts along the way, and was dogged by snipers and flanking 
machine-gun fire. Once on the final objective, the brigade had to consolidate and maintain its 
isolated position in the face of repeated German counter-attacks. In short, the task undertaken 
was extremely difficult, which made its achievement all the more remarkable.  
 
The assault on Miraumont demonstrates neatly the reversal to a fluid battlefield after 
the long years of static trench warfare – a more mobile method of warfare that was 
                                                 
214 The difference in yards per gun ratio is due to the fact that the attack of 64th Brigade was supported by 64 
guns. See above, p.106. 
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necessitated by the demands of the Spring Offensive and fostered during the Hundred Days. 
This threw the command and control process into the melting pot. Against the backdrop of 
growing tactical and technological innovation, the increasing impossibility of continual 
reference to superior officers lead to the re-emergence of local command, by which junior 
officers and NCOs displayed flexibility, initiative and improvisation during an actual assault, 
forcing the German withdrawal and eventually winning the war. However, it is important to 
remember that the impossibility of continual reference to superior officers had also been a 
feature of the fighting during the German Spring Offensive, and had accustomed most units 
involved to decentralisation of command before the Hundred Days. McCulloch, for instance, 
had distinguished himself commanding ac hoc composite forces during that period, which 
may have influenced the divisional decision to deploy his 64th Brigade for this difficult attack. 
Nevertheless, the assault on Miraumont demonstrates perfectly this emergence of talent at 
local levels of the BEF – the decision by McCulloch to lead his brigade personally shows the 
extent to which he was determined to command his troops ‘on the spot’. The battle also 
illustrates the ‘hands off’ approach adopted by GHQ during the Hundred Days, which 
established the logistical infrastructure by which to equip the troops carrying out attacks like 
this without the set-piece planning from higher commands.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Beaurevoir Line – 8 October 1918 
 
This final battle is important for the analytical study of 21st Division as it demonstrates the 
full extent of tactical evolution and reform since the assault at Bazentin, fifteen months 
earlier. Not only does it illustrate the complex level of operational planning at this late stage 
in the war, but also the degree of initiative, flexibility and all-round tactical skill displayed by 
troops on the ground. The assault was made in three bounds, each in a different direction, 
pivoting on the second and third jumping-off points that were actually within the territory to 
be captured during the previous bounds. In addition, the troops attacked independently of 
flanking forces, often advancing completely isolated, with the only-sporadic assistance of a 
covering barrage, and primarily in the difficult conditions of a pitch-black night. Put simply, 
21st Division’s assault on the Beaurevoir Line illustrates the evolution of the BEF by the end 
of the war, thus presenting a range of analytical material with which to compare and contrast 
the division’s performance at varying stages of the war. 
 
Sources  
 
The attack on the Beaurevoir Line is as little documented as the battle of Miraumont, and for 
much the same reason: fought during a protracted period of offensive action, in which the 
division had very recently attacked and would again shortly after, diarists were restricted to 
the barest of summaries. Similarly, the scarcity of secondary literature pertaining to the 
capture of the Beaurevoir Line stems from the dearth of primary evidence. Primary sources 
can be found at the Public Record Office in Kew (hereafter PRO) under the classmark WO 
95, which holds the War Diaries. WO 95 / 2134 contains documents relating to 21st Division, 
including the Operation Order pertaining to this battle, O.O. No. 246, including instructions 
for artillery, tanks, and machine guns. There appear to be no appendices. This lack of further 
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information is due primarily to the great pressure to issue Operation Orders with sufficient 
time for them to be adhered to. The diary also contains a ‘Summary of Operations for period 
Sept. 26th to Oct. 10th 1918’ (sic), which recounts the events of 8 October according to the 
receipt of messages and information received from the front line.  
 
 Documents from the higher levels of command, V Corps and Third Army, can be 
found in the classmarks WO 95 / 751 and 374 respectively. The only document of note in 
Third Army Papers is a ‘Summary of Operations’ relating to V Corps, an extremely bare 
account of the battle using incomprehensible map references to demonstrate the capture of 
objectives, and therefore of frustratingly little use. The documents of V Corps are also 
surprisingly fruitless. The Operation Order issued to its divisions cannot be found in either 
diary of V Corps or 21st Division, leading to the question as to whether one was issued at all. 
The only document of any real use is ‘V Corps Narrative of Operations From August 21st to 
November 11th 1918’, which summarises in some detail the attack of its three divisions, but is 
too broad to give any genuine indication of how the battle was actually fought by the man on 
the ground. It is the battalion War Diaries that usually add this colour to the distanced 
narrative of Army, Corps and even Divisional reports. 
 
 War Diaries of 62nd Brigade and its subordinate units are to be found in WO 95 / 2154 
and 2155. The sister battalions of 1st and 2nd Lincolns (2154) both offer particularly detailed 
narratives, given the hurried circumstances under which they were written, which could 
indicate a diligence peculiar to the regiment. Both diaries outline the attack using the times at 
which objectives were reached, plus listing battalion losses and captures of men and materiel. 
The 1st battalion diary also describes the three-step attack, whilst the 2nd includes a note about 
the weather. The final battalion of 62nd Brigade, 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers (2155), 
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recorded the attack in one abrupt sentence, devoting more space to the losses incurred. 
However, there is one note in the dairy worthy of mention – the listing on 1 October of the 
battalion strength, by which one can ascertain the scale of losses at this time and in 
comparison with earlier battles. 
 
 The diaries of 64th Brigade’s battalions are similarly brief. That of 15th Durham Light 
Infantry (2161) is quite detailed, though concise, noting the problem of mines and the 
difficulty in the capture of objectives. The diary of 9th KOYLI (2156) is likewise very brief 
and also not as detailed, neither does it list any casualty figures. The diary of 1st East Yorks is 
useful in that it gives battalion strength before, during and after the battle, which gives some 
indication as to the scale of the fighting, but its narrative of the actual battle is little more than 
a series of bald statements of action, consolidation or orders forward. 
 
 The diaries of 110th Brigade’s battalions are likewise extremely concise. The sister 
battalions of 6th and 7th Leicesters (2164) are spectacularly useless: the former only uses map 
references to demonstrate the progress of the battalion, whilst that of the latter summarises the 
attack in just two bald sentences. The account of 1st Wilts (2164) covers barely three lines, but 
gives a detailed summary of the battalion’s captures and losses.  
 
 As has been noted in the source material for the attack on Miraumont, the Hundred 
Days campaign is shamefully neglected in the Great War literature. Despite the tactical 
difficulties presented by the three-step attack, the Official History (hereafter OH), Military 
Operations France and Belgium 1918, Volume V, compiled by Brigadier Sir James Edmonds 
(London: HMSO, 1947), only allocated three paragraphs to its narration. Similarly, J.P. 
Harris’ recent study of the last months of the war, Amiens to the Armistice – The B.E.F. in the 
Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August – 11 November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998), devotes 
 122 
 
only one paragraph to the assault of V Corps, and does not even mention the divisions 
involved. Matthew Richardson’s The Tigers – 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th (Service) Battalions of the 
Leicestershire Regiment (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2000), devotes just over a page to the battle’s 
narration, but the account is more or less lifted straight from David Kelly’s 39 Months with 
‘The Tigers’ - The 110th Infantry Brigade (London: Benn, 1930). Kelly’s account is quite 
detailed, but focuses more on the tactical plan than the assault itself, simply because he was 
not involved in the attack. H.R. Cumming’s A Brigadier in France, 1917-1918 (London: 
Cape, 1922), is the only source that offers much in the way of useful information, 
concentrating primarily on the different assemblies of troops on the three successive jumping-
off points. One final eye-witness account can be found in Captain Wilfred Miles’ The 
Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of the D.L.I. (London: 
Cassell, 1920), which offers a short but detailed narrative account, describing the problem of 
the château and the casualties incurred in its eventual capture. 
 
Context 
 
After the success of the Allied attacks on the Somme and at Arras in the late summer of 1918, 
the Germans had been forced to withdraw to their main line of defence, the Hindenburg Line. 
This apparently impregnable ‘trench city’, a system with five trench lines each protected by 
notoriously deep belts of wire, was breached at the end of September astride the St Quentin 
Canal. “Once the Germans had been driven from the Main Hindenburg System it was 
increasingly clear that they could hold no position on the Western Front for very long. There 
were still six weeks of very large-scale and very high-intensity fighting ahead – the bloodiest 
in history up to this point. But in a rational mind, there could be no doubt that Germany had 
now lost the war. The German Army continued to fight not for victory but only to avoid the 
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more extreme forms of humiliation which Germany’s enemies might impose upon her.”215 
With this in mind, Haig ordered a Second Army offensive in his favoured stamping-ground, 
the Ypres Salient, and Fourth Army continued its advance through the Hindenburg Line to the 
Beaurevoir Line, the last prepared system of defence a few miles to the east.  
 
The attack on 8 October, titled by the Battles Nomenclature Committee216 as the battle 
of Cambrai 1918, was to be a combined attack by the British Third and Fourth Armies and the 
French First Army to the south. However, due to the advances made by Fourth Army in early 
October, it was considerably further east than Byng’s Third Army, and had already hammered 
its way through the Beaurevoir Line. This was an obstacle yet to be faced by Byng’s forces, 
primarily V Corps, which was on the extreme left of Third Army, flanking the Fourth. “In 
order to avoid exposing Fourth Army to flanking fire Rawlinson and Byng considered it 
important that Third and Fourth Armies should keep abreast of one another… The result was 
that Shute’s V Corps was to mount a preliminary operation at 01.00 to seize the Beaurevoir 
Line on its front. The rest of Third Army was to attack at 04.30 and Fourth Army and the First 
French Army would pitch in at 05.10.”217
 
                                                 
215 J.P Harris with Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice – The B.E.F. in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August – 
11 November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998), p. 228. 
 
216 The Battles Nomenclature Committee was appointed in August 1919, as the ‘sole authority for what action 
fought during the Great War has official recognition, under what name it is known and what are its geographical 
and chronological limits… it was also the basis on which the regiments laid claim to their battle honours.’ 
Colonel Terry Cave, in foreword to The Official Names of The Battles and other engagements fought by The 
Military Forces of the British Empire during The Great War, 1914-1919, and The Third Afghan War, 1919. 
Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee as approved by the Army Council (East Sussex: The Naval and 
Military Press, 1992). 
 
217 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p. 238. See also Sir James E. Edmonds, The Official History of the Great 
War - Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Volume V – The Advance to Victory (London: HMSO, 
1947), pp. 199-200. 
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Aims218
 
The primary objective allocated to V Corps was to carry the Beaurevoir Line north-west of 
Villers Outreaux, with the villages of Walincourt and Malincourt cited as distant objectives. 
The Corps was to advance to a line running from Villers Outreaux in the south via the 
Château des Angles to Hurtebise Wood on the northern corps boundary. This position was on 
the eastern edge of a small plateau overlooking the valley of the Sargrenon stream, where the 
Corps was to obtain touch with the left of the Fourth Army, which was to attack just after       
5 a.m. The advance was to be continued at the same hour as the second bound of the Fourth 
Army, some four hours later, towards the long spur east of the Sargrenon, upon which lay the 
villages of Malincourt and Walincourt. 
 
Method 
 
The task of 21st Division within V Corps was simply to advance in line with Corps orders, 
dealing with any resistance or strong-points during the assault. It was to be made in three 
stages, in the first instance making good Château des Angles and the high ground 
immediately to the north of it; in the second the line of the high ground from Haut Farm to 
Hurtebise Farm, and in the third the village of Walincourt and the high ground to the north.219 
This was a particularly complicated attack which, as one commentator noted, “illustrated the 
improvement in tactical method since 1916, comprising an easterly attack… to capture a road 
and trenches east of Montecouvez Farm, and an attack swinging northwards by the two 
remaining battalions, who were to form up and start from a line indicated in the area which 
                                                 
218 See Maps VII and VIII, pp. 151 and 152. 
 
219 V Corps Narrative of Operations, from August 21st to November 11th 1918, The attack on the Beaurevoir 
Line, Villers Outreaux and Malincourt, PRO, WO 95 / 751. 
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had first to be taken”220 during the first advance. This line was south of Ardissart Farm, 
facing north, with the objective of the Beaurevoir Line and the high ground immediately east 
of it as far north as Hurtebise Farm, where junction with 37th Division could be established.221 
The final bound again involved a pivot on a point to be captured in the second objective, with 
62nd Brigade, detailed for the final objective of Walincourt, swinging round to assault 
eastwards. Not only did the infantry have to cope with an extremely complex plan of assault, 
they also had to deal with the actual Beaurevoir system itself and, en route to the second and 
final objectives, were to encounter Hurtebise, Walincourt and Angles Woods, as well as 
flanking fire from Château des Angles on the southern divisional boundary.  
 
Order of Battle222
 
The order of battle for the assault on the Beaurevoir System differed little from that at 
Miraumont, some six weeks earlier. On 8 October 1918, 21st Division was still under the 
command of Lieutenant-General C.D. Shute’s V Corps, on the extreme right of Byng’s Third 
Army. Again, the division was the left of V Corps’ two divisions. 38th Division, under Major-
General T.A. Cubitt, was now on the immediate right of 21st Division, with Major-General 
H.C. Jackson’s 50th Division of XIII Corps, Fourth Army to its right. On the left of 21st 
Division was Major-General H. Bruce-Williams’ 37th Division of IV Corps. In total, Third 
Army to the north and Fourth Army to the south deployed six divisions in three corps and 
four divisions in two corps respectively.223  
 
                                                 
220 D.V. Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’ - The 110th Infantry Brigade (London: Benn, 1930), p. 145. 
221 Hanway R. Cumming, A Brigadier in France, 1917-1918 (London: Cape, 1922), p.241. 
 
222 See Appendices XI and XII pp. 169 and 170. 
 
223 OH 1918, Volume V, Sketches 15 and 16. 
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 For the preliminary and final attacks 21st Division deployed 110th Brigade on the left 
and 64th Brigade on the right, with the second bound of the assault entrusted to 62nd Brigade. 
110th Brigade deployed the 1st Wilts for the first objective, with 6th and 7th Leicesters detailed 
for the final objective; whilst 64th Brigade utilised both 9th KOYLI and 15th Durham Light 
Infantry (DLI) for the first objective, with 1st East Yorks detailed for the follow through.224  
 
 Battalions were formed up on a two-company frontage, for the most part in two 
separate waves of two platoons. Each platoon had two fighting sections in the front line of 
each wave, with Lewis Gun sections in the second. The inner rear companies were deployed 
for mopping-up purposes, while the outer ones (on the brigade boundaries) were to protect the 
flanks. This was particularly pertinent for those battalions on the divisional boundaries.225
 
Resources 
 
For the preliminary assault, V Corps supported its two divisions with eight brigades of field 
artillery and four of garrison artillery.226 In addition, there were ten batteries of 6” howitzers, 
two batteries of 8” howitzers, six batteries of 6” guns and two 9.2” railway guns.227 There is 
no mention in any of the literature as to how these guns were to be deployed, although for the 
sake of this study it must be assumed that these guns were divided equally between the two 
                                                 
224 Battalion reports can be found at the PRO, WO 95 / 2154-6, 2161, 2164. Most unit reports show that the 
assaulting battalions went in on a two-company frontage, but there is little evidence to either confirm or refute 
this: the OH gives the assault practically no coverage, barely two paragraphs (p. 202). 
 
225 See narrative of 2nd Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2154. The reference to “fighting sections” is 
ambiguous, as it is taken directly from the narrative. One can only assume that they were rifle sections. 
 
226 V Corps Narrative of Operations. The OH gives different figures, citing four brigades of field and two of 
garrison artillery for the 38th Division, and only three field and two garrison for the 21st Division. In the latter 
case, these were the 17th st Division artillery and one brigade from the 21 , under Brigadier-General H.W. 
Newcombe, and the XVII and XXXIV Brigades RGA (see OH 1918, Volume V, pp. 201-2 f). A 21st Division 
order for the assault states that five field artillery brigades were to be used (PRO, WO 95 / 2134). It must be 
assumed, therefore, that there was some unforeseen problem with 21st Division’s other brigade of field artillery 
which prevented its deployment in the fighting.  
 
227 V Corps Narrative of Operations. 
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divisions, allowing 42 field guns and 63 heavies and howitzers per division. Allowing for the 
very approximate attack frontage of 1700 yards,228 this gives an average of one gun per         
16 yards.  
 
Given the mobile state of infantry warfare at the time, it must be assumed that the 
element of surprise was not as necessary as had been previously, and therefore a preliminary 
bombardment may have been fired.229 The need for a barrage was as important as ever, as was 
counter-battery work, and it is for these purposes that the arsenal must have been used, 
although in what proportions is unknown. Against a fortified trench system such as the 
Beaurevoir Line, the task of wire-cutting must also have fallen to the artillery, although the 
only reference to this is that there was “a great deal of wire, and this had not been adequately 
gapped by the artillery”.230 Finally, Brigadier-General Newcombe, BGRA 21st Division, also 
instructed the divisional artillery that “the village of Walincourt and the high ground will be 
kept under smoke from 0800 hours till the approach of the 62nd Infantry Brigade necessitates 
lifting”.231
 
 21st Division also utilised its machine gun companies; using three in the barrage on the 
second objective, one to support the advance of 62nd Brigade with direct fire from the 
overlooking ridge, and allotting one company to each infantry brigade for consolidating the 
                                                 
228 Taken from OH 1918, Volume V, Sketch 16. 
 
229 Narrative of the 2nd Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, notes that the barrage for the 64th Brigade opened at 11 p.m. on 
the 7th, while the 1st Wilts War Diary simply notes that the battalion attacked after a ‘heavy barrage’. See PRO, 
WO 95 / 2154 and 2164. 
 
230 Harris, Amiens to the Armistice, p. 238. However, this was in reference to the entire V Corps front. The wire 
is only mentioned in one battalion report, that of the 1st th Wilts, 110  Brigade, which notes that “ ‘A’ Company 
was held up by the wire… the other Companies found good gaps” (1st Wilts War Diary, Appendix No. 1 – 
Operation 7 – 8 October 1918, PRO, WO 95 / 2164.) However, Brigadier-General Cumming, commanding 110th 
Brigade, noted in his book that the wire was “thick and practically undamaged”; from these three conflicting 
reports one can only assume that the artillery’s success in cutting the wire was scattered.  
 
231 21st Division Order No. 246, PRO, WO 95 / 2134. 
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objectives when gained.232 There is no mention of these companies in the battalion War 
Diaries, except for that of the ever-useful 2nd Lincolns, which simply notes that one section 
attached to the battalion was moved up to protect the left flank in the consolidation of the 
second objective. This battalion also notes the attachment of a battery of light trench mortars 
and two field guns for sniping purposes, which “were used to great advantage at a critical 
period”.233
 
 In addition to the artillery, both 21st and 38th Divisions were allotted six Mark 5* 
tanks, all from 11th Tank Battalion. However, none of these was to be used in the initial 
assault, it having been deemed too dark for the drivers to see adequately from inside. Instead, 
two were to be used after daylight to clear up the area around Château des Angles, and the 
others not until the second part of the attack at 5.15 a.m., when the first objective was to be 
extended northwards to Hurtebise Farm.234 Once these objectives had been taken the tanks 
were to advance with 62nd Brigade, clearing up pockets of the enemy during the advance to 
the third objective.235
 
Terrain 
 
The terrain over which 21st Division was to advance was between the enemy’s main defensive 
line and its support system - the Hindenburg and Beaurevoir Lines. This land, therefore, had 
clearly not been fought over since 1914, and would not bear the same scars of war seen on the 
                                                 
232 Ibid. 
 
233 Narrative of 2nd Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2154. 
 
234 OH 1918, Volume V, p. 202. 
 
235 21st Division Order No. 246. These tanks were intended to give particular assistance to 1st Lincolns, 62nd 
Brigade, which was advancing without a barrage. The War Diary gives no explanation for this, leading to the 
assumption that the artillery could not be limbered-up and brought forward to cover the advance. In the event, 
only one tank was functioning properly, and this broke down later in the assault. See Narrative of 1st Lincolns, 
PRO, WO 95 / 2154. 
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original Somme battlefield over which the division had advanced some weeks earlier. David 
Kelly of 6th Leicesters, 110th Brigade, gave evidence of this when describing the house to 
which battalion headquarters moved on the evening of 7 October, Gratte Panche Farm: “it was 
complete with roof and windows, the first tangible proof that we were entering the promised 
land beyond all the devastated areas.”236
 
 It must be assumed that the German retreat and the Allied advance, which was 
accompanied by a severe bombardment campaign, had pocked the ground with shell holes 
and signs of battle, but the general state of the land was fairly level. The plateau overlooking 
the Sargrenon stream, by its very name, suggests that it was a level area, and although most of 
the objectives were on ‘high ground’, it must be noted that the valley produced by the stream 
was a very shallow incline.237 Similarly, the British gave specific orders for Whippets to be 
used in the battle, although not in this sector, which is clear evidence that the ground was 
suitable for the deployment of these small, swift-moving tanks.238
 
Enemy 
 
The trench system along the Beaurevoir Line had been adapted from defensive trenches used 
by the Germans during the Somme campaign of 1916. Given that the Hindenburg Line, 
between two and three miles to the west, had been the main, and allegedly impenetrable, 
system of defence, the Beaurevoir Line was not as fortified or as meticulously crafted as the 
main line. In addition, neither position was actually a ‘Line’, in that they consisted of multiple 
                                                 
236 Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’, p. 146. 
 
237 There are good photographs of the Beaurevoir Line in the recent ‘Battleground Europe’ series, although the 
land remains little documented. See Jack Horsfall and Nigel Cave, Battleground Europe: Hindenburg Line. 
Cambrai – The Right Hook (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999). 
 
238 Whippets were generally reserved for exploitation echelons, thus adding weight to the idea that a 
breakthrough was deemed possible for this attack. See Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front – The 
British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18 (London: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 162-66.   
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lines of trenches: the Beaurevoir system had two, with concrete emplacements every two or 
three hundred yards and with machine-gun nests scattered in depth behind it.239 The DLI’s 
historian noted that the system was “well wired and strong in concrete machine-gun 
emplacements and shelters, [and] held in great strength by the Germans who also occupied 
Montecouvez Farm and other advanced positions”.240 However, it must be noted that until a 
battle for the position seemed imminent - only once the Hindenburg Line had been breached – 
the system was inadequately fortified and had incomplete wiring.241  
 
 The enemy personnel defending this position are extremely difficult to ascertain. The 
OH makes no reference to individual units, and the Sketches only state the Allied formations. 
It must be assumed that the troops and guns that defended the position on 8 October were 
those in retreat from the assaults on the Hindenburg Line, although if the Germans were in 
plain retreat one must assume that V Corps was still in pursuit of the remnants of General 
Otto von Below’s Seventeenth Army.242 It is possible that the Germans were in such a state of 
confusion after the fall of the Hindenburg Line that the units were so mixed up as to be 
unidentifiable. This is borne out by the one of the two references made to the enemy by the 
OH: “The German regimental histories present a doleful account of the 8th October: the 
infantry absolutely ‘played out’ with the battalions down to an average of 150 of all ranks. 
The Bavarian official account writes: ‘The troops were completely used up and burnt to 
cinders… Cohesion had only been maintained in some formations by severe measures.’”243 
                                                 
239 OH 1918, Volume V, p. 158. 
 
240 Captain Wilfred Miles, The Durham Forces in the Field 1914-1918, The Service Battalions of the D.L.I. 
(London: Cassell, 1920), p. 326.  
 
241 OH 1918, Volume V, p. 96. 
 
242 See above, Chapter 3, pp. 110-1. 
 
243 OH 1918, Volume V, pp. 210-11. 
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The other reference to a German unit notes that in an operation undertaken by 110th Brigade, a 
German battalion was cut off and completely destroyed. This was II/105th Regiment, 30th 
Division.244
 
Results 
 
The attacking troops began the march to assembly positions at 10 p.m. on 7 October. It was an 
exceptionally dark night,245 and some heavy rain had fallen during the evening. David Kelly 
also remarked on the pitch-dark night, and remembered “marvelling at the manner in which 
the Wiltshires found their way to their starting point and were formed up ready to attack by    
1 a.m.”,246 but the assembly of brigades was nevertheless carried out successfully.  
 
 The barrage opened at the infantry zero hour of 1 a.m., and 9th KOYLI and 15th DLI of 
64th Brigade, with 1st Wilts of 110th Brigade on the right moved forward in artillery formation 
towards the Beaurevoir Line. The narrative of V Corps states that “the attack of the 21st 
Division on the left progressed very rapidly in spite of the wire in front of the Beaurevoir Line 
and the fire of many machine guns in the trench line itself”.247 The KOYLI noted that the 
enemy put down a heavy counter-barrage throughout the entire British assault, but this passed 
harmlessly over the attacking troops, causing more anxiety to the battalion headquarters.248 
This is indicative of the disorganised state of the German defenders – neither their counter-
battery work nor their protective barrages seemed at all effective. The Beaurevoir system 
itself was taken fairly swiftly, although a strong machine-gun post on the front of the DLI 
                                                 
244 OH 1918, Volume V, p. 202. 
 
245 Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 241. 
 
246 Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’, p. 146. 
 
247 V Corps Narrative of Operations. 
 
248 Narrative of 9th KOYLI, 64th Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2156. 
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initially held up the advance, but this was eventually rushed and captured. The battalions then 
pushed on to Château des Angles, which was strongly and tenaciously held by machine-gun 
posts, and the fighting continued with varying units until midday.249 The diary of the DLI 
notes that about a hundred prisoners were captured from the château, after a very stiff fight, 
but its clearance was prevented by pockets of enemy resistance holding out in the wood to the 
west of the château.250  
 
Others lurked in the woods around the building and there were no British troops 
on the flanks of this party of Durhams, who now numbered no more than thirty. 
The officers judged it prudent to withdraw to a convenient sunken road where 
reinforcements eventually reached them. At 6 a.m., after another struggle, the 
château was occupied again, but the grounds were mined and repeated explosions 
compelled a second retirement. Later in the morning came the final capture of the 
building which was then held as the right of the line occupied by the battalion.251
 
This was the last action of the DLI for this offensive, as 1st East Yorks passed through 
the battalion and into position for the second objective. On the front of 110th Brigade, 6th and 
7th Leicesters moved into position on the right, on the line of a communication trench south of 
Ardissart Farm. This was no easy operation in the pitch-black night, particularly as the 
communication trench in question was barely a foot deep and therefore extremely difficult to 
find.252 Nowhere in the literature is there a description of this second phase of the attack, with 
all three battalion diaries stating simply that the objective was taken with the capture, all told, 
of nearly six hundred prisoners, four field guns and many machine-guns. Only David Kelly 
makes any note of the actual assault and, though his view was from behind the lines, given the 
absence of any other description his is worthy of note: 
                                                 
249 Cumming, A Brigadier in France, p. 241. 
 
250 Narrative of 15th Durham Light Infantry, 64th Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2161. 
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  About 4.30 a.m. I was ordered to go forward and see the 6th and 7th Leicesters 
forming up in the area just taken by the Wiltshires and in the slang of the period 
‘jumping off’. As their zero hour was to be 5 a.m. there was no time to be lost. 
The German batteries must have been well behind the line, for they were now 
very active, and as I entered Montecouvez Farm – in reality a small village – 
falling shells and a shower of bombs from a low-flying aeroplane combined to 
produce a terrifying uproar. Houses were crashing and bricks flying in every 
direction, always a specially unpleasant sound in the darkness, and I ran hard 
through the village and on along a road which brought me to the positions just 
taken by the Wiltshires. From the spot where the trenches they had captured 
crossed this road, there was another road running north to the assembly positions 
of the other two battalions, and following this, visiting the Company commanders 
on the way, I found the attacking waves of the two battalions already moving 
forward towards Ardissart Farm. Day dawned, enabling me to watch their 
progress, and having carried out my instructions I started to return by the same 
road, which proved difficult as it was being swept by enemy machine-guns which 
were still holding out in Angle Château and harassing the whole area. I found the 
Wilts Battalion headquarters sitting under heavy shell-fire in the road just north of 
Montecouvez Farm, a road which had appeared from the map to be sunken, but 
turned out to have a low bank on one side only. I was back at headquarters by 7 
a.m., with a good appetite and a report that the complicated operation had been 
crowned with complete success.253  
 
By 7.30 a.m. the ridge from Haut Farm to Hurtebise Farm had been taken and 62nd 
Brigade, detailed for the final objective - Walincourt and the high ground to the north – 
passed through its sister brigades for the attack at 8.45 a.m.. This advance was supposed to be 
in conjunction with that of 114th Brigade, 38th Division, on the right, but the failure of the 
leading battalions of this division to take the first objectives had forced Major-General Cubitt 
to postpone the advance of 114th Brigade until 11.30 a.m.254 Brigadier-General Gater, 
commanding 62nd Brigade, was unaware of these developments, and his troops moved for the 
attack with both flanks in the air. The brigade lined up with all three battalions in the front 
line, with 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers in the centre between 1st and 2nd Lincolns on the 
                                                 
253 Kelly, 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’, pp. 146-7. 
 
254 For an account of this division’s actions see OH 1918, Volume V, pp. 201-3; Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Munby, 
A History of the 38th th Division (London: Rees, 1920); Major-General H.D. De Pree, The 38  (Welsh) Division in 
the last five weeks of the Great War (Reprinted from the Royal Artillery Journal, LVIII 1933), pp. 332, 448; 
Captain J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, 1914-1919; A Chronicle of Service in France and Belgium 
(London: Abacus, 1998), pp. 550-6. 
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left and right respectively. The assault was delivered under a barrage and with the assistance 
of six tanks, although the diary of 1st Lincolns notes that the battalion was attacking without a 
barrage and with four of these six tanks.255  
 
The assault made little progress during the morning, immediately being raked by enemy 
guns. 1st Lincolns came under heavy machine-gun fire whilst in the assembly positions from 
high ground immediately west of the Beaurevoir Line, and the attack was halted until 110th 
Brigade had completed the consolidation process and cleared the line of the enemy. Similar 
resistance was encountered from Hurtebise Farm and the copse of the same name, but a 
forward section of field artillery, plus a light trench mortar and a captured German field gun 
were turned onto the enemy who eventually surrendered.256 On the right of the assault, 2nd 
Lincolns had been held up by machine-gun fire coming from the flank, due primarily to 38th 
Division not attacking at the original zero hour. The two tanks allotted to the battalion pushed 
on to the quarries and removed the enemy, although not before a large number of casualties 
had been incurred.257
 
 It seems pertinent here to outline the assault of the Fusiliers in the centre of 62nd 
Brigade’s attack, if for nothing else to demonstrate the scarcity of documentation for this 
battle. The War Diary simply states: “Weather fine. The battalion attacked Walincourt at        
6 a.m. and gained objective at 6 p.m.”, along with a list of casualties.258 One can only ponder 
as to what happened during those 12 hours. 
 
                                                 
255 Narrative of 1st Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2154. 
 
256 Ibid. 
 
257 Narrative of 2nd Lincolns, 62nd Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2154. 
 
258 Narrative of 12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers, 62nd Brigade, PRO, WO 95 / 2155. 
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At 2.30 p.m. 62nd Brigade resumed its advance and reached a line of trenches east of 
Walincourt and Briseux Woods, but was halted here due to machine-gun fire, particularly on 
1st Lincolns’ front, from Guillemin Farm and the Walincourt – Esne Road. 2nd Lincolns on the 
right had advanced a little further, having already sent out patrols to reconnoitre the attack 
frontage and, acting on the findings, the battalion was able to advance to and occupy the 
sunken road west of Walincourt. During the assault a platoon from B Company, which had 
extended southwards to protect the right flank, captured two German field guns.259 This 
completed the capture of the Beaurevoir Line on the entire divisional frontage, and although 
the left of the assault was unable to make any ground east of the Sargrenon River, the troops 
of V Corps had taken the villages of Villers Outreaux and Malincourt, and Angle, Walincourt 
and Hurtebise Woods, with an average advance of five thousand yards.260 Brigadier-General 
Cumming of 110th Brigade remarked that it was:  
 
a most successful day, although an arduous combination of hard fighting with a 
long advance. On going over the ground next day it was astounding to see the 
depth and thickness of the wire, practically undamaged, through which the troops 
had forced a passage. Moreover the intense darkness made the feat all the more 
marvellous.261  
 
David Kelly noted that “the complicated operation had been crowned with complete success, 
and we eventually learned that four field-guns, sixty-seven machine-guns, six trench-mortars 
and 624 prisoners had fallen to the Brigade”.262 Third Army War Diary noted 873 prisoners 
coming through the Corps cages,263 which would suggest that either there was a numerical 
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superiority of enemy troops on the front of 21st Division, or that 38th Division to the left were 
lax in their taking of prisoners. It must be remembered that its initial advance had not been as 
successful as that of 21st Division, so the capture of prisoners may not have been considered 
as important as the capture of objectives, although this in itself virtually guarantees the taking 
of personnel. However, there are other possibilities; the enemy here may have been quicker to 
retreat or that there may have been more enemy dead on this divisional frontage than were 
captured.264  
 
Casualties 
 
The casualties sustained for this remarkable success are as difficult to ascertain as much of the 
division’s actions. 9th KOYLI, true to form, does not list its losses; neither, unusually, does 6th 
Leicesters,265 whilst 1st East Yorks only cited figures for the capture of the first objective. 
12/13th Northumberland Fusiliers, despite noting more on the weather than the advance, gave 
casualty figures totalling 138, including twenty-seven killed, which indicates a far more 
contested assault than the narrative would suggest. Both Lincolnshire battalions and 1st Wilts 
give figures just under a hundred, with 7th Leicesters a similar figure of 104; suggesting that 
this was a fairly standard loss for the assault. Only 15th DLI seem to have suffered unduly, 
although this must be attributed to the long tussle for Château des Angles rather than the 
                                                 
264 One source suggests that this was unlikely, that the Germans were more than eager to give themselves up to 
the British: ‘The [twenty] prisoners were so docile that only one man was sent to HQ with them as escort… On 
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by his charges.’ Lieutenant H. Turner, quoted in Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, p. 554. 
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LINE. Captured all objectives including 430 prisoners and 4 Field Guns. All Coys. in front line. Bn. H.Q. in 
BEAUVOIS front line.” PRO, WO 95 / 2164. 
 
 137 
 
initial assault.266 The only comparison to be found in the literature is with 63rd Division, far to 
the north of Third Army’s attack near Cambrai, which sustained 703 casualties.267
 
Conclusions 
 
The final assault on the Beaurevoir Line is unquestionably the most successful in this study, 
thereby implying an extensive degree of tactical evolution by the end of the war. The assault 
was by far the most tactically innovative – made in three bounds, with the second and third 
jumping-off points in territory that had yet to be captured, and facing in different directions. 
Furthermore, the division attacked independently of flanking forces, often advancing 
completely isolated, with little assistance from the nominal covering barrage. The infantry 
met with surprisingly ferocious German resistance for this late stage in the war: enemy 
outposts held up attacks during each of the three bounds, and the garrison of the château clung 
tenaciously to its position throughout the day, causing many casualties. Similarly dogged 
resistance was met on the high ground west of the Beaurevoir Line and from outposts in the 
many woods and copses on the divisional front. Finally, the attack was undertaken primarily 
                                                 
266 Battalion reports can be found at the PRO, WO 95 / 2154-6, 2161, 2164.  Casualty figures, as taken from the 
War Diaries, are as follows: 
 
Officers  Other ranks   
  Killed Missing Killed Missing Total 
 
Wounded 
 
Wounded 
Battn. Strength        
1/Lincs  2 4 - 11 54 13 84 
2/Lincs  - 3 - 14 70 9 96 
NFs 26; 805 3 1 - 24 88 22 138 
E. Yorks 17; 383 Probably none (no refs.) at least 3 kia and 28 wia 31 
 none listed* 5* unknown 5 
 
9/KOYLI 
15/DLI  - 5 - 24 140 49 218 
1/Wilts 34; 855 2 3 - 11 78 2 96 
6/Leics  unknown 19* unknown 19 
7/Leics  - 1 - 26 76 1 104 
Total  7 17 - 137 534 96 791 
 
* Figures taken from the CD-Rom, Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19. Those figures calculated from these 
cannot be considered definitive. 
 
267 OH 1918, Volume V, p. 210. 
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in the difficult conditions of a pitch-black night, and the heavy rain of the previous evening 
onto the baked ground of summer had lead to extremely slippery conditions. The average 
advance was over 5,000 yards, with the least favourable ratio of 16 yards per gun, and 
sustaining the fewest casualties whilst capturing significant prizes in terms of German 
prisoners and materiel. Troops in this assault demonstrated the most initiative, turning a 
captured field gun on its fleeing teams, and utilising a forward section of field artillery, plus a 
light trench mortar for the same purpose.  
 
 The performance of 21st Division in rushing and capturing the Beaurevoir Line 
displayed great dexterity and skill. Not only was the assault plan hugely complex, illustrating 
the improvement and evolution in tactical method since 1916, but its execution was also 
incredibly skilful, with troops on the ground using initiative and improvisation to ensure 
success in this difficult assault. This final assault on the Beaurevoir Line demonstrates not 
only the evolution of tactical thought and planning by the end of the war, but also that of 
tactical execution – the fact that the British High Command were planning offensives that 
were hugely evolved from their 1916 counterparts, and that the British infantry were capable 
of carrying them out with a huge degree of success. In short, this final battle demonstrates the 
tactical evolution of the BEF by the end of the war. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This case study demonstrates the tactical evolution of 21st Division during the war. Not only 
were the assaults of 1918 more complex and intricate in design than their earlier counterparts, 
but they were also executed with far more precision, dexterity, and flexibility. The later 
assaults captured more in terms of ground and objectives, with significantly less artillery 
support, and suffered considerably fewer casualties. 
 
 Yet in terms of comparative data, these four battle studies have yielded few results that 
were actually comparable. The methods of assessment outlined in the Introduction – the 
comparison of variables such as the weather, the terrain, the enemy factor, and various 
artillery statistics268 - actually produced little in the way of statistics with which to compare 
the battles. There were two main reasons for this: firstly, the lack of primary source material, 
particularly for the two battles in 1918, meant that some performance indicators could not be 
completed for all four battles; and secondly, because the battles were so very different it 
proved almost impossible to compare them. For example, the only battle for which there is 
any mention of the weather is, unsurprisingly, that at Broodseinde, where the rain was coming 
down in torrents. It can reasonably be assumed that the night attack on Miraumont was 
probably cold, damp and misty, but there is nothing to confirm or deny this, and there is little 
indication beyond ‘fair’ as to the weather during either of the other two battles. Similarly, all 
four battlefields were so different in terrain that it is fruitless to try and compare them. The 
infamous mud of the Ypres Salient probably produced the most difficult terrain over which to 
advance, but it is impossible to judge whether the marshy tangle of fallen trees, reeds and wire 
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over the Ancre at Miraumont was more or less surmountable than the maze of trenches and 
shell holes at Bazentin or the fortified trench system of the Beaurevoir Line. 
 
 It is equally difficult to compare the enemy factor for each battle. In terms of 
personnel, it is possible to state which troops were facing 21st Division, but without lengthy 
and exhaustive research into the strength, morale and skill of these forces, it is difficult to 
state much about these units other than their title.269 Similarly, the defence method employed 
by these units was more or less dictated by the differing conditions of the land, and though it 
is possible to compare the German entrenchments on the Somme, the improvised pill boxes 
and shell-hole-trenches in Flanders, and the multi-trench system of the Beaurevoir Line, it is 
difficult to state which defence method was the hardest to penetrate. It could be argued that as 
21st Division was successful both at Bazentin and on the Beaurevoir Line but not at 
Broodseinde, that the former emplacements were more easily taken than those at Flanders, but 
it has already been shown that the division’s relative failure at Broodseinde was primarily due 
to other factors, so again it is very difficult to draw conclusions from this collection of 
statistics.  
 
 The only set of comparative data that yielded particularly useful figures involved the 
attack frontage and objective distance, which amounted to the ground captured, and the 
comparison of this together with the artillery data: the number of yards per gun proved the 
most useful barometer. Other factors concerning the artillery, including any preliminary 
bombardment, the method of the barrage, the inclusion of smoke or gas within the barrage, 
                                                 
269 This research would also entail resurrecting my rusty GCSE German skills, and it is doubtful whether they 
would be up to the task. This type of research is probably better suited to a German-speaking historian, although 
from a British perspective. 
 
 141 
 
and the use or otherwise of machine-gun or trench mortar barrages, were so irregularly 
recorded that it proved impossible to compare even two battles using the same criteria. 
 
 Finally, the choice of brigade and battalion for the assault, which promised so much in 
providing evidence of the learning curve, offers frustratingly little in terms of comparative 
statistics. Although 64th Brigade appears to have been utilised most frequently – deployed in 
the final three assaults - it must not be forgotten that this study only incorporates four battles 
from 28 for the division listed by the Battles Nomenclature Committee.270 The use of this 
brigade rather than the other two in just over 10 per cent of battles throughout the war does 
not prove any preference on the part of divisional headquarters. Similarly, there are no clues 
in the source material about why any particular unit was utilised for a specific attack, and the 
notes in the War Diaries of units attending training schools and exercises do not list those 
sections that took part. Also, it must not be forgotten that personnel attending these exercises 
may well not have been involved in the next attacks, either through their becoming a casualty, 
their not being in the line during an assault, or simply the deployment of another unit. 
 
One further problem that contributed to the inconclusive data is the lack of divisional 
reports in the primary sources. Despite thorough and exhaustive investigation of 21st Division 
War Diaries, they contain very few documents either relating specifically to the division itself, 
or reports that cannot be found in the superior or subordinate unit diaries. Reports from Army 
and Corps level give clear evidence about how the assaults were planned and how they were 
to be supported; brigade and battalion level reports indicate how the assault actually unfolded. 
However, there is very little indication why certain decisions were made at divisional level, 
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London: HMSO, 1937-45) vol. 3, pp. 108-9. 
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particularly why certain units were chosen for an assault, and without knowledge like this the 
conclusions of a divisional study cannot be stated with conviction.  
 
The data, therefore, is of little use in determining the extent of the tactical evolution of 
21st Division throughout the war. Nevertheless, the enormous improvement in the division’s 
performance by October 1918 seems indisputable evidence of the learning curve that 
historians argue took place within the BEF by the end of the war. However, it does not 
indicate a smooth learning curve. From a firm footing at Bazentin in 1916, the performance of 
21st Division dipped dramatically at Broodseinde in 1917, and rose to equally striking success 
in the final battles in 1918. However, there are explanations for this erratic learning curve: the 
division’s relatively dismal performance at Broodseinde was arguably due to the immense 
difficulties experienced in reaching the assembly point and the problems peculiar to the Ypres 
Salient. Similarly, the huge advances made in the autumn of 1918 can be attributed to the shift 
from static trench warfare to a more fluid battlefield, which allowed the troops more mobility. 
The question whether this was the sole reason for these enormous gains, or whether they can 
be attributed in the main to hugely evolved tactics, technologies and fighting methods, is 
perhaps an avenue for future research.  
 
Another necessary field of research is that concerning the Third Ypres campaign and 
its impact on the learning curve. The set-piece battles of Plumer’s Passchendaele campaign 
could indicate one of two things: either a mere blip in the learning curve; or a return to the 
old-style battles, in order to deal with German defensive tactics in this difficult sector, rather 
than continuing the burgeoning initiatives of the time. If Passchendaele was merely a ‘blip’, 
then it was a lengthy one: the Third Ypres campaign officially lasted from 31 July to            
12 November 1917, a total of 114 days, although Plumer’s handling of the offensive lasted  
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53 days from 20 September. Far more research needs to be undertaken into the other 
campaigns of 1917 – Arras, Cambrai, and the actions on the Hindenburg Line – in order to 
determine whether these battles were more tactically innovative than those of 1916, thus 
indicating the learning curve.  
 
Similarly, it must not be assumed that this study of 21st Division is unequivocal 
evidence of a learning curve experienced throughout the entire BEF. It should be seen as 
merely indicative of tactical evolution throughout this division during the war. Whilst 21st 
Division can be described as fairly standard and typical of the British Army, far more research 
needs to be undertaken before the assertion of widespread tactical evolution throughout the 
BEF can be proved. The divisional studies currently underway271 will constitute a further step 
towards proving the existence of the learning curve, but it is the SHLM project, or another 
like it, that will provide the most evidence through which to determine the overall 
performance of the BEF throughout the war. Comparisons need to be drawn between Regular, 
Kitchener and Territorial divisions, and their relative performances should be assessed, 
possibly in much the same way as in this study. This approach is probably best suited to a 
Doctoral thesis,272 but any future comparison between the three types of forces will be a 
necessary and valuable contribution to our emerging understanding of the British Army’s 
learning curve in the Great War. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
PLANS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS 
 
  Before entering on the second stage of the operations, the Corps 
Commander desires to draw attention to certain lessons of the recent fighting. 
Most of these lessons were learnt during the offensive operations last year by 
those who took part in them. They have, however, been much emphasised 
during the last ten days. 
  
1. The artillery must clear the way for the infantry by a smashing bombardment. 
Provided the bombardment is long enough (the time varying according to the 
objective to be attacked) and intense enough, the hostile defences will be 
practically destroyed, and the defenders who still remain will be so dazed and 
stupefied by the violence of the bombardment as to be incapable of offering a 
really vigorous resistance. But this state only lasts a short time. Unless the 
infantry at once take advantage of the situation prepared by the artillery, the 
opportunity is gone. Then a re-bombardment becomes necessary, and a fresh 
attack has to be organised. Every time that the bombardment has to be repeated 
much ammunition is expended which, in other circumstances, would have been 
available for preparing a fresh advance, and a large proportion of the available 
‘energy’ of the troops in the front line is expended in vain. The movements of 
the infantry must therefore be regulated according to the artillery fire, and not 
vice versa. 
 
For this reason the attack must be regulated by a time table. The duration of the 
bombardments, the hours at which they will lift, and the successive lines on 
which the front of each successive barrage or bombardment will be placed, must 
all be laid down beforehand. 
 
The infantry must conform absolutely to the time table of the various lifts. They 
must be prepared to seize each successive line of area immediately on the 
barrage lifting, and before the enemy therein has been able to recover. 
 
To do this the infantry must advance as close to the barrage as possible before it 
lifts. It is better to risk a few casualties from an occasional short round from our 
own artillery than to suffer the many casualties which occur when the 
bombardment is not at once followed up. 
 
The time table of barrages is drawn up in consultation with the Divisions 
concerned, and after close attention has been given to the following 
considerations:- 
 
(a) All enemy defences and points likely to be held must be thoroughly 
bombarded, i.e. made ‘ripe’ for the assault before the artillery fire lifts and 
infantry assault. 
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(b) As each line or area is captured the infantry must have sufficient time to 
‘mop up’, reorganise, if necessary pass fresh troops through, and advance 
close up to the next barrage ready to assault before that barrage lifts. 
 
 
(c) The various bombardments must not be protracted to such an extent as to 
delay progress when the infantry are ready to go forward, and also in order 
to prevent unnecessary expenditure of ammunition. 
 
To follow the bombardment and barrages closely:- 
 
(a) All ranks must understand the method on which the advance is to be carried 
out. 
 
(b) Every single officer and man must have his particular objective and duty 
allotted to him. 
 
(c) All ranks must know the lines of the various barrages and the clock hours at 
which each barrage will lift. 
 
Where possible, (usually in the case of a big attack like that on the German 
second line of which fairly long notice can be given), sketch maps will be issued 
to the extent required by divisions. Corps will also endeavour to send to 
divisions sufficient copies of sketch maps with the lines of barrages and their 
time of lift marked on them for issue on a scale of at least one copy to each 
Battalion. Battalions must arrange to let regimental officers copy this. 
 
As long as the previously arranged time table is adhered to, the enemy can be 
pounded thoroughly well. Our difficulties always start when the time table has 
to be departed from. 
 
The alteration may occur from two reasons:- 
 
(a) The infantry having progressed quicker in some portion of the line than was 
anticipated, and being anxious to continue the advance before the hour at 
which the barrage has been timed to lift. 
 
(b) Any part of the line being held up. 
 
With regard to (a), no deviation from the time table laid down should be made 
for this reason – once the line of the barrage is lifted to allow a portion of the 
infantry to go through, it is impossible to warn the troops of the change of plan 
and of what is happening. The barrage cannot again be established because it is 
not known how far the leading troops may have advanced. Consequently the 
infantry is deprived of close artillery support. 
 
The infantry must wait for the barrage to lift. 
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With regard to (b), this unfortunately cannot be avoided. If possible a fresh time 
table should be issued. If time does not permit of this, the only thing that can be 
done is to warn the infantry that if they are held up they must wait for the re-
bombardment and be prepared to follow it up the moment the fire lifts, on each 
of the successive stages. 
 
  
2. Bombing and attack over the open. It must be realised by all ranks that the rifle 
and the bayonet is the main infantry weapon. Now that the first network of 
trenches has been crossed, the use of the bomb becomes of a minor degree of 
importance. Bombs are useful for close fighting when a trench has been rushed 
or to clear up small lengths of trench. No great progress, however, will ever be 
made by bombing. The moment an attack comes down to the bombing stage it 
may be taken for granted that the operation has become sedentary and that no 
further real progress can be expected. 
 
It must be impressed on subordinate commanders that attacks, it they are to 
progress at all must be made over the open. Similarly it is impossible to provide 
a series of trenches for forming up preparatory to an attack. But provided the 
attack is organised with a heavy preliminary bombardment and barrages on the 
systems explained in para. 1, the troops can form up under such cover as the 
ground affords and can advance across the open. Until the enemy in front of us 
is found to be inconsiderably greater strength than he is at present, attacks under 
cover of the heavy artillery fire we can develop will always succeed if pushed 
with vigour and determination. 
 
3. Counter-battery work. To enable the infantry to form up and advance over the 
open, it is necessary that they do not come under a really heavy hostile artillery 
barrage. To prevent this barrage we must maintain the artillery supremacy we 
now possess. This has been done by the activity of our counter batteries, and the 
lesson to be drawn is the great importance of this very active counter-battery 
work. 
 
4. Patrols. Constant trench fighting appears in some cases to have induced officers 
to think that patrols can only be sent out at night. 
 
Directly the fighting becomes more open as has been the case from July 3rd 
onward, great use should be made of patrols by day and night. 
 
When circumstances permit, the hour at which patrols are being sent out and the 
points to which they are being directed, should be notified beforehand to 
Divisional Headquarters so that the artillery fire may be regulated accordingly. 
 
Patrolling must not, however, be neglected because the artillery have not been so 
warned. 
 
 155
 
5. Co-operation with aeroplanes. The use of flares for showing the position of our 
troops and use of ground sheets for showing Brigade and Battalion Headquarters 
has proved very useful. Both these points should be developed to the full. Some 
battalions and brigades are still backward about putting out their ground sheets. 
It will nearly always be possible to put the sheets out where they will not be 
visible to the enemy. 
 
The Corps Commander considers that if Battalion Commanders realised what an 
easy means for communicating their position the ground sheet is, and what 
facilities the signalling patrol affords for sending back messages via the contact 
aeroplane, they would make more use of these methods. 
6. ‘Mopping up’. When attacking trenches the importance of clearing all enemy 
forces from trenches captured must not be overlooked. Cases have occurred 
where the attacking troops have passed over the German trenches only to 
discover later that points in their rear were still held by groups of the enemy who 
probably emerged from dugouts which had not been dealt with. With each 
attacking party, an adequate number of men must be detailed for ‘mopping up’ 
and for the safety of these in front must be made responsible that the work is 
done thoroughly. 
  
 Brigadier-General, 
General Staff.
 H.Q. XV Corps, 
        11-7-1916. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BAZENTIN-LE-PETIT: GENERAL BRITISH ATTACK 
 
 
Fourth Army - General Sir Henry Rawlinson 
  
  
    
 
XV Corps - Lieutenant-General Sir H.S. Horne 
  
 
XIII Corps - Lieutenant-General W.N. Congreve  
  
     
          
 
21st Division 
 
Major-General D.G.M. Campbell 
 
7th Division 
 
Major-General H.E. Watts 
  
 
3rd Division 
 
Maj.-Gen. J.A.L. Haldane 
 
9th Division 
 
Maj.-Gen. W.T. Furse 
        
 
110th Brigade 
 
Br.-General W.F. Hessey 
 
20th Brigade 
 
Br.-General C.J. Deverell 
 
8th Brigade 
 
Br.- General E.G. Williams 
 
27th Brigade 
 
Br.- General S.W Scrase-Dickens 
            
 
62nd Brigade 
 
Br.-General C.G. Rawling 
 
22nd Brigade 
 
Br.-General J. M’C. Steele 
 
26th Brigade 
 
Br.-General A.B. Ritchie 
  
 
76th Brigade 
 
Br.-General R.J. Kentish 
 
64th Brigade 
 
Br.-General H.R. Headlam 
 
91st Brigade 
 
Br.-General J. R. Minshull-Ford 
 
9th Brigade 
 
Br.-General H.C. Potter 
 
South African Bde. 
 
Br.-General H.T. Lukin 
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APPENDIX III 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BAZENTIN-LE-PETIT: DIVISIONAL ATTACK 
 
 
21st Division - Major-General D.G.M. Campbell 
  
    
 
110th Brigade – Brigadier-General W.F. Hessey 
  
    
      
 
Attack 
 
Support 
 
Reserve 
  
      
            
  
1 Coy 8/Leics   
 
Remainder 8th Leics 
 
9th Leics 
 
1st East Yorks  
(64th Bde) 
   
Lt.-Col. J.G. Mignon 
 
7th Leics 
 
Lt.-Col. 
Drysdale 
  
 
6th Leics 
 
Lt.-Col. 
Challenor 
     
 
Lt.-Col. Haig 
 
under command of 
Leicester C.O.s 
            
                      
(Formed in 
four lines -  
 
A 
 
B 
 
D 
 
B 
 
C
 
A
 
D 
 
C 
 
B (to 7th Leics.) 
 
A (to 6th Leics.) 
  
 
companies 
unspecified)   D C 
 
A & B 
(to 7th 
Leics.) 
 
C & D 
(to 6th 
Leics.) 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
CSM STAFFORD’S LETTER TO THE WOUNDED CAPTAIN WARD 
 
‘D’ Company 8th Leicestershire Regiment 21.8.16
   Captain F. Ward. 
 
Sir, 
 Mr Goodliffe has today shown me parts of a letter you have written to him. He 
suggested that I should write to you and give you as many details of the Battle as I possibly 
can. First of all, Sir, I remember you lying there wounded with a man holding you up. You 
were shouting to the Company to go on, and I took up the cry also. They who were not hit 
‘carried on’, but how anyone reached the German trench I don not know. I am pleased to say, 
sir, what remained of the Company got into the right Trench. One party about a dozen lost 
their direction a little and were making for the Bazentin Wood, they, however, were redirected 
and recovered the proper direction. 
 We did not catch it from our front but from the left flank. The enemy seemed to have 
collected on the left of that communication trench and treated us severely with liquid fire, 
bombs and their devilish machine-guns. When we eventually reached their lines most of ‘em 
retired to the left (our left, their right). I sent as many men as I could spare to clear that trench 
which they did remarkably well. We had no trouble from that quarter the whole of the 4 days 
we were in. Their dugouts were packed and no man escaped from them whilst we were in. 
They were all well bombed and the only retaliation they made in the trench from a dugout was 
one bomb which did not reach the top of the Steps, but made myself and L/Sgt Hills A.E. 
jump. We had no more trouble from that Quarter. 
 ‘D’ Company took one prisoner which we had to as he had both legs broken and was 
absolutely helpless. We blocked the junction of their fire trench and the communication 
trench in no time and every man set to work and we soon had some fire steps made and the 
trench deepened. On the right of the Company the enemy attempted to force their way into the 
trench luckily after we had had a breather and it was there that the Colonel was killed. We had 
a job to keep up with them in bombs, but we had all the bombs collected from the casualties 
in front and the German bombs came in handy too. L/Cpl Mason fought well in this defensive 
action but was unfortunately killed. We were shelled fairly heavily too, on occasions and 
suffered a few more casualties. We were in the trenches 4 days and every man breathed a sigh 
of relief when we marched through Mametz Wood for the last time. 
The Company suffered heavily, Sir, 4 Officers (2 killed, Messrs Greenaway and 
Bowells) 2 wounded, you and Lt. Ewen, and 310 other ranks. There were no Sergts killed, 
Sgt. Kirk was very badly wounded but is in England now. Sgts. Buxton, Croker, Hills were 
wounded badly before we reached our objective. Sgt. Reed of the Lewis Gunners was killed 
on the last day in the trench. L/Sgt. Hills was wounded by shrapnel a day or two after the 
attack. Cpl Rayson, L/Cpls Rogers, Wheeler, Morley G., Holyoak, Mason, E., Dunn, West, 
Chesham and Clarke were all killed, Sir. 
Unfortunately, Sir, the boys had no opportunity of showing the ability with the 
Bayonet. The Bayonet work was done in Bazentin Wood which we missed. L/Cpl Clarke, 
A.A., showed great pluck, Sir, I believe he was the first man over, but was killed by a rifle 
bullet. Our Lewis Gunners suffered heavily, Sir, only about 3 or 4 getting through. In one 
sense, Sir, the Company was lucky to have had one left. 
 159
Personally, Sir, I was extremely lucky, bullets pierced my clothing and equipment in 
six places and a bomb dropped at my feet but I jumped out of the way and caught a tiny bit in 
the cheek, the forced knocked me over though. 
I think, Sir, you have every reason to be a proud man (I hope you will pardon me 
saying so). Only well trained and well disciplined troops could have faced the Hell we faced. 
It was your training, Sir, and I’m a proud man to have served under such an Officer. The 
‘Boys’ did wonderfully well, Sir, and I’m proud to be Com Sgt Major over the ‘Remnants’. 
We have always prided ourselves on being the BEST Company in the Battalion and I think 
Bazentin-le-Petit proved it. 
My ambition is, Sir, to bring the Company up to its old efficiency. It is our Duty in 
remembrance of our late C.O. and you, Sir, who made the Company what it was. 
I hope, Sir, you will soon be in good fettle again, I hope your wounds will heal quickly 
and with as little pain as possible. I’m not going to wish you a Speedy Return to the Front, 
Sir, as I should be wishing you no good. With every wish for a speedy recovery from 
everyone in ‘D’ Company. I know the boys would want me to include their good wishes. 
I remain, Sir, 
      Your sincere Sergeant, 
 Ben. W. Stafford 
 Coy. Sgt. Major 
 ‘D’ Company. 
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APPENDIX V 
 
BRIEF PLAN OF OPERATIONS 
 
4th October, 1917 
 
1. At 6 a.m. on October 4th, 1917, the X Corps is to attack in conjunction with 
the IX Corps on the right and the I Anzac Corps on the left. 
  
2. The attack is to be preceded by intense Counter Battery work, bombardment 
and isolating fire. Practice barrages are to be put down on X Corps front at 9.30 
a.m. and 8.15 p.m. on 1st October, 5.45 a.m. and 2.30 p.m. on 2nd October and  
6 a.m. and 3 p.m. on 3rd October. 
  
3. The X Corps is to attack with three Divisions :- 
 5th Division on the right; H.Q. BURGOMASTERS FARM, DICKEBUSCH. 
21st Division in the centre; H.Q. SCOTTISH WOOD. 
7th Division on the left; H.Q. SECARD CHATEAU. 
 The 23rd and 33rd Divisions in Reserve in the BERTHEN and 
BLARINGHEM areas respectively.  
  
4. The position of assembly of the attacking troops, objectives, boundaries 
between Divisions and Brigades are shown on the attached map. 
  
5. The 5th Division is to attack with the 13th Infantry Brigade on the right, 95th 
Infantry Brigade on the left and 15th Infantry Brigade in reserve. 
 The 21st Division is to attack with the 64th Infantry Brigade on the right, the 
62nd Infantry Brigade on the left and the 110th Infantry Brigade in reserve. 
 The 7th Division is to attack with the 91st Infantry Brigade on the right, the 
20th Infantry Brigade on the left and the 22nd Infantry Brigade in reserve. 
 The Infantry advance is to be preceded by a creeping barrage. This barrage is 
to consist of all natures and is to be 1,000 yards in depth. The 18pdrs are to fire 
on a line nearest to the assaulting Infantry, then 4.5” Howitzers, then machine 
guns, then 6” Howitzers and lastly 8” and 9.2” Howitzers. 
  
6. The attack is to be made in stages as under :- 
  
 1st Stage 7th and 21st Divisions advance from original front line to RED 
line. 
 2nd Stage 7th and 21st Division advance from RED line to BLUE line. 
 1st and 
final Stage
5th Division advances from original front line to BLUE line. 
  
7. At Zero Hour the barrage is to open and will fall 150 yards beyond the 
Infantry Jumping-off line. 
 At Zero pus 3’ the barrage is to move forward for 200 yards and 100x in  
4 minutes. 
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 The barrage is then to slow down to 100 yards in 6’ and to halt as a protective 
barrage 200 yards in front of the 1st Objective. 
 A pause of about 1 hour, 40 minutes is to be made on the first objective (RED 
line). From the RED line to the final objective the barrage is move at the rate of 
100 yards in 8 minutes until it reaches the line of the protective barrage, where it 
will halt. 
 In order to simulate an advance on GHELUVELT the barrage of the 5th 
Division is to creep forward at the same time as the barrage of the 7th and 21st 
Divisions are to move from the RED line to the BLUE line. 
  
8. The assaulting Infantry are to advance preceded by the barrage mentioned in 
para. 7 and will pause on the RED line for 1 hour and 40 minutes. 
 The lines when taken are to be consolidated. 
 Whilst consolidation is proceeding on the BLUE line the barrage is to roll 
forwards for a distance of about 1,000 yards at intervals. 
 The attack is to be carried out in depth on the leap-frog principle, battalions 
being detailed for definite objectives, and passing through one another to their 
objectives. 
  
9. ARTILLERY ACTION
 A stated in paras. 5,7 and 8 above, in addition known strong points and M.G. 
emplacements are to receive special attention. During the attack intense 
neutralising fire is to be directed on hostile batteries. See also paras. 10 and  
11 below. The rate of fire of the 18-pdr guns is to be increased to 4 rounds per 
gun per minute for the 4 minutes immediately preceding the lift off the RED 
protective barrage line. 
  
10. GAS
 It is intended to use gas shell for the purpose of neutralising hostile batteries. 
4.5” Howitzers and 60-pdrs are to use chemical shell for ordinary neutralisation 
from 2nd October onwards. The 60-pdr Counter-batteries are to neutralise hostile 
batteries with gas from Zero hour onwards. 
  
11. SMOKE
 During the barrage in support of the attack as a signal to the Infantry that the 
barrage has reached its halting place each 18-pdr of barrage ‘A’ (i.e. barrage 
nearest the assaulting Infantry) on arriving on the RED line protective barrage 
and again on the BLUE line protective barrage will fire 4 rounds of smoke shell. 
 If the wind is from S.W. to N.W. the 5th Division is to place a smoke screen 
on GHELUVELT, and the 7th and 21st Divisions on BECELAERE with 4.5” 
Howitzers. 
  
12. TANKS
 12 Tanks will be available and are allotted to Divisions :- 
 21st Division are to use four tanks to work round the South of POLYGONE 
(sic) WOOD and move forward with the Infantry from the RED line to the 
BLUE line. 
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 The 7th Division are to have four tanks. They intend to keep them in reserve 
near STIRLING CASTLE and to use them after the attack, should they be 
required for clearing up and enemy strong point that may be holding out. 
 The 5th Division do not intend to use Tanks as the ground over which they are 
to attack is not suitable for their employment. 
  
13. R.F.C.
 Contact Patrol Aeroplanes are to be in the air from Zero till Zero plus  
4 hours. They are fitted with wireless but will only use it for the purpose of 
reporting a Counter attack or transmitting an Infantry Signal message calling for 
a barrage. 
 They are to call for flares by firing a white light or sounding a Klaxon Horn. 
The leading Infantry are to light flares approximately at the following times :- 
 On the RED line at Zero pus 1 hour 5’. 
 On the BLUE line at Zero plus 3 hours 30’. 
  
 In addition to the Contact Patrol Aeroplanes a Counter attack machine fitted 
with wireless is to be up throughout the day. 
 In the event of a counter attack developing these machines will call on the 
artillery by Zone Call. 
 The message dropping ground is to be in the neighbourhood of 
RENINGHELST. 
 Four messages are to be dropped at a time in each message bag, on for the 
Corps and one for each Division. 
  
  
 4/10/17. 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BROODSEINDE: GENERAL BRITISH ATTACK 
 
 
Fifth Army – General Sir Hubert Gough 
  
 
Second Army – Sir Herbert Plumer 
  
    
              
 
XIV Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
Earl of Cavan 
  
 
XVIII Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
Sir I. Maxse 
  
 
II Anzac Corps 
 
Lieut.-General  
Sir W.R. Birdwood 
  
 
I Anzac Corps 
 
Lieut.-General  
Sir A.J. Godley 
  
 
X Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
Sir T. Morland 
  
 
IX Corps 
Lieut.-Gen. 
Sir A. 
Gordon 
  
            
                      
 
29th 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
Sir B.  
de Lisle 
  
 
4th 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
T.G. 
Matheson 
  
 
11th 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
H.R. 
Davis 
  
 
48th 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
R. 
Fanshawe 
  
 
NZ 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
Sir A.H. 
Russell 
  
 
3rd Aus. 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
Sir John 
Monash 
  
 
2nd Aus. 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
N.M. 
Smyth 
  
 
1st Aus. 
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. 
H.B. 
Walker 
 
7th 
Division 
 
M.-Gen 
T.H. 
Shou-
bridge 
 
21st 
Division 
 
M.-Gen 
D.G.M. 
Camp-
bell 
  
 
5th 
Division 
 
M.-Gen 
R.B. 
Stephens 
 
 
37th  
Division 
 
Maj-Gen. H. 
Bruce 
Williams 
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APPENDIX VII 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BROODSEINDE: DIVISIONAL ATTACK 
 
 
21st Division - Major-General D.G.M. Campbell 
  
  
    
 
62nd Brigade – Brigadier-General C.G. Rawling 
  
 
64th Brigade – Brigadier-General H.R. Headlam 
  
    
              
 
1st Objective 
  
 
2nd Objective 
  
 
Brigade Reserve 
  
 
1st Objective 
  
 
2nd Objective 
  
 
Bde Support  
  
 
Bde Reserve 
  
              
                
 
3/4 Queens 
 
 
  
 
1st Lincs. 
 
 Lt.-Col. 
Evans  
  
 
12/13 NF 
 
Lt.-Col. 
Dix  
  
 
10th Yorks 
 
Lt.-Col. Mathias 
 
 
9th KOYLI 
 
 
  
 
10th KOYLI 
 
 
  
 
1st East Yorks 
 
 
  
 
15th Durhams 
 
 
  
A B D D C C D  C D B C   
C B A B A  A B A D   
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APPENDIX VIII 
 
DUMPS  
 
 Main Div. Dump Advanced Div. Dump –  
CLAPHAM JUNCTION 
Right Brigade Dump Left Brigade Dump 
S.A.A. 400,000 500,000  150,000 150,000  
Mills Grenades No. 5 2,000 3,000  1,500 1,500  
Mills Rifle Grenades No. 23 500 1,000  750 750  
Rifle Grenades No. 24 500 500  750 750  
Rifle Grenades No. 22 500 500  750 750  
Stokes Ammunition 1,000 2,000  1,5000 1,5000  
** Grenades 300 300  200 200  
30.27 Smoke 150 150  100 100  
No. 28. K.J. 75 50  50 50  
Smoke Candles (Single type S) 1,500 1,5000  1,000 1,000  
S.O.S. Rifle Grenades 100 75  50 50  
Flares Red 3,000 2,000  1,000 1,000  
Daylight Mortar Signals (sets) - 15  10 10  
Very Lights 1” White 2,000 2,000  1,000 1,000  
Very Lights 1½” White 1,000 1,000  500 500  
Pistol Ammunition 2,000 2,000  1,000 1,000  
Petrol Tins 1,100 500  200 200  
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APPENDIX XI 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BEAUREVOIR LINE: GENERAL BRITISH ATTACK 
 
 
Third Army – General The Hon. Sir Julian Byng 
 
 
Fourth Army – General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Bt. 
      
          
 
VI Corps 
 
Lieut.-General  
Sir A. Haldane 
 
 
IV Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
G.M. Harper 
 
 
V Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
 C.D. Shute 
 
 
XIII Corps 
 
Lieut.-General 
Sir T. Morland 
 
 
IX Corps 
 
Lieut.-Gen. 
Sir W. 
Braithwaite 
 
          
                    
 
2nd Div. 
 
3rd  Div. 
 
NZ Div. 
 
37th  Div. 
 
21st Div. 
 
38th Div. 
 
50th Div. 
 
 
66th Div. 
 
25th Div. 
 
6th Div. 
Major-Gen. 
C.E. 
Pereira 
Major-Gen. 
C.J. 
Deverell 
Major-Gen. 
Sir A.H. 
Russell 
Major-Gen. 
H. Bruce-
Williams 
Major-Gen. 
D.G.M. 
Campbell 
Major-Gen. 
T.A. Cubitt 
Major-Gen. 
H.C. 
Jackson 
Major-Gen. 
H.K 
Bethell 
Major-Gen. 
J.R.E. 
Charles 
Major-Gen. 
T.O. 
Marden 
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APPENDIX X 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – MIRAUMONT: DIVISIONAL ATTACK  
 
 
21st Division - Major-General D.G.M. Campbell 
  
  
 
64th Brigade – Brigadier-General A.J. McCulloch 
  
    
     
 
Objective 
 
 
Brigade Reserve 
 
    
      
 
1st East Yorks (less A company) 
 
 
  
 
9th KOYLI (less one company) 
   
Lt.-Col Greenwood 
 
15th Durhams (plus detached companies) 
 
Lt.-Col. Holroyd-Smith 
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APPENDIX XII 
 
ORDER OF BATTLE – BEAUREVOIR LINE: DIVISIONAL ATTACK  
 
 
21st Division - Major-General D.G.M. Campbell 
  
  
      
 
1st Objective 
  
 
2nd Objective 
  
 
3rd Objective 
  
      
          
 
110th Brigade 
 
Br.-Gen. Cumming 
  
 
64th Brigade 
 
Br.-Gen. Edwards 
  
 
110th Brigade 
 
Br.-Gen. Cumming 
  
 
64th Brigade 
 
Br.-Gen. Edwards 
  
 
62nd Brigade 
 
Brigadier-General Gater 
  
          
                  
 
1st Wilts. 
 
9th 
KOYLI 
 
15th DLI 
 
6th Leics. 
 
7th Leics. 
 
1st East Yorks 
 
1st Lincs. 
 
12/13th N. 
Fusiliers 
 
2nd Lincs. 
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BIOGRAPHICAL INDEX 
 
Only Great War service is listed, and where subjects achieved high rank, their final Great War 
rank is listed. 
 
Acland-Troyte, Gilbert John (1876-19??) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. DAA & QMG VII Corps, 4 August 1914 – 
27 November 1915; AA and QMG, 21st Division, 28 November 1915 – Armistice. DSO; 
MiD seven times. Son of Colonel C.A.W. Troyte. 
 
Addison, G.H. (18??-19??) 
CRE, 21st Division, 16 January 1917- 19 July 1918. MiD four times. 
 
Alcock, J.H. (18??-19??) 
Lieutenant. Lincolnshire Regiment. 8th Battalion. Captured at Loos. Wrote a matter-of-fact 
account of the battle from a PoW camp in Germany – his list of casualties makes difficult 
reading. Released to the Netherlands as part of a prisoner exchange in April 1918. A 
Cambridge graduate, after the war he became a solicitor in Mansfield. In the Second World 
War he served as a Squadron Leader in the Legal Branch of the RAF. See Bibliography. 
 
Allenby, Edward Henry Hynman (1861-1936) 
Field Marshall. Dragoons. GOC Cavalry Division in the original BEF, 5 August 1914 – 
12 October 1914; GOC Third Army, 10 October 1914 – 7 May 1915; GOC V Corps, 8 May 
1915 – 23 October 1915; GOC Third Army, 23 October 1915 – 9 June 1917; C-in-C 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 10 June 1917 – Armistice. High Commissioner to Egypt, 
1919 – 1935. 1st Viscount of Megiddo and Felixstowe. Rector of Edinburgh University. 
Twice failed the entrance exam for the Indian Civil Service before entering Royal Military 
College, Sandhurst. Nicknamed ‘The Bull’, due to his irascible nature, although he later 
proved himself to be a talented diplomat. 
 
Below, Otto Ernst Vinzent Leo von  (1857-1944) 
German military commander. Served on the Eastern Front, in the Balkans, Italy and on the 
Western Front. Commanded the Austro-German Fourteenth Army that crushed the Italians at 
Caporetto in late autumn 1917. Later commanded the German Seventeenth Army on the 
Western Front, which was pursued by the British Third Army under Julian Byng during the 
Hundred Days campaign. After the war he was appointed head of XVII Army Corps at 
Danzig by the new Republican government, but he soon resigned in opposition to the 
government’s conciliatory policy to the new Polish state. Son of a Prussian General. 
 
Bent, Philip Eric (1893-1917) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Leicestershire Regiment. GOC 9th Battalion. Killed in action leading his 
battalion at Polygon Wood, 1 October 1917. Awarded the VC for bravery and inspiring 
leadership when he saw the right of his battalion, and the battalion on its right, being forced 
back east of Polygon Wood. He personally led forward all available reserves at hand, made a 
successful counter-attack and regained the position, which was of essential importance for 
subsequent operations. He was killed at the objective, after giving his orders for 
reconsolidation. Also DSO; MiD twice. A pre-war civilian, he returned from Canada in 1914 
to enlist. 
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Bruce-Williams, Hugh Bruce (1865-1942) 
Major-General. Royal Engineers. MGGS Second Army, 15 July 1915 – 5 June 1916; GOC 
137th Brigade, 5 June 1916 – 9 November 1916; GOC 37th Division, 9 November 1916 – 
Armistice. DSO. The ‘Bruce’ of his mother’s maiden name was added in 1920. 
 
Byng, Hon. Julian Hedworth George (1862-1935) 
General. Hussars. GOC Forces in Egypt at the outbreak of war. GOC 3rd Cavalry Division, 
29 September 1914 – 7 May 1915; GOC Cavalry Corps, 7 May 1915 – 16 August 1915; 
GOC IX Corps, 16 August 1915 – 8 February 1916; GOC XVII Corps, 27 February 1916 – 
25 May 1916; GOC Canadian Corps, 29 May 1916 – 8 June 1917; GOC Third Army, 9 June 
1917 – Armistice. Governor-General of Canada, August 1921 – August 1926. In 1928 he 
became Chief Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police and set about reforming 
Scotland Yard. Famous for his success at Cambrai and Vimy Ridge, which lead to his long 
association with the area and with the Canadians, whose forces largely undertook the battle. 
Son of the 2nd Earl of Stafford. 1st Viscount of Vimy. Nicknamed ‘Bungo’. 
 
Cameron, Archibald Rice (1870-1944) 
Brigadier-General. Black Watch. GSO2 Staff College, May – August 1914; GSO1 
5th Division, March – October 1915; BGGS X Corps, 21 October 1915 – 2 July 1918; BGGS 
(Additional) Fourth Army, July 1918 – Armistice. Before the war he was an Instructor at 
Sandhurst; he later became Governor of Edinburgh Castle, 1936-7. 
 
Campbell, David Graham Muschet (1869-1936) 
Major-General. Lancers. GOC 6th Cavalry Brigade, 9 November 1914 – 23 May 1916; GOC 
21st Division, 22 May 1916 – Armistice. MiD seven times. One of the longest-serving 
divisional generals, his command lasted for 903 days. Governor and Commander in Chief, 
Malta from 1931. Son of Major H. Wootton Campbell. Nicknamed ‘Soarer’. See 
Introduction, pp. 15-16. 
 
Clarke, Arthur Aubrey (18??-1917) 
Captain. Leicestershire Regiment. Wounded at Bazentin, 14 July 1916, where he was 
awarded the MC for gallant leadership. He was killed in action near Polygon Wood, 
1 October 1917. 
 
Coffin, Clifford (1870-1959) 
Major-General. Royal Engineers. CRE, 21st Division, 1 June 1915 – 9 January 1917; GOC 
25th Brigade, 11 January 1917 – 4 May 1918; GOC 36th Division, 6 May 1918 – Armistice. 
Won the VC at Westhoek, 31 July 1917; also DSO and bar; MiD four times. Son of 
Lieutenant-General Sir I.C. Coffin. 
 
Congreve, Walter Norris (1862-1927) 
Lieutenant-General. Rifle Brigade. GOC 18th Brigade, 5 August 1914 – 29 May 1915; GOC 
6th Division, 27 May 1915 – 14 November 1915; GOC XIII Corps, 15 November 1915 – 
17 June 1917; GOC VII Corps, 3 January 1918 – 13 April 1918. Wounded once; MiD five 
times. He was awarded the VC during ‘Operations in the Transvaal’, 1902. Son of Captain 
William Congreve, DL. Nicknamed ‘Squib’. 
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Cubitt, Thomas Astley (1871-1939) 
Major-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. Commander of troops in Somaliland, July 
1914 – January 1916; GOC 57th Brigade, 6 April 1917 – 24 May 1918; GOC 38th (Welsh) 
Division, 23 May 1918 - Armistice. Governor and Commander in Chief, Bermuda, 1931-36. 
DSO; MiD four times. Son of Major F. Astley Cubitt. 
 
Cumming, Hanway Robert Warren (1867-1921) 
Brigadier-General. Durham Light Infantry. GSO2 India, to May 1915; GSO1 31st Division, 
24 August 1915 – 2 April 1916; GSO1 48th Division, 2 April 1916 – 27 August 1916; GOC 
MGC Training Centre, August 1916 – February 1918; GOC 110th Brigade, 16 March 1918 – 
Armistice. DSO; MiD twice. Murdered by Sinn Fein in an ambush near Cloonbannin while 
he was Military Governor of Kerry, 5 March 1921. Author of A Brigadier in France. See 
Bibliography. 
 
Daniell, Francis Edward Lloyd (18??-1916) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Seaforth Highlanders. GSO1 21st Division, 16 August 1915 – 4 March 
1916 – killed when a shell hit divisional HQ, also wounding Claud Jacob. DSO; MiD twice. 
 
Dix, Stephen Hamilton (1878-1917) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Prince of Wales Leinster (Royal Canadian) Regiment, attached 
Northumberland Fusiliers. GOC 12/13th Battalion. Killed in action at Broodseinde, 4 October 
1917, along with all four company commanders. MC; MiD three times. 
 
Drysdale, William (1876-1916) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Lothian (Royal Scots) Regiment. GOC 7th Leicestershire Regiment. 
Wounded in the march to assembly positions at Bazentin, 14 July 1916, he was killed by a 
sniper during a preliminary tour of the new trench system, 29 September 1916, soon after his 
return to the battalion. At the outbreak of war he was a Brigade-Major, and rose to GSO2 in 
1915. DSO. 
 
Dunn, James Churchill (1871-1955) 
Medical Officer with 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Responsible for compiling the hugely-
influential The War the Infantry Knew 1914-1919. See Bibliography. DSO; MC; MiD three 
times. 
 
Edmonds, James Edward (1861-1956) 
British Official Historian. Also served with the Royal Engineers. GSO1 4th Division, 
5 August 1914 – 4 September 1914; Deputy Chief Engineer, GHQ. Author of the British 
Official History. Accused of having deliberately falsified the account so as to protect the 
reputations of senior commanders, but without his dedication the 16-volume series would 
never have been finished. Nicknamed ‘Archimedes’. See Bibliography.  
 
Edwards, Christopher Vaughan (1875-1955) 
Brigadier-General. Green Howards. GOC 2nd Green Howards; GOC 64th Brigade, 28 August 
1918 – Armistice. Wounded twice; DSO; MiD three times.  
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Evans, Lewis Pugh (1881-1962) 
Brigadier-General. Black Watch. GOC 14th Brigade, 10 June 1918 – Armistice. Commanded 
1st Lincolnshire Regiment (62nd Brigade) on 4 October 1917. Awarded the VC for gallant 
leadership through the enemy barrage and in the subsequent assault. Seeing casualties being 
caused by an enemy machine gun, he went forward himself and, firing his revolver through 
the loophole of the emplacement, forced the detachment to surrender. Though severely 
wounded, he continued to lead his battalion to the objective until, after its consolidation, he 
collapsed through loss of blood. Previously awarded DSO; MiD four times. Nephew of 
Lieutenant W.G. Cubitt, VC. 
 
Falkenhayn, Erich Georg Anton Sebastian von (1861-1922) 
German Chief of the General Staff, September 1914 – August 1916. Conqueror of Romania. 
Responsible for the ‘Race to the Sea’ in the first months of the war and the battle of attrition 
at Verdun in February 1916, in which he sought to ‘bleed the French Army white’. He was 
dismissed in late August after failing to break the French, and later served in the East and in 
Palestine, ending the war as an Army commander in Lithuania. The son of a moneyless 
Junker estate owner, though the family was of ancient nobility, Falkenhayn seemed the epitome 
of a Prussian Staff officer: tall, slender and aloof, conjuring up visions of precision, exactness 
and action.  
 
Fergusson, Sir Charles Bt. (1865-1951) 
Lieutenant-General. Grenadier Guards. GOC 5th Division, 5 August 1914 – 18 October 
1914; GOC 9th Division, 26 October 1914 – 31 December 1914; GOC II Corps, 1 January 
1915 – 28 May 1916; GOC XVII Corps, 25 May 1916 - Armistice. Military Governor of 
Cologne, December 1918 – August 1919. Later Governor-General New Zealand, 1924 – 
1930 and Grandmaster of New Zealand Freemasons. Also Lord-Lieutenant Ayrshire, 1937 – 
1950. Fergusson was the longest-serving Corps commander of the war, serving 1414 days as 
a Lieutenant-General. 
 
Forestier-Walker, George Townshend (1866-1939) 
Major-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. BGGS II Corps, 5 August 1914 – 1 January 
1915; MGGS Second Army, 26 December 1914 – 23 February 1915; GOC 21st Division, 
11 April 1915 – 18 November 1915. Scapegoated and sent home after 21st Division’s 
difficulties at Loos were attributed to him. Later commanded 63rd (Naval) Division. MiD six 
times. Nicknamed ‘Hooky’. 
 
Franklyn, Harold Edmund (1885-19??) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Green Howards. GSO1 21st Division, 17 October 1917 – Armistice. 
Wounded once; DSO; MC; MiD five times. Son of Lieutenant-General Sir William Edmund 
Franklyn. 
 
French, Sir John Denton Pinkstone (1852-1925) 
Field Marshall. Hussars. Commander in Chief in the original BEF in France, 5 August 1914 
– 19 December 1915. Resigned after his misdeployment of the reserves at Loos, although 
history remembers him as a scapegoat. Later 1st Earl of Ypres. A hot-tempered and 
argumentative man, French tended to bear grudges and had an extremely volatile character. 
A keen military historian, he was a great admirer of Napoleon. 
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Gater, George Henry (1886-1963) 
Brigadier-General. Sherwood Foresters. GOC 9th Sherwood Foresters, 18 October 1915 - 
February 1916;  GOC 6th Lincolnshire, 15 August 1916 - ??; GOC 6th Lincolnshire; GOC 
62nd Brigade, 1 November 1917 – Armistice. Served in Gallipoli with 9th Sherwoods. DSO 
and bar; MiD four times. In civilian life he was a distinguished civil servant and educational 
administrator, as Assistant Director of Education for Nottinghamshire.  
 
Gough, Sir Hubert de la Poer (1870-1963) 
General. Lancers. GOC 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 5 August 1914 – 16 September 1914; GOC 
2nd Cavalry Division, 16 September 1914 – 19 April 1915; GOC 7th Division, 19 April 1915 
– 14 July 1915; GOC I Corps, 13 July 1915 – 1 April 1916; GOC Reserve Corps, 4 April 
1916 – 22 May 1916; GOC Fifth Army, 22 May 1916 – 28 March 1918. Dismissed as a 
scapegoat during the Spring Offensive although his command in this period was far better 
than during the (Third) Ypres campaign of 1917. His character was marked by impetuosity, 
arrogance and conceit, remarking in his memoirs that he was the youngest cadet at 
Sandhurst, and thenceforth at each subsequent appointment. Both he and his Army were 
widely unpopular amongst the troops. Son of General Sir C.J.S. Gough, VC. Nicknamed 
‘Goughie’. 
 
Haig, Sir Douglas (1861-1928) 
Field-Marshall. Lancers. GOC I Corps, 5 August 1914 – 26 December 1914; GOC First 
Army, 26 December 1914 – 22 December 1915; Commander in Chief BEF in France, 
22 December 1915 – Armistice. Commander in Chief of the Forces in Great Britain, 
1919-20. Later became Rector and Chancellor of St Andrew’s University. 1st Earl Haig of 
Bemersyde. Through the Earl Haig Fund he devoted the last years of his life to the cause of 
those who had fought in the Great War. Although a highly-efficient soldier, careful and 
resolute, Haig was noticeably taciturn and not above intrigue and back-stabbing. His Great 
War diaries clearly demonstrate the extent to which he felt the burden of the war, yet he 
remains one of the most reviled and controversial figures in British military history. 
 
Harper, George Montague (1865-1922) 
Major-General. Royal Engineers. BGGS GHQ, 7 November 1914 – 20 February 1915; GOC 
17th Brigade, 11 February 1915 – 24 September 1915; GOC 51st (Highland) Division, 
24 September 1915 – 11 March 1918; GOC IV Corps, 11 March 1918 - Armistice. DSO; 
MiD six times. Nicknamed ‘Uncle Harper’. Close friend and protegé of Sir Henry Wilson 
(CIGS, 1918), but made two unwise enemies, the historians J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell-
Hart, who have ever since blighted his reputation. Despite this, recent research has proved 
him to have been an outstanding commander, particularly towards the end of the war. 
 
Headlam, Hugh Roger (1877-1955) 
Brigadier-General. York and Lancasters. Brigade Major, 16th Brigade; GOC 64th Brigade, 
13 June 1916 – 28 July 1918. Inspector of Infantry in late 1918. DSO; MiD seven times. Pre-
war service in South Africa, India and Ireland; post-war he served in India and the Middle 
East.  
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Hessey, William Francis (1868-1939) 
Brigadier-General. Royal Iniskilling Fusiliers. GOC 11th Battalion; GOC 110th Brigade, 
9 June 1916 – 20 June 1917; GOC 109th Brigade, 23 June 1917 – Armistice. DSO and bar; 
MiD five times. Retired Staff Officer at outbreak of war. 
Hindenburg, Paul Ludwig Hans von Beneckendorf und von (1847-1934) 
German military commander and hero of the Eastern Front, having been dug out of 
retirement in August 1914 at the age of sixty-seven. Sent to the Western Front to succeed 
Falkenhayn in German Supreme Command in August 1916, where he formed a formidable 
partnership with Ludendorff. Phlegmatic and composed, surrounded by an aura of 
imperturbable calm, Hindenburg provided an anchor to his more volatile colleague. 
Instrumental in launching the Spring Offensive, which eventually brought Germany to ruin. 
However, this did not critically damage his reputation at home, and he became German 
President, 1925 – 1934. His death allowed Hitler’s assumption of power. 
 
Holroyd-Smyth, Charles Edward Ridley (18??-1918) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Dragoon Guards, also attached to Durham Light Infantry. Acting GOC 
64th Brigade after McCulloch was wounded, 24–28 August 1918. Died of wounds received 
near Epéhy, 23 September 1918. DSO; MC; MiD four times. 
 
Horne, Henry Sinclair (1861-1929) 
Lieutenant-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. CRA I Corps, 5 August 1914 – 
1 January 1915; GOC 2nd Division, 1 January 1915 – 5 November 1915; GOC XV Corps, 
12 January 1916 – 29 September 1916; GOC First Army, 30 September 1916 – Armistice. 
MiD eight times. The ‘unknown’ general, Horne kept no diary, has no biographer, and only a 
few letters to his wife remain, but he was a dedicated, skilful and respected soldier. Son of 
Major James Horne. 
 
Hutton, Edward Thomas Henry (1848-1923) 
Lieutenant-General. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. GOC 21st Division, 16 September 1914 – 
11 April 1915. An elderly Regular, he was a retired Lieutenant-General at the outbreak of 
war, and was forced back into retirement in 1915 due to ill-health. Nicknamed ‘Curly’. 
 
Jackson, Henry Chomondeley (1879-1972) 
Major-General. Bedfordshire Regiment. GSO3 War Office; GOC 175th Brigade; GOC 
50th (Northumbrian) Division, 23 March 1918 – Armistice. Wounded once; DSO; MiD eight 
times. Son of a Professor, and son-in-law to General Lord William Seymour. Nicknamed 
‘Jacko’. 
 
Jacob, Sir Claud William (1863-1948) 
Lieutenant-General. Worcestershire Regiment. GOC 19th Derha Dhu Brigade, 5 January 
1915 – 7 September 1915; GOC 7th Merrut Division, 7 September 1915 – 17 November 
1915; GOC 21st Division, 18 November 1915  – 22 May 1916; GOC II Corps, 28 May 1916 
– Armistice. Transferred from pre-war service with the Indian Army to serve on the Western 
Front. MiD nine times. 
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Kelly, David V. (18??-19??) 
Lieutenant. Leicestershire Regiment. Later became Intelligence Officer, 110th Brigade. MC. 
After the war he became a distinguished diplomat, culminating with the rank of Ambassador 
to the Soviet Union in the 1940s. Author of 39 Months with ‘The Tigers’ – the 110th Infantry 
Brigade. See Bibliography. 
 
Kitchener, Lord Herbert Horatio (1850-1916) 
Field Marshall. Secretary of State for War, 1914-16. Responsible for the raising of the New 
Armies and immortalised in his recruitment poster. Possessed of a driving ambition, which 
proved advantageous to his army career, Kitchener was also, rather peculiarly, devoted to a 
small poodle. Drowned when HMS Hampshire struck a mine off the Orkneys on a 
diplomatic mission to Russia, 6 June 1916. 1st Earl of Khartoum and Broome. 
 
Kühl, Hermann Joseph von (1856-1958) 
German Staff Officer and military historian. Chief of Staff of Crown Prince Rupprecht’s 
Army Group and played a leading role in the operational planning of the Spring Offensive. 
His post-war writings include a two-volume history of the war, Der Weltkrieg (1930), plus 
works on the ‘Miracle of the Marne’ and on the planning of the 1918 campaign. 
 
Liddell Hart, Basil Henry (1895-1970) 
British military historian. Served briefly with 10th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, but 
was gassed and invalided from the Somme. After the war he became one of its foremost 
military historians, and although an initial supporter of the British prosecution of the war, 
became increasingly critical of British generalship. From 1937 he advised the UK War 
Office on army reorganisation. 
 
Lisle, Alexander Charles Nicholas March-Phillipps de (18??-19??) 
Lieutenant. Leicestershire Regiment. Second-Lieutenant with 9th Battalion during the attack 
on Bazentin, 14 July 1916, and wrote a vivid account of his battalion’s actions. Son of an 
MP. See Bibliography. 
 
Lisle, Henry de Beauvoir de (1864-1955) 
Lieutenant-General. Durham Light Infantry. GOC 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 5 August 1914 – 
12 October 1914; GOC 1st Cavalry Division, 12 October 1914 – 27 May 1915; GOC 
29th Division, 4 June 1915 – 12 March 1918; GOC XIII Corps, 13 March 1918 – 12 April 
1918; GOC XV Corps, 12 April 1918 – Armistice. DSO; MiD eight times. 
 
Lloyd-George, David (1863-1945)  
British politician, and the only minister to serve in government throughout the war. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-15; Minster of Munitions, 1915-1916; Secretary of State 
for War, 1916; Prime Minister, 1916-22. The ‘Welsh Wizard’ was a brilliant speaker and an 
extremely shrewd politician, although his campaign against the generals, particularly Haig, 
revealed him to be hypocritical, self-serving and vindictive. 1st Earl Lloyd-George of 
Dwyfor. 
 
Loch, Lord Edward Douglas (1873-1942) 
Brigadier-General. Grenadier Guards. BGGS, VI Corps; GOC 110th Brigade, 22 August 
1917 – 4 January 1918. DSO; MiD five times. Chairman of the Greyhound Racing Trust. 
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Lossberg, Friedrich Karl von (1868-1934) 
German Staff Officer, responsible for the defence theory of ‘elastic defence in depth’, which 
became the official doctrine of the German army by the end of 1916. It was used against the 
British during the (Third) Ypres campaign at an increasing cost to the British Second Army. 
Lossberg was also responsible for the ‘retreat to the Hindenburg Line’, one of the most 
remarkable operational achievements of the war that shortened the German line on the 
Western Front and allowed them to maintain a two-front war throughout 1917. His 
reputation as a defensive tactician earned him the nickname of ‘the fireman of the Western 
Front’. 
 
Ludendorff, Erich von (1865-1937) 
German military commander and military technocrat. Chief of Staff on both Eastern and 
Western Fronts. A brilliant military technician - his swift rise through the Prussian ranks was 
due to his clear ability in a number of staff appointments - but he lacked political judgement. He 
was also extremely temperamental and had a tendency to panic in times of crisis. His Spring 
Offensive of 1918 brought Germany to ruin. Later propagated the ‘stab in the back’ myth, 
according to which the German military was about to win the war in 1918 when the politicians 
betrayed the generals and surrendered to the Allies. 
 
Lukin, Henry Timson (1860-1925) 
Major-General. Cape Mounted Infantry (SA). GOC South African Brigade, 11 August 1915 
– 2 December 1916; GOC 9th (Scottish) Division, 2 December 1916 – 4 March 1918. Under 
his command 9th Division is generally regarded as having been the best division in the BEF; 
it was unquestionably the most tactically innovative. Nicknamed ‘Tim’. 
 
Martyn, M.C. (18??-19??) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment, also attached to 
Leicestershire Regiment. GOC 6th Battalion. Taken PoW, 25 August 1918, near the Butte de 
Warlencourt. DSO; MiD twice. 
 
Master, George (1882-19??) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Royal Engineers. CRE 21st Division, 19 July 1918 – Armistice. DSO; 
MiD three times. 
 
Maxse, (Frederick) Ivor (1862-1958) 
Lieutenant-General. Royal Fusiliers. GOC 1st Guards Brigade, 5 August 1914 – 
26 September 1914; GOC 18th Division, 2 October 1914 – 15 January 1917;  GOC 
XVIII Corps, 15 January 1917 – 22 June 1918; Inspector-General of Training, BEF, 3 July 
1918 – Armistice. DSO; MiD five times. Talkative and bursting with energy, Maxse was 
reputed to have been the best trainer of troops during the war, although he always regarded 
his last post as a demotion. Son of an admiral. 
 
McCulloch, Andrew Jameson (1876-19??) 
Brigadier-General. Highland Light Infantry. GOC 64th Brigade, 28 July 1918 – 24 August 
1918. Wounded whilst leading his brigade towards Miraumont. Previously commanded 
9th KOYLI. DSO and bar; MiD three times. Son of a judge and was himself a barrister-at-law 
after studying at St Andrews University and New College, Oxford.  
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McKinnon, T. (18??-19??) 
Lewis Gun Officer. Northumberland Fusiliers. Forced to command 12/13th Battalion on 
4 October 1917 when all other officers senior to him had become casualties. 
 
Mignon, Jephson George (1869-1916) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Leicestershire Regiment. GOC 8th Battalion. Captain in the Reserve of 
Officers at the outbreak of war, having previously served as a staff officer in the Boer War. 
Killed in action  at Bazentin, 14 July 1916. 
 
Morland, Thomas Napier Lethbridge (1865-1925) 
Lieutenant-General. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. GOC 5th Division, 18 October 1914 – 15 July 
1915; GOC X Corps, 15 July 1915 – 15 April 1918; GOC XIII Corps, 12 April 1918 – 
Armistice. Commander-in-Chief of the Rhine Army until March 1922. DSO; MiD seven 
times.  
 
Newcombe, Henry William (1875-1963) 
Major-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. BGRA 21st Division, 13 May 1917 – 
30 October 1918. Wounded twice; DSO; MiD seven times. Also served at School of 
Artillery, Larkhill during the war and later in India. 
 
Paley, A.T. (18??-19??) 
Lieutenant-Colonel. GSO1 21st Division, 7 March 1916 – 17 October 1917. DSO; MiD six 
times. 
 
Plumer, Sir Herbert Charles Onslow (1857-1932) 
General. York and Lancaster. GOC V Corps, 8 January 1915 – 8 May 1915; GOC Second 
Army, 8 May 1915 – 9 November 1917 & 13 March 1918 – Armistice. Commander-in-Chief 
in Italy in the interim. Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Malta, 1919-24; High 
Commissioner to Palestine, 1925-28. 1st Viscount of Messines. Plumer’s rather bemused 
expression and impressive walrus moustache masked a steely core – he was a strict 
disciplinarian, although he was loved and respected by all that served with or under him. 
Everyone’s favourite Great War general. Nicknamed ‘Plum’. 
 
Powell, Edward Weyland Martin (1869-1954) 
Brigadier-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. BGRA 3rd Division, 8 February 1916 – 
24 July 1916; BGRA II Anzac Corps, 24 July 1916 – 31 December 1917; BGRA 
XXII Corps, 31 December 1917 – Armistice. DSO; MiD four times. Son of Colonel W. 
Martin Powell. Retired 2 July 1910 to Reserve of Officers but reinstated to active service at 
the outbreak of war. 
 
Rawling, Cecil Godfrey (1870-1917) 
Brigadier-General. Somerset Light Infantry. GOC 62nd Brigade, 13 June 1916 – 28 October 
1917. Killed in action at the Second Battle of Passchendaele, 28 October 1917. DSO; MiD 
twice. A New Army Brigadier, in pre-war life he had surveyed Western Tibet and written 
many geographical works.  
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Rawlinson, Sir Henry Seymour, Bt. (1864-1925) 
General. King’s Royal Rifle Corps. GOC 4th Division, 23 September 1914 – 4 October 1914; 
GOC IV Corps, 5 October 1914 – 22 December 1915; GOC First Army, 22 December 1915 
– 4 February 1916; GOC Fourth Army, 5 February 1916 - Armistice. Commanded Second 
Army for ten days in November 1917. Rawlinson possessed a strong streak of independence 
and was a man of definitive views, although he lacked the ability to stand up to Haig. This 
was an increasing problem during the 1916 Somme campaign, of which Rawlinson was the 
principal progenitor. 1st Baron of Trent. Son of Major-General Sir H.C. Rawlinson. 
Nicknamed Rawly, although he was also widely known as ‘The Cad’ or ‘The Fox’, both of 
which referred to the considerable mistrust which he evoked. Died in Delhi, March 1925, 
after a hard game of polo and making 21 runs at cricket.  
 
Riddell, Gilbert B. (18??-19??) 
Captain. Northumberland Fusiliers. Wounded at Broodseinde, 4 October 1917. MC. Later 
became a maths teacher and an extremely active advocate of the Officer Training Corps. 
 
Robertson, Clement (18??-1917) 
Captain. Queen’s (Royal West Surrey) Regiment, also attached at Tank Corps. Awarded the 
VC for outstanding valour for leading his tanks in attack under heavy fire. He guided them 
on foot across most difficult ground to their objective, and thereby ensured their successful 
action. He was killed shortly after the objective had been reached, 4 October 1917. 
 
Rowlands, D.L. (18??-19??) 
Durham Light Infantry. NCO with 15th Battalion. His letter of January 1918 describes the 
battalion’s experience at Broodseinde. MM. Later served in the Second World War with the 
Royal Ulster Rifles. See Bibliography.  
 
Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria (1869-1955) 
German military commander. An able and intelligent soldier, he was also sensitive to the 
suffering and exhaustion of his troops, as well as the plight of those at home. 
 
Shoubridge, (Thomas) Herbert (1871-1933) 
Major-General. Dorset Regiment. GSO1 18th Division; GOC 54th Brigade, 23 January 1916 
– 6 April 1917; GOC 7th Division, 1 April 1917 – Armistice. DSO; MiD five times. 
 
Shute, Cameron Deane (1866-1936) 
Lieutenant-General. Welsh Regiment. GOC 59th Brigade; GOC 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, 
17 October 1916 – 19 February 1917; GOC 32nd Division, 19 February 1917 – 27 April 
1918; GOC V Corps, 27 April 1918 – Armistice. MiD  seven times. Lieutenant of the Tower 
of London, 1926-27. Nicknamed ‘Tiger’. 
 
Spicer, Lancelot Dykes (1893-1979) 
Captain. Yorkshire Light Infantry. Second-Lieutenant with 9th Battalion. Adjutant, 
10th KOYLI, 10 July 1917 – 17 February 1918; Brigade Major, 64th Brigade, 18 February 
1918 - Armistice. DSO, MC and bar; MiD twice. Son of the Hon. Sir A. Spicer Bt. Author of 
Letters from France, 1915-1918 (Robert York, London, 1979).  
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Stafford, Ben W. (18??-19??) 
Leicestershire Regiment. CSM, 8th Battalion. His letter to the wounded Captain Ward makes 
for uncomfortable reading. See Appendix IV, pp. 159-60. 
 
Stephens, Reginald Byng (1869-1955) 
Lieutenant-General. Rifle Brigade. GOC 25th Brigade; GOC 5th Division, 1 April 1916 – 
4 July 1918; GOC X Corps, 3 July 1918 – Armistice. MiD  seven times. Commanded at 
every level from battalion to corps. Nicknamed ‘Stiff’un’.  
 
Tudor, (Henry) Hugh (1871-1966) 
Major-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. BGRA 9th Division, 1 February 1916 – 
6 September 1917; BGRA Cavalry Corps, 6 September 1917 – 28 March 1918; GOC 
9th Division, 28 March 1918 – Armistice. MiD seven times.  
 
Wakeford, Edward Kingsley (18??-1917) 
Leicestershire Regiment. Second-Lieutenant with 7th Battalion during assault on Bazentin-le-
Petit on 14 July 1916. He was killed in action exactly a year later. 
 
Wanless O’Gowan, Robert (1864-1947) 
Major-General. Cameronians. GOC 13th Brigade; GOC 31st Division, 24 August 1915 – 
21 March 1918. MiD six times. 
 
Ward, F. (18??-19??) 
Captain. Leicestershire Regiment. GOC D Company, 8th Battalion. Wounded at Bazentin, 
14 July 1916. 
 
Watts, Herbert Edward (1858-1934) 
Lieutenant-General. Lancashire Fusiliers. GOC 21st Brigade, 31 August 1914 – 
27 September 1915; GOC 7th Division, 26 September 1915 – 7 January 1917; GOC 
XIX Corps, 4 February 1917 – Armistice. MiD seven times. Nicknamed ‘Teeny’, for reasons 
unspecified. Son of the Reverend R.L.R. Watts, late vicar of Wisbech. 
 
Wellesley, Richard Ashmore Colley (1868-1939) 
Brigadier-General. Royal Horse and Field Artillery. BGRA 21st Division, 6 October 1915 – 
12 May 1917; BGRA XIII Corps, 13 May 1917 – Armistice. MiD six times. Assistant 
District Commissioner for the Boy Scouts; one of the Governors of the Star and Garter 
Home for wounded ex-soldiers. 
 
Yeo, Harold E. (18??-19??) 
Major. Yorkshire Light Infantry. Staff Captain, 64th Brigade. His extensive collection of 
letters, nearly 300 written to his parents, offers a detailed and descriptive insight into his 
duties with the battalion and of battle experience. MC; MiD twice. Also awarded the MBE. 
During the Second World War he was an Embarkation Commandant in Glasgow. See 
Bibliography.  
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